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Abstract 
Behavioural scientists argue that ‘social learning’ provides the link between biological 
phenomena and cultural phenomena because of its role in the ‘cultural transmission’ of 
knowledge among individuals within and across generations. However, leading authors 
within the social sciences have proposed alternative ways of thinking about social life not 
founded on the Modern oppositions including nature-culture, biology-culture, body-
mind, and individual-society. Similarly, the distinction between a domain of nature and a 
domain of nurture has also been extensively criticized within biology. Finally, advocates 
of ‘radical embodied cognitive science’ offer an alternative to the representational-
computational view of the mind which supports the conventional notion of culture and 
cultural information. This thesis attempts to integrate developmental systems theory, 
radical embodied cognitive science, and relational thinking, with the goal to bring the 
field of social learning closer to these critical theoretical developments. In Chapter 2, I 
find no justification for the claim that the genome carries information in the sense of 
specification of biological form. Chapter 3 presents a view of ontogeny as a historical, 
relational, constructive and contingent process. Chapter 4 uses the notions of 
environmental information, abilities, affordances, and intentions to make sense of 
behaviour and learning. In Chapter 5, I argue that the notion of social learning can be 
understood in terms of relational histories of development rather than in terms of 
transmission of information. I then report empirical studies investigating behavioural 
coordination and social learning consistent with this theoretical framework. Chapter 6 
presents evidence that dyads in a joint making activity synchronize their attention 
constrained by their changing situation and that coordination of attention is predictive of 
implicit and explicit learning. Chapter 7 presents evidence that joint attention does not 
require gaze following and that attentional coordination is predictive of learning a manual 
task. Together, these theoretical and empirical studies suggest a new way of thinking 
about how humans and other animals live and learn socially, one that is consistent with 
critical theoretical and philosophical developments that are currently neglected in the 
literature on social learning. 
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Chapter 1 General Introduction 
1.1 The idea of a (dis)continuity between nature and culture 
One of the epistemological foundations of Modernity (roughly, the historical period after 
the Middle Ages) has been the belief that the human condition corresponds to a radical 
separation from the rest of nature, often described as due to culture or society (Descola & 
Pálsson, 1996; Latour, 1993). The term ‘culture’ itself has been used within the social 
sciences in a variety of different contexts and there is no consensual definition (see, for 
example, Geertz, 1973; Ingold, 2000, 2011a; Kroeber, 1917; Kroeber & Kluckhohn, 
1952; Lévi-Strauss, 1966; Tylor, 1871). Nevertheless, it had generally been uncontentious 
that, whatever it is that makes humans unique, we could say that it belonged to the cultural 
domain. This is reflected in the historical separation between the natural and social 
sciences. 
However, the idea of a sharp distinction between a domain of nature and a domain 
of culture has been under criticism in many disciplines. Take the example from paleo-
anthropology. A long-standing, influential hypothesis, called “the human creative 
revolution” model, suggests that symbolic language – and, with it, culture – emerged 
abruptly in the hominin lineage around 50 thousand years ago (Klein, 2009). There was 
indeed rich and solid empirical evidence from European excavation sites, as well as cave 
paintings, supporting this model. Invoking the sudden appearance of the domain of 
culture as the result of a ‘creative revolution’ supports and is supported by a worldview 
that sets humans apart from other animals. Recent paleoanthropological evidence, 
however, especially from African Middle Stone Age study sites, suggest that such an 
abrupt passage from a ‘state of nature’ to a ‘state of culture’ has never occurred (d'Errico 
& Stringer, 2011; McBrearty & Brooks, 2000). 
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The idea of culture as a domain related to, but ultimately distinct from, the 
biological process that is the living body acting in the world, has also been under criticism 
within anthropology. Ethnographers describing the immense variation in human ways of 
living have accumulated accounts for over a century which collectively indicate that 
thinking in terms of a nature-culture or nature-society opposition is neither a human 
universal nor a logical imperative, but rather a historical peculiarity within our own, so-
called Western, European, Modern tradition (Descola & Pálsson, 1996). French 
anthropologist Claude Lévi-Strauss, the founder of Structural Anthropology, argued that 
the separation between nature and culture had had “the force almost of dogma” (Lévi-
Strauss, 1992, p. 28) within the discipline. Throughout his work, he argued that culture 
should be taken as a heuristic tool and a relational concept – i.e., one that does not point 
to some concrete thing but to a differential relation between two ethnographic groups. In 
his words (Lévi-Strauss, 1963, p. 295): 
What is called a ‘culture’ is a fragment of humanity which, from 
the point of view of the research at hand and of the scale on which 
the latter is carried out, presents significant discontinuities in 
relation to the rest of humanity. [. . .] Accordingly, the same set 
of individuals may be considered to be parts of many different 
cultural contexts: universal, continental, national, regional, local, 
etc., as well as familial, occupational, religious, political, etc. 
While the notion of culture still thrives in parts of contemporary anthropology, an 
increasing number of influential authors have taken a more radical step. What they have 
in common is a dissatisfaction with accepting a set of Modern distinctions as a reasonable 
starting point for their studies – including between nature-culture, nature-society, 
biology-culture, body-mind, individual-society (Descola & Pálsson, 1996; Ingold, 2000, 
2011a; Ingold & Pálsson, 2013; Latour, 1993; Toren, 2012). These distinctions have been 
taken for granted in the history of anthropology until recently (and indeed still prevail in 
most disciplines as well as in common parlance), but now these authors argue for the need 
to find theoretical alternatives that are not sustained by them. The Modern notion of 
culture rests on a view of the mind as separate from the world which it must ‘represent’ 
in order to perceive it, think about it, and act upon it. Thus, authors critical of the nature-
culture or biology-culture divide, such as the influential anthropologists Tim Ingold and 
Christina Toren, align themselves against the representational-computational approach in 
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the cognitive sciences. In both authors’ work, the life of humans, and indeed of all living 
beings, is seen as a historical, relational process in which form is continually generated 
and transformed rather than being encoded (as genetic or cultural information) and 
expressed (in development or behaviour). 
Among others, Tim Ingold has repeatedly, carefully, and passionately, argued that 
“it makes no sense to speak of ‘culture’ as an independent body of context-free 
knowledge” (Ingold, 2000, p. 37) or “as an internalised system of rules and meanings as 
distinct from manifest behaviour patterns and their artefactual products” (p. 159, his 
emphasis). Instead of taking the idea of a mind (or the individual) separated from the 
world as our point of departure, as implicit in many notions of culture related to the 
representational view of the mind, he argues we should take “the human condition to be 
that of a being immersed from the start, like other creatures, in an active, practical and 
perceptual engagement with constituents of the dwelt-in world” (Ingold, 2000, p. 43). 
Thus, human so-called ‘cultural’ behavioural variation should be understood, not in terms 
of representations being transmitted between people but as variation in the skills 
embodied in the process of development of each human organism engaged with his 
environment. Ingold (2000) acknowledges that his view was profoundly influenced by 
the work of philosopher of biology Susan Oyama on developmental systems theory as 
well as James Gibson’s ecological approach to visual perception. 
Similarly, in her studies of child development and other topics, anthropologist 
Christina Toren (2008, 2012), makes no reference to culture or mental representations. 
These terms, along with the associated distinctions including biology-culture and body-
mind, do not play the epistemic role of starting points. Instead, her starting point is the 
idea of social living, including learning, as a micro-historical process. Mind is not 
conceived of as a function of the brain “but of the whole human being in intersubjective 
relations with others in the environing world” (Toren, 2012). Toren (2012) acknowledges 
the influence in her approach of the autopoietic theory of Maturana and Varela (1980), 
the developmental work of Piaget, and phenomenology.  
The notion of a sharp distinction between humans and nonhuman animals in terms 
of culture has also been under criticism within the natural sciences. Raised in the general 
atmosphere of Buddhism, biologist Kinji Imanishi, the founder of Japanese primatology, 
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did not believe in a radical separation between humans and other living things, and argued 
that other animals might exhibit something like culture. To refer to this possibility, he 
coined a neologism based on the sound of the English word: “kaluchua” (Nakamura & 
Nishida, 2006). Imanishi (2002) emphasized the unity and harmony of nature (humans 
included), the integrated and inseparable system formed by organism and its environment, 
and the need to recognize the simultaneous existence of similarities and differences 
among things. With this conviction, he appropriated and adapted methods originally from 
the social sciences, including identification of individuals and long-term observations of 
their behaviour and social relations, and applied them to the study of wild horses in 
Mongolia and, more famously, Japanese monkeys (Macaca fuscata) on the Koshima 
Island and chimpanzee in Africa. 
Starting in the sixties with Imanishi, Jane Goodall and others, field studies in Africa 
revealed that chimpanzees live in social units (or communities) and establish lifelong 
social relationships (Nishida, 1968); use various tools (Goodall, 1964), including 
hammers to open hard nuts (Boesch & Boesch, 1981, 1984); hunt cooperatively or 
collectively (Boesch & Boesch, 1989); and might even actively teach in some 
circumstances (Boesch, 1991). It became clear that the behaviour of the chimpanzee, our 
most closely related species, was much more complex, diverse, and humanlike – or, 
conversely, that human behaviour was much more apelike – than ever realized. Following 
his ground-breaking research on the variability of chimpanzee behaviour across study 
sites, William McGrew argued throughout his career that the term ‘culture’ should apply 
to chimpanzees as well (McGrew, 1992, 2004; McGrew & Tutin, 1978; Whiten et al., 
1999). I have looked at the history of attribution of culture to nonhuman animals and the 
tensions with anthropology in my masters dissertation (Pagnotta, 2014). 
Regardless of the controversies involving the term and ignoring decades of critical 
debate within the social sciences (Descola & Pálsson, 1996; Ingold & Pálsson, 2013; 
Latour, 1993), behavioural scientists appropriated the conventional, Modern 
anthropological notion of culture (such as summarized in Kroeber & Kluckhohn, 1952) 
and redefined it to avoid any explicit reference to humans, language or symbol use. In 
one influential paper, Whiten et al. (1999) say that “a cultural behaviour is one that is 
transmitted repeatedly through social or observational learning to become a population-
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level characteristic”. Thus redefined, the term could now be used more inclusively such 
that not only humans, but other species too, could be said to have culture. After decades 
of research on an increasing list of taxa, there is particularly good evidence of the 
phenomena described in such terms in chimpanzees (Hobaiter, Poisot, Zuberbuhler, 
Hoppitt, & Gruber, 2014; McGrew, 1992; Whiten et al., 1999), bonobos (Hohmann & 
Fruth, 2003), orangutans (van Schaik et al., 2003), whales and dolphins (Allen, Weinrich, 
Hoppitt, & Rendell, 2013; Whitehead & Rendell, 2015), birds (Aplin et al., 2015; 
Slagsvold & Wiebe, 2007), and fishes (Helfman & Schultz, 1984; Warner, 1988). 
The idea that culture is not restricted to humans is one step away from the Modern 
view. However, the step consists mainly in arguing that humans are not the only animals 
to be both biological and cultural beings. There is a common argument in this literature 
(e.g., McGrew & Tutin, 1978; Whiten et al., 1999) that goes as follows: (1) 
anthropologists cannot agree on a definition of culture; (2) therefore, biologists are 
justified in providing their own definition; (3) with culture thus redefined, it is a concept 
that applies to nonhuman animals; (4) with this terminological issue settled, we can get 
on with the study of interest. This argument suggests that the use of the term ‘culture’ in 
relation to nonhuman animals never intended to question the Modern opposition between 
two domains (nature-culture) or the related oppositions as a reasonable premise. This was 
probably the case because behavioural scientists were focusing on the observations 
accumulating from their empirical work on animal behaviour in the field and in the lab 
more than on the critical discussion going on in the social sciences about the constitution 
of Modernity (Latour, 1993) and the establishment of the Modern Sciences (Stengers, 
2000). 
I find the observations described in the literature on animal learning fascinating. 
However, instead of assuming as a starting point an inclusive definition of culture and 
then focusing on the mechanisms responsible for the transmission of cultural information, 
this project attempts a more radical step. I want to avoid the nature-culture distinction 
altogether, along with the associated set of problematic distinctions nature-society, 
individual-society, body-environment, nature-nurture, gene-environment, innate-
acquired, biology-culture, and body-mind. My intention in attempting this is to bring 
studies of ‘social learning’ in humans and other animals conceptually closer to the 
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contemporary anthropological criticism to the Modern oppositions (Descola & Pálsson, 
1996; Ingold, 2000, 2011a, 2013; Ingold & Pálsson, 2013; Toren, 2012). Thus, the aim 
of this project is not simply to avoid sensitive terms but to begin the exploration of a new 
way of thinking about the phenomena of interest. 
1.2 Social learning as ‘transmission of information’ 
The notion of ‘social learning’ is central to this debate because it is considered to provide 
a conceptual link between biological phenomena and ‘cultural’ phenomena. This is the 
case because categories of social learning, such as stimulus/local enhancement, 
emulation, and imitation, are said to underlie the “cultural transmission” of knowledge 
and behaviour among individuals within and across generations, thus providing the 
mechanism that might lead to the establishment of group-typical behaviour patterns 
(Hoppitt & Laland, 2013; Mesoudi, 2011; Richerson & Boyd, 2005). Much of the 
currently influential and representative work on social learning and culture (such as Boyd 
& Richerson, 1985; Heyes, 1994, 2012, 2016; Hoppitt & Laland, 2013; Laland, Odling-
Smee, & Feldman, 2001; Mesoudi, 2011; Richerson & Boyd, 2005; Tomasello, 1999; 
Tomasello, Carpenter, Call, Behne, & Moll, 2005) expresses or, at least partially, 
endorses a set of inter-related ideas about development, inheritance, evolution, cognition, 
and ‘culture.’ These ideas come from different fields including biology, the cognitive 
sciences, and some approaches to culture theory. 
From biology, this includes the ideas that cellular metabolism is fundamentally 
controlled by information encoded in the genome (Alberts, Wilson, & Hunt, 2008; A. J. 
F. Griffiths, 2008); that development is mostly controlled by genetic information, 
possibly complemented by or interacting with information in the animal’s environment 
(Maynard Smith, 2000; Mayr, 2004); that inheritance is about the transmission of genetic 
information (Futuyma, 1998; Mayr, 2004; Ridley, 2004); and that evolution is about 
changes in genetic information (Futuyma, 1998; Mayr, 2004; Ridley, 2004). The main 
idea coming from the cognitive sciences is that the central nervous system is 
fundamentally a structure that processes information (Fodor, 1975; Thagard, 2014). And 
the main idea coming from some approaches to cultural theory is that cultural processes 
are sustained by, and interact with, but are in some strong sense distinct from, biological 
processes (Kroeber, 1917; Kroeber & Kluckhohn, 1952). 
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Crucially, behavioural scientists studying social learning and culture added some 
of their own ideas to the list above. Arguably the main idea is that development – more 
specifically, the development of behaviour patterns through learning – depends on the 
‘genetic information’ involved in making the body (including the animal’s cognitive 
structure responsible for learning), on ‘information’ acquired through individual learning, 
and also on ‘cultural information’ acquired through social learning (Hoppitt & Laland, 
2013). As Richerson and Boyd (2005, p. 6) put it, “we are largely what our genes and our 
culture make us”. Another idea is that inheritance includes the transgenerational 
transmission of ‘genetic information’ and also ‘cultural information’ (Mesoudi, 2011; 
Odling-Smee, Laland, & Feldman, 2003; Richerson & Boyd, 2005). As a consequence, 
evolution is viewed in terms of changes in the ‘genetic information’ and also changes in 
the ‘cultural information’ transmitted across generations in the population (Mesoudi, 
2011; Odling-Smee et al., 2003; Richerson & Boyd, 2005). With regard to cognition, 
learning is thought of in terms of ‘acquiring information’ either socially or asocially 
(Heyes, 2012; Hoppitt & Laland, 2013). 
It should be evident, given the way I chose to present the set of ideas above, that 
the term ‘information’ figures prominently in them. Consistent with this, the notion of 
culture, as currently used by behavioural scientists, is fundamentally associated with the 
idea of information being transmitted between individuals and across generations socially 
rather than genetically (Hoppitt & Laland, 2013; Mesoudi, 2011; Richerson & Boyd, 
2005). As Hoppitt and Laland (2013, p. 11) say, “culture is built upon socially learned 
and transmitted information... and does not apply to genetic information or to knowledge 
and skills that individuals acquire alone”. Some authors even identify ‘culture’ with 
‘information’ and ‘mental state’: “Culture is information capable of affecting individuals’ 
behavior that they acquire from other members of their species through teaching, 
imitation, and other forms of social transmission... by information we mean any kind of 
mental state, conscious or not, that is acquired or modified by social learning and affects 
behavior” (Richerson & Boyd, 2005, p. 5). 
If my characterization is indeed representative, ‘information’ plays a central 
epistemic role in the study of social learning and culture. However, it is not at all clear 
that the term means the same thing when used in reference to different phenomena such 
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as the molecular processes within cells (metabolism), the typical sequence of changes 
throughout the lifespan (development), the similarities in the developmental trajectories 
of organisms related by genealogy (inheritance), the physiological processes within the 
central nervous system (perception, learning, cognition in general), the organism-
environment interaction in real time (behaviour), the establishment, persistence, and 
change of population-level patterns of behaviour across generations (culture), or mental 
states. Using the same term without a clear understanding of what it might mean in each 
case can lead to confusion and equivocation, especially when crossing disciplinary 
borders. For this reason, I attempted to clarify the different meanings of the term 
‘information’ in relation to these different contexts and I do my best to use the term 
consistently throughout. 
A common thread runs through the set of inter-related ideas about development, 
inheritance, evolution, cognition, and culture I mentioned above. I will refer to it, 
following Oyama (1985/2000), as preformationism, understood as a way of thinking 
about how form arises in nature. Preformationism indicates the idea that form is already 
present in some configuration before it appears in another configuration. With regard to 
contemporary biology, this way of thinking supports, and is supported by, the metaphor 
that “the genome... is a set of instructions on how to make [an organism]” (Maynard 
Smith, 2000). Thus, biologists conventionally say that some aspects of biological form 
are already specified by ‘information’ encoded in the genome before they appear in the 
phenotype as a result of developmental processes. With regard to the behavioural 
sciences, this way of thinking supports, and is supported by, the idea that behaviour is the 
expression of the activity of the nervous system (Hogan, 2017). Thus, behavioural 
scientists conventionally say that some aspects of behavioural form are already specified 
by ‘information’ encoded in the brain before they appear in overt behaviour as the 
expression of neurophysiological activity. Mesoudi (2011, p. 2) gives an illustrative 
example of this preformationist way of thinking in the context of social learning and 
culture: 
Whereas genetic information is stored in sequences of DNA base 
pairs, culturally transmitted information is stored in the brain as 
patterns of neural connections (albeit in a way that neuroscientists 
are only beginning to understand), as well as in extrasomatic 
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codes such as written language, binary computer code, and 
musical notation. And whereas genetic information is expressed 
as proteins and ultimately physical structures such as limbs and 
eyes, culturally acquired information is expressed in the form of 
behavior, speech, artifacts, and institutions. 
1.3 This thesis 
My intention is to avoid this way of thinking altogether and to begin the development of 
an alternative. I do this inspired by a set of authors. Susan Oyama (1985/2000, 2000b, 
2015) offers a thorough critique of the various versions of the nature-nurture opposition 
and suggests a processual, relational way of thinking about development, inheritance, and 
evolution in which history and context-dependency are in the foreground. This way of 
thinking is known as ‘developmental systems theory’, where ‘theory’ is meant in a broad 
sense, as a general perspective. The term ‘developmental system’ refers to a target entity 
(for example, the animal under study) and the changing set of interdependent influences 
and interactants that make a difference in its persistence and change over time. These 
interactants might be detected at any scale of size and time and be located on either side 
of its boundaries (such as the cell membrane or the skin). I will also indicate a 
developmental system by using expressions such as ‘the organism-environment system’ 
or ‘the organism-in-the-environment’. Assuming a developmental systems perspective as 
a starting point involves adopting a view of life as a set of nested, multiscale processes 
unfolding in time and space; a view of causality in terms of relations of mutual constraints 
rather than in terms of linear antecedent-consequent relations; and a view of control as 
emerging in the contingent relations among interactants rather than as localized in a 
privileged factor (say, the genes in development and mental representations in behaviour). 
Following this approach, I conceive of ontogeny – the life span of organisms, in all its 
aspects – as a historical achievement, a process in which biological and behavioural forms 
are not ‘encoded’ and ‘expressed’ but rather continually generated and transformed.  
Because behaviour is one aspect of ontogeny, adopting a developmental systems 
perspective of ontogeny invites, if not in fact requires, exploring an alternative way of 
thinking about cognition as well. I therefore explore works that have been critical of the 
dominant representational-computational approach in the cognitive sciences and 
advocate for ecological, dynamical, enactive views instead, including Chemero (2009); 
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Fogel (1993); E. J. Gibson (1988); J. J. Gibson (1979/2015); Kelso (1995); Maturana and 
Varela (1980, 1987); Thelen and Smith (1994); Thompson (2007); Varela, Thompson, 
and Rosch (1991). It has become common to refer to this body of work as advocating for 
a “radical embodied cognitive science” (Chemero, 2009). The dominant way of thinking 
in the cognitive sciences views the cognizing organism as an entity separate from the 
world, which it must represent in order to perceive it, think about it, and act upon it. The 
alternative way of thinking, indicated by the label radical embodied cognitive science, 
starts with a relational view of the organism-in-the-world as a unitary system of causal 
influences flowing in time, in which both the cognizing organism and its environment are 
continually being differentiated. In my opinion, this way of thinking about cognition is 
consistent with the developmental systems perspective. The authors listed above are the 
main influences in how my own ideas persisted under transformation over the past years. 
This project has two complementary components, one conceptual-theoretic 
(Chapters 2 to 5) and one empirical (Chapters 6 and 7). They are presented as one 
following the other but in fact they ran somewhat in parallel, mutually influencing each 
other. In Chapter 2 I begin to explore different meanings of the word information in 
relation to biological phenomena in an attempt to clarify how the term might be used 
consistently. I then attempt an original integration of ideas from developmental systems 
theory, radical embodiment, and relational thinking. My goal is to develop a processual, 
relational way of thinking about ontogeny (Chapter 3), behaviour (Chapter 4), and social 
life (Chapter 5) which might be used to explore the phenomena described by the literature 
on social learning and culture in new ways. I then move on to the empirical component 
of the project, in which I report two studies that were conceived, carried out, and analysed 
motivated by this alternative way of thinking. I focused on phenomena that would 
conventionally be considered cases of ‘transmission of cultural information’ and viewed 
them from a processual, relational perspective. Chapter 6 presents the results of a 
thoroughly exploratory study conducted in a Science Museum with children participating 
in a joint making task assisted by an instructor. Chapter 7 reports a study conducted with 
adults in the more controlled setting of an eye tracking laboratory at the University of 
Edinburgh. Finally, Chapter 8 presents a brief overview of the findings and shortcomings 
of this enterprise.
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Chapter 2 Information in biology 
2.1 Introduction and outline 
The received view in biology includes the idea that DNA carries information about the 
phenotype (Alberts et al., 2008; Futuyma, 1998; A. J. F. Griffiths, 2008; Maynard Smith, 
2000; Mayr, 2004; Ridley, 2004). To take a representative example, a leading textbook 
on cell biology states that cells “use raw materials to create a network of catalysed 
reactions… according to an elaborate set of instructions encoded in the hereditary 
information” (Alberts et al., 2008, p. 401). When commenting on “[t]he colloquial use of 
informational terms” in molecular biology, the eminent evolutionary biologist John 
Maynard Smith wrote he was “not aware of any confusion arising because their meanings 
are not understood. In fact, the similarities between their meanings when referring to 
human communication and genetics are surprisingly close” (Maynard Smith, 2000, p. 
178). Philosophers of biology, on the other hand, seem less optimistic, and have 
repeatedly argued that such information talk, though pervasive, is highly problematic 
because it encourages genetic determinism, essentialism, and the nature-nurture 
disjunction (Godfrey-Smith, 2007; P. E. Griffiths, 2001; Oyama, 1985/2000; Sarkar, 
1996; Sterelny & Griffiths, 1999). This chapter explores this tension. More precisely, my 
goal is to provide critical answers to two related questions: 
• Are biologists justified in using information talk to describe and explain 
molecular and developmental processes? 
• Are biologists justified in attributing a special informational role to genes in 
molecular and developmental processes?  
Defining gene is not straightforward (Keller, 2000; Neumann-Held & Rehmann-
Sutter, 2006) but in this piece I assume an inclusive textbook definition of gene as “the 
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segment of DNA sequence corresponding to a single protein or set of alternative protein 
variants (or to a single catalytic or structural RNA molecule for those genes that produce 
RNA but not protein)” (Alberts et al., 2008, p. 7). 
As for ‘information,’ different notions coexist in the biological literature and their 
uses can be mutually inconsistent. The term often goes undefined and unindexed, and this 
does not help clarify its meanings across texts. Thus, to address these questions 
satisfactorily we must clarify what one might mean by ‘information’ in general and in the 
context of biology. I will distinguish between the communication-theoretic concept of the 
amount of information in a signal as the reduction of uncertainty associated with it 
(Shannon, 1948a); the situation-theoretic concept of the specific information carried by 
a signal as nomic dependence (Dretske, 1981) or constraint (Israel & Perry, 1990) 
between situations; the teleosemantic concept of information as biological function 
resulting from natural selection (Maynard Smith, 2000; Sterelny, Smith, & Dickison, 
1996), and the concept of information as a difference that makes a difference for the 
system under study (Bateson, 1972; Oyama, 1985/2000). 
In my discussion, I shall mention the roles genes play in molecular and 
developmental processes. In doing so, I will not dispute the conventional body of 
scientific knowledge and empirical observations in molecular biology, cell biology, and 
genetics, such as the model for the molecular structure of the DNA initially suggested by 
Watson and Crick (1953a, 1953b), the processes involving DNA which result in the 
production of mRNA (transcription) and proteins (translation), the reliable correlations 
that are observed between the sequence of nucleotides in the DNA and the sequence of 
amino acids in the corresponding polypeptide (the ‘genetic code’), or the measurable 
correlations between alleles (or in fact any feature of the developmental complex) and 
other phenotypic features. These will be taken as well-constructed scientific facts (Alberts 
et al., 2008; A. J. F. Griffiths, 2008). What will be open to critical evaluation are the 
questions of whether there are justifiable uses of informational concepts in these contexts, 
and whether the role genes play in development justify the common information talk. 
Views about how organisms come to be are relevant not only for the molecular 
biologist working at the bench, but they also inform how psychologists study cognitive 
processes. On top of clarifying the use of information among biologists, another goal of 
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the chapter is to make explicit some of the motivations for rejecting  the received 
computational-representational model of the mind (Fodor, 1975). This model is based on 
the premise that cognition is about computation with representations and that the nervous 
system is fundamentally an input-output system that processes ‘information’ – which 
sense of information is a question I will explore in the following chapters. Thus, the 
present discussion about ‘information’ in development is an essential step to our 
subsequent discussions about cognition, social learning and the relation between biology 
and culture. 
The chapter is organized as follows. Because of its central importance to our 
purpose, I will first distinguish between the concept of information developed in the 
mathematical theory of communication (Shannon, 1948a, 1948b) and the related, 
semantic concept of the specific informational content carried by a signal (Dretske, 1981). 
I will then discuss these notions in relation to the roles played by genes and environment 
in developmental processes. As we go along, it will become necessary to introduce the 
concept of intentional information to address critical points raised by Sterelny and 
Griffiths (1999) and Maynard Smith (2000). I will suggest that the idea that genes play a 
special informational role in development is motivated by an underlying, implicit or 
explicit, way of thinking about how form arises in nature that is ‘hylomorphic’ (Ingold, 
2013) and ‘preformationist’ (Oyama, 1985/2000, 2000b, 2015). These ideas, although 
present in influential textbooks and part of the received view, do not find support in 
empirical facts and biological theory (Sarkar, 1996) and I will indicate an alternative way 
of thinking that motivates this thesis. At this point I will present yet another sense of 
information as a difference that makes a difference (Bateson, 1972; Oyama, 1985/2000). 
For clarity, I will always make explicit (usually in a note within brackets) which concept 
of information is being referred to when I use the term. I think this is good practice that 
might help avoid misunderstanding and equivocation. I will also occasionally use 
‘information’ with single quotation marks when no specific sense is evoked. 
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2.2 What is information? An initial distinction 
2.2.1 Information as reduction of uncertainty in the mathematical theory of 
communication  
The initial development of the mathematical concept of information is associated with an 
interest in solving the technical problems faced by engineers working with the 
transmission of signals through telegraph and later telephone lines (Markowsky, 2013). 
It was in this context that Claude Shannon published his mathematical theory of 
communication in two articles in the technical journal of the Bell Telephone Laboratories 
where he worked (Shannon, 1948a, 1948b). Shannon’s work provided engineers with a 
systematic way to analyse specific communication systems and, for example, improve 
performance in signal transmission in existing telephone cables. He developed a simple 
and fairly abstract model of a communication system which includes signal (or message, 
state, and so on), noise, source, transmitter (or encoder), channel, receiver (or decoder), 
and destination. Because of its abstract formulation, we can think of the source as a 
person, an animal, a computer, a thing or any process which selects (intentionally or 
metaphorically) a signal from a set of possible alternatives. The transmitter or encoder 
transforms or encodes the message into a form suitable for transmission through the 
channel. The channel is the medium or the set of physical-chemical processes that 
transmits the signal to the receiver. The transmission of signals through the channel can 
be more or less affected by sources of noise. The receiver or decoder transforms or 
decodes the signal into a message that can be utilised by the destination. The destination 
can also be a person, an animal, a computer, a thing or process which interprets or 
otherwise uses the message. 
Before we consider the flow of information in communication systems, we must 
clarify how information is generated in the first place. According to Shannon (1948a), 
information is generated when a message is chosen from a set of alternatives. The process 
of selecting a state from a set of possibilities is associated with some reduction of 
uncertainty – say reducing from a set of 100 possible messages to the one that is actually 
chosen, encoded and transmitted. Shannon proposed a way to quantify this process and 
called it a measure of the amount of information associated with the signal generated at 
the source. This quantification has nothing to do with either the meaning or the specific 
information a message may convey to someone or something able to interpret it.  
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One way to reduce a set of alternatives to one is by asking a series of yes/no 
questions. The answer to each such question distinguishes the initial set into ever smaller 
groups which will eventually include only the one chosen message. Each answer can be 
represented by a binary digit or bit (e.g. 1 for yes and 0 for no, or the alternative states in 
a transistor) and thus each message in the set can be represented by a unique combination 
of the bits which represents the answers to such questions (e.g. 1010001). Therefore, we 
can use the number of the binary decisions required to identify the message at the source, 
𝑠𝑖, as a measure of the amount of information (sensu Shannon entropy or reduction of 
uncertainty) associated with it, 𝐼. Following previous suggestions, Shannon defined this 
quantity as the negative logarithm (of base 2 for binary decisions) of the probability that 
a message is chosen by the source, 𝑝(𝑠𝑖), and is formalized as follows:  
𝐼(𝑠𝑖) =  − log2 𝑝(𝑠𝑖)  
Engineers are less concerned with particular messages and more with the average 
amount of information generated by the source and by the receiver, and especially with 
how they are coupled. The average amount of information produced by the source, 𝐼(𝑠), 
depends on the probability that each possible message is actually selected, 𝑝(𝑠𝑖), and the 
amount of information each contains. This is given by the formula: 
𝐼(𝑠) =  − ∑ 𝑝(𝑠𝑖) log2 𝑝(𝑠𝑖) 
The same formula can be used to compute the average amount of information 
generated in the receiver. Then one can calculate, for example, how much information in 
the receiver correlates with information in the source and how much does not. In sum, 
according to the mathematical theory of communication, the amount of information 
carried by a specific message is a measure of the reduction of uncertainty associated with 
its being chosen, which is relative to the alternatives being distinguished.  
One important feature of Shannon’s treatment is that he focuses mainly on the 
problems related to the encoding of signals (transforming the chosen messages into a form 
suitable for the channel) and their transmission. He explicitly avoids semantic aspects of 
communication such as how signals can have meaning and be about something else: 
“These semantic aspects of communication are irrelevant to the engineering problem. The 
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significant aspect is that the actual message is one selected from a set of possible 
messages” (Shannon, 1948a, p. 379).  
When you (the source) are talking to a friend (the destination) on the phone the 
sounds you make correlate with the electric signals generated in your device (the 
transmitter), which in turn correlate with the electric signals and thus the sounds generated 
in your friend’s device (the receiver and decoder) as constrained by the channel conditions 
linking them. As a result, your friend (the destination) can then try to make sense of what 
she hears. In this case we can say that some amount of information (sensu Shannon 
entropy or reduction of uncertainty) is transmitted between your mobiles. But this notion 
of information does not refer to the interpretation of the meaning of the message, which 
depends on sense-making abilities supported by linguistic conventions and the context in 
which communication occurs. Neither does it refer to what you intended to convey, or 
what your friend now thinks you meant. Anyone who has tried to communicate their 
ideas, or who tries to understand a message spoken or written in an unfamiliar language 
or about an unfamiliar topic, will have experienced that the meaning intended by the 
speaker and the meaning constructed by the listener can be frustratingly different. 
Shannon’s concept of information does not refer to what you might learn, from the signal 
or message, about other events or processes, regardless of the communicator’s intentions. 
To address these aspects of information, we must distinguish between the 
communication-theoretic concept of the amount of information (sensu Shannon entropy 
or reduction of uncertainty) and the semantic concept of the specific informational 
content, or specific information, associated with a message. This distinction was advanced 
by Dretske (1981) and is also developed in situation theory (Barwise & Perry, 1981; 
Devlin, 2006; Israel & Perry, 1990). 
2.2.2 ‘Information about’ as constraint between situations in situation 
theory 
Meaning and intentionality have been contentious topics in linguistics and the philosophy 
of mind, but they are central to the ordinary use of the term information (P. Jacob, 2014). 
People (including philosophers) say, for example, that perceptions, thoughts, and 
feelings, and also the sentences spoken to communicate them, are about features external 
to the ‘mind’. Intentionality or reference to an object has famously been considered to be 
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a “characteristic exclusively of mental phenomena. No physical phenomenon exhibits 
anything like it” (Brentano, 1995, pp. 88-89, originally published 1874). More recently, 
philosophers have attempted to naturalize the notion (e.g., Barwise & Perry, 1981; 
Dennett, 1987; Dretske, 1981; Millikan, 1984). 
Intentionality and (biological) meaning are also central to the way the average 
biologist ordinarily uses the term, such as in reference to the metaphor of a genetic code, 
the correlations between segments of DNA and phenotypic features, and the correlations 
between features in the environment and the behavioural or cognitive states of the 
perceiving-acting organism (Maynard Smith, 2000). In this section I will present some 
aspects of the semantic theory of information developed by Dretske (1981) and the 
situation theory as initially developed by Barwise and Perry (1981), both of which build 
on Shannon’s treatment. These works provide a clear path from the idea that any situation 
can generate some amount of information (sensu Shannon entropy or reduction of 
uncertainty) to the idea that signals or situations carry specific information about other 
signals or situations. 
Despite the original context of interest, namely the telephone and other physical 
systems, the mathematical notion of information can be conceived in far more general 
terms. “Any situation”, as Fred Dretske explains, “may be taken, in isolation, as a 
generator of information. Once something happens, we can take what did happen as a 
reduction of what could have happened to what did happen and obtain an appropriate 
measure of the amount of information associated with the result” (Dretske, 1981, p. 14). 
In addition, the concept of communication channel can also be conceived in more 
general terms. If the state of affairs or situation B depends on the state of affairs or 
situation A due to (lawful) regularities, then we can say that situation B carries specific 
information about situation A, and vice versa (Dretske, 1981). 
Another way to express this semantic notion is to say that the specific information, 
or the informational content, of a signal or message is “the what-it-is-we-can-learn from 
that signal or message (in contrast to the how-much-we-can-learn)” (Dretske, 1981, p. 
47). This is how Dretske (1981, p. 45) defines the semantic concept of informational 
content:  
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A state of affairs contains information about X to just that extent 
to which a suitably placed observer could learn something about 
X by consulting it. This, I suggest, is the very same sense in which 
we speak of books, newspapers, and authorities as containing, or 
having information about a particular topic. 
For example, the volume of a liquid such as ethanol covaries with its surrounding 
temperature, and this regularity allows us to use ethanol to build thermometers: the values 
reading in the thermometer carries specific information (sensu constraint between 
situations or what-it-is-we-can-learn-from-it) about the air temperature and vice versa. 
Thus, the fact that the length of the ethanol column in the thermometer attached to my 
window is such and such carries the specific information that the air temperature outside 
is such and such. What that means is that I, the observer, can read the values on the 
thermometer and learn about how many layers I should wear before leaving the house. 
Crucially, relative to the constraint, the air temperature carries specific information about 
the ethanol column as well, by the same token.: If I go for a walk and experience that it 
is snowing, I can learn something about the value currently reading in the thermometer 
back home (e.g., that it is probably at or below zero degrees Celsius). 
Consider the following question, which was implicitly hinted at above. Is specific 
information something objective – in the sense that it exists in the world independent 
from any observer or cognitive agent detecting it, or is specific information always 
information relative to some observer? The answer is relevant for our discussion because 
biologists talk about information being in the DNA with an objective tone to it (Maynard 
Smith, 2000). Let me refer back to Shannon (1948a). In his account, information (sensu 
reduction of uncertainty) is generated when one possibility is selected among alternative 
possibilities, and in this abstract formulation it does not depend on any observer. As for 
the semantic notion developed above, there is an unresolved tension around this point. 
On the one hand Dretske (1981, p. 57) considers that  
Information, as defined above, is an objective commodity, the 
sort of thing that can be delivered to, processed by, and 
transmitted from instruments, gauges, computers, and neurons. It 
is something that can be in the optic array, on the printed page, 
carried by a temporal configuration of electrical pulses, and 
stored on a magnetic disk, and it exists there whether or not 
anyone appreciates this fact or knows how to extract it. It is 
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something that was in this world before we got here. It was, I 
submit, the raw material out of which minds were manufactured. 
On the other hand, he also states that “how much information a signal contains, and 
hence what [specific] information it carries, depends on what the potential receiver 
already knows about the various possibilities that exist at the source” (Dretske, 1981, p. 
79). What should count, one might ask, as the relevant possibilities being discriminated? 
“When a possibility becomes a relevant possibility is an issue that is, in part at least, 
responsive to the interests, purposes, and, yes, values of those with a stake in the 
communication process.” (Dretske, 1981, p. 132). Thus, on the one hand, specific 
information is “an objective commodity”, and on the other hand it is a relative concept 
that depends on the knowledge state of the information user. Dretske further says that 
specific information “has this social, relative, pragmatic dimension to it” (Dretske, 1981, 
p. 132), and the same applies to knowledge, which he defines as “information-produced 
belief” (Dretske, 1981, p. 92).  
Dretske acknowledges the tension but does not see it as problematic for his purpose. 
“The relative character of information”, he says, “does not make it ‘less objective’ but it 
requires that the receiver to which one refers is made clear” (Dretske, 1981, p. 79). One 
way to escape this tension is by resorting to what he calls a harmless fiction: “we have 
indulged in the harmless fiction that the number of possibilities existing at the source (and 
their respective probabilities) was fixed independently of what anyone happened to 
know” (Dretske, 1981, p. 57). His specific suggestion is that information is a relative 
concept but it is harmless to speak as if it were an absolute concept in such cases where 
“[e]very relevant party knows the same thing about the possibilities existing at the source” 
(Dretske, 1981, p. 80). “Only when there is a shift of reference systems”, he argues, “does 
the need arise to make explicit the relative nature of the quantity under consideration” 
(Dretske, 1981, p. 80). This may not be problematic for his purpose, but we must 
remember that his purpose is to provide a semantic theory of information that is useful 
for the domains of cognition and language use. He is not trying to account for the role 
genes play in development or protein synthesis but things like belief, knowledge, concept, 
and meaning; as well as sensory, cognitive, and learning processes. These processes 
imply cognitive systems detecting and making use of the ‘information’ available in the 
environment via action and perception (see next chapter).  
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Situation theorists write in a similar spirit. “What underlies the phenomenon of 
information”, say Israel and Perry (1990, p. 3), “is the fact that reality is lawlike; that 
what is going in one part of reality is related to what is going on in some other part of 
reality, by laws, nomic regularities, or as we shall say, constraints”. Because the world is 
“knitted together by constraints… situations carry information. The fact that there is a 
situation of one type, carries the [specific] information that there are situations of the 
types that one involves” (Israel & Perry, 1990, p. 3). This passage refers to constraints as 
lawful regularities, as did Dretske (1981) but other authors suggest a more inclusive 
notion. “Constraints are linkages between situation types. They may be natural laws, 
conventions, logical (i.e., analytic) rules, linguistic rules, empirical, law-like 
correspondences, etc.”(Devlin, 2006, p. 608). 
Note that this introduces the relation of intentionality or ‘aboutness’ into the picture, 
since the informational content conveyed by a situation is about some other situation. 
However, this relation is not between ‘mental phenomena’ and ‘physical phenomena’ as 
in Brentano (1995), but between situations (parts of the world). Thus, intentionality need 
not imply a distinction between the body and the mind. 
So far, I have started to clear the conceptual ground and distinguished between two 
concepts: the amount of information (sensu Shannon entropy or reduction of uncertainty) 
associated with a signal and the specific information it conveys (sensu constraint between 
situations or what-it-is-we-can-learn-from-it). I will now finally move to our scientific 
context of interest and examine information talk in biology.  
2.3 Information talk in biology 
Philosopher of biology Sahotra Sarkar (1996) suggests that the term information was 
introduced in the molecular biology literature by James Watson and Francis Crick in their 
seminal discussion of the implications of their model for the structure of the DNA, where 
they (Watson & Crick, 1953a, p. 965) say: 
The phosphate sugar backbone of our model is completely 
regular, but any sequence of the pairs of bases can fit into the 
structure. It follows that in a long molecule many different 
permutations are possible, and it therefore seems likely that the 
precise sequence of the bases is the code which carries the 
genetical information. 
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The idea that genes carry information about proteins or the phenotype has since 
become widespread. It is indeed possible to talk about the process of protein synthesis, or 
even the entire development or ontogeny of organisms, using a version of Shannon’s 
model of communication (for a review and explicit defence of this talk in biology, see 
Maynard Smith, 2000). The DNA (or mRNA, it does not matter for the analogy) is the 
transmitter, the protein or phenotype is the receiver, and all non-genetic components of 
the developmental matrix, along with the constructive processes they take part in, 
constitute the constraints or channel conditions – which usually get lumped under the 
vague rubric ‘the environment’.  
Suppose I follow a common experimental design and raise organisms with different 
alleles in very similar conditions; and suppose I find that different genotypes correlate 
with some aspect of the phenotype. If I ignore the complexities of actual developmental 
processes, then I might say that some amount of information (sensu Shannon entropy or 
reduction of uncertainty) was transmitted from genotype to phenotype by means of 
development. I might also say, following Dretske (1981) and Israel and Perry (1990), that 
the genotype carries specific information (sensu constraint between situations or what-it-
is-we-can-learn-from-it) about the phenotype. I assume this analogy is not necessarily 
controversial; however, three points are in order.  
The first point is that, whenever situation types are connected by constraints, 
specific information flows between situation tokens in both directions. Therefore, we 
might say that, for an observer, the genotype carries specific information about the 
phenotype and we might also say that the phenotype carries information about the 
genotype. As Godfrey-Smith tells us, “the information in the genes is something that only 
we, the observers and describers of genetic systems, use. This information is not part of 
any explanation of the biological role that the genes play within organisms. Here, genes 
are being used by us just as we might use tree rings [to infer the age of the tree]” (Godfrey-
Smith, 2004, p. 278). 
When the observer is explicitly mentioned, as above, this symmetry in 
informational relations does not seem particularly problematic: depending on the 
available prior knowledge about the system under study, a geneticist can learn about the 
probable phenotype of an organism by consulting its genotype; alternatively, she can 
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learn about its probable genotype by consulting the phenotype. But in the received view, 
‘information’ is used in a sense that is not consistent with “that commodity capable of 
yielding knowledge” to an observer (Dretske, 1981, p. 44). Rather, it is conceived of as 
being in the DNA in some objective or absolute sense, and as encoding instructions to 
create and maintain metabolism. I conclude that this use, so common among biologists, 
is different from the notion of specific information (sensu constraint between situations 
or what-it-is-we-can-learn-from-it) I have presented above. 
The second point is that the distinction between source and channel conditions in a 
system of causal relations is a matter of convention. Suppose I use a spring scale to 
measure the mass of unknown materials. Given the instrument’s design and an 
appropriate gravitational field, the amount of mass in the material correlates with the state 
of the spring and, thus, with the position of the pointer. On the one hand, if the focus of 
attention is on the material being tested, I might say that the instrument’s design and the 
gravitational field compose the channel conditions and that the pointer (destination) 
carries specific information (sensu constraint between situations or what-it-is-we-can-
learn-from-it) about the material (source). On the other hand, during calibration the focus 
of attention is on the inner functioning of the instrument itself rather than the materials 
being measured. To calibrate the scale, one must measure materials with known values of 
mass. This allows us to adjust the parameters of the instrument as required. Note, 
however, that now the pointer (destination) carries specific information about the state of 
the instrument (now the source) and the materials being measured fall into the background 
as part of the constraints or channel conditions. 
Turning to biology, as well as varying the genotype while holding the external 
micro-environmental conditions similar, one could also hold the genotype constant and 
vary the environment, as geneticists routinely do (using clones) or what studies of 
identical twins to some extent set out to do through statistical procedures. Now in this 
design different values of the environmental variable may correlate with different 
phenotypes and I should be equally justified in saying that some amount of information 
(sensu Shannon entropy or reduction of uncertainty) was transmitted from the 
environment to the phenotype through the channel of development. I could also say that 
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the environment carries or conveys specific information (sensu constraint between 
situations or what-it-is-we-can-learn-from-it) about the phenotype. 
This other symmetry in informational relations has been pointed out by several 
philosophers of biology in previous discussions on the topic (Godfrey-Smith, 2007; P. E. 
Griffiths, 2001; Oyama, 1985/2000, 2000a; Sarkar, 1996; Sterelny & Griffiths, 1999). 
For example, suppose I incubate eggs with clones of the American alligator (Alligator 
mississippiensis) at different temperatures. Depending on the specific temperature, the 
eggs will develop and become either females or males (Gilbert, 2000). In this case, for an 
observer with the appropriate background knowledge, the temperature of incubation 
carries specific information (sensu constraint between situations or what-it-is-we-can-
learn-from-it) about the sex that one can expect the embryos to develop. If you incubate 
eggs at 30oC you can predict that all animals will probably become female, and if you 
know an animal’s sex you can infer the approximate range in temperature it experienced 
during the critical period. 
Thus, any developmental resource should count as a legitimate source of specific 
information about development, and not just the genome. But I think no biologist would 
conclude, from the premise that the environmental variable under consideration carries 
specific information about the phenotype, that environmental features encode “an 
elaborate set of instructions” (Alberts et al., 2008, p. 401) for development. Yet, the 
notion that DNA does contain instructions is unlikely to raise an eyebrow. Some other 
premise is in place. I will return to this point later; first I must turn to another strategy to 
conceptualize information in biology. 
2.3.1 The teleosemantic concept of intentional information as biological 
function 
In a comment about Dretske’s (1981) notion of specific information, Maynard Smith says 
it “has the virtue of clarity, but… [it] would rule out the current usage of the concept in 
biology” (Maynard Smith, 2000, p. 189). The reason for this, he argues, is that Dretske’s 
definition can be legitimately applied to any component that correlates with 
developmental outcome (as I have pointed out above). “Colloquially, this is fine;” he 
concedes, “a child’s environment does indeed predict its future. But biologists draw a 
distinction between two types of causal chain, genetic and environmental, or ‘nature’ and 
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‘nurture’, for a number of reasons” (Maynard Smith, 2000, p. 189). I will present and 
discuss his reasons further below (in section 2.3.3). For now, let us follow closely his 
attempt to justify “the current usage” of the term. 
The starting point of his argument is to distinguish between what he calls two 
different contexts in which the notion of information is used in colloquial speech. The 
first context he mentions is related to Dretske’s (1981) semantic concept of specific 
information, or informational content, as nomic dependence: “for example, we may say 
that the form of a cloud provides information about whether it will rain”. The other 
context involves intentionality. “In biology,” he says, “the statement that A carries 
information about B implies that A has the form it does because it carries that 
information” (Maynard Smith, 2000, p. 189). To clarify the difference between the two 
contexts he says that a “DNA molecule has a particular sequence because it specifies a 
particular protein, but a cloud is not black because it predicts rain. This element of 
intentionality comes from natural selection” (Maynard Smith, 2000, p. 189). His thesis 
then is that “[t]he notion of information as it is used in biology… implies intentionality. 
It is for this reason that we speak of genes carrying information during development, and 
of environmental fluctuations not doing so” (Maynard Smith, 2000, p. 193). 
His reference to intentionality deserves close attention. The only work referenced 
in this passage comes not from biology but from philosophy of mind. The cited work is 
The intentional stance, by philosopher Daniel Dennett (1987), in which he distinguishes 
between three levels of abstraction in the study of the mind – the physical stance, the 
design stance, and the intentional stance – while famously advocating for the intentional 
stance as a strategy to understand human behaviour. In this context intentionality is a 
property of mental states such as believing and thinking. The domain of inquiry discussed 
in this work is quite remote from the molecular processes in which genes participate. To 
justify the attribution of intentionality to the genome, Maynard Smith uses an analogy 
with genetic algorithm, an optimization strategy used in software development inspired 
by the very notion of evolution by natural selection. In the implementation of genetic 
algorithm different codes ‘compete’ against each other in their ability to solve a 
predefined computational problem. They undergo an iterative procedure involving 
‘selection’ of the best scripts and ‘mutation’ of these scripts over ‘generations’ until some 
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code meets the satisfaction criteria. Just as “there is information in the bit string, which 
has been programmed by selection [in the genetic algorithm]”, he suggests that the same 
is true for the information in the genes, arguing that “[t]his element of intentionality 
[present in the genes] comes from natural selection” (Maynard Smith, 2000, p. 190). 
Thus, he concludes that 
the analogy… [between genetic algorithm and evolution by 
natural selection] justifies biologists in saying that DNA contains 
information that has been programmed by natural selection; that 
this information codes for the amino acid sequence of proteins; 
that, in a much less well understood sense, the DNA and proteins 
carry instructions, or a program, for the development of the 
organism; that natural selection of organisms alters the 
information in the genome; and finally, that genomic information 
is ‘meaningful’ in that it generates an organism able to survive in 
the environment in which selection has acted. 
Let us follow him a bit further. He says that a “very similar conclusion about the 
concept of information in biology has been reached by Sterelny and Griffiths (1999)”. 
The passage he then quotes from these authors seems to support this: “In particular, they 
[Sterelny and Griffiths (1999)] write, ‘Intentional information seems like a better 
candidate for the sense in which genes carry developmental information and nothing else 
does’” (Maynard Smith, 2000, p. 193). As P. E. Griffiths (2001) points out, the strategy 
to define intentional information in terms of biological function derived from a history of 
selection relates to the teleosemantic strategy to naturalize ‘meaning’ (Millikan, 1984; 
Papineau, 1987). One well-developed version of the teleosemantic strategy in biology 
argues that it is legitimate to talk about a genome representing or carrying ‘information’ 
about the developed phenotype because “the genes have the biofunction of guiding 
phenotypic development” (Sterelny et al., 1996, p. 388). 
Interestingly Maynard Smith fails to acknowledge a critical point that Sterelny and 
Griffiths (1999) developed in the paragraphs just following the quoted passage, regarding 
attributing intentional information to genes alone: “many other means through which 
parents influence their offspring have selection histories too” (Sterelny & Griffiths, 1999, 
p. 105). The authors argue that, if one wants to use the teleosemantic concept of 
intentional information, it should apply to “all adapted developmental resources” whose 
present form results from a history of selection (Sterelny, 2000, p. 197). Some authors 
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refer to these resources, which may be reliably available or passed on from parents to 
offspring, as additional, non-genetic inheritance systems. Suggestions are far reaching 
and include cytoplasmic factors, obligatory endosymbionts, environmental features, 
social interactions and learning opportunities (Jablonka, 1994; Jablonka & Lamb, 2005; 
Odling-Smee, Laland, & Feldman, 1996; Odling-Smee et al., 2003; Richerson & Boyd, 
2005).   
According to Godfrey-Smith (2007), one problem with the teleosemantic account 
is that it is not clear why semantic properties should be equated with biological function: 
“having a function in the rich historical sense is not generally sufficient for having 
semantic properties. Legs are for walking, but they do not represent walking. Enzymes 
are for catalysing reactions, but they do not instruct this activity” (Godfrey-Smith, 2007, 
p. 108).  
Another problem with Maynard Smith’s argument, as I see it, is the following. 
Being directed more to justifying current usage rather than to provide a critical discussion, 
he takes for granted the received idea that DNA contains information in the sense of 
instruction or specification of form: “the genome is not a description of the adult form, 
but a set of instructions on how to make it: it is a recipe, not a blueprint” (Maynard Smith, 
2000, p. 187). The idea “that the genome contains enough information to specify the form 
of the adult”, he suggests, “is a reasonable assumption, because it is hard to see where 
else the information is coming from” (Maynard Smith, 2000, p. 186). With this as a 
premise, he asks the, as he puts it, “hard question. If there is ‘information’ in DNA, copied 
to RNA, how did it get there?” (Maynard Smith, 2000, p. 180). His answer, as I pointed 
out, is that natural selection put it there. But, as I argued above, whatever clear definition 
of information one chooses, there is no empirically or theoretically justifiable way to find 
it only in the DNA but not in other components of the developmental matrix that also 
meet the defining criteria.  
What is puzzling is that the philosophers’ conclusion seems to be unwelcome, 
unpleasant, and uncomfortable to a lot of reasonable scientists such as Maynard Smith. It 
would seem that this is not the conclusion biologists would want philosophers to arrive 
at. But this is indeed the conclusion we have in front of us. Why is it that we find it so 
difficult to let go off the unquestioned idea that there must be information in the genes in 
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the sense of instructions on how to make organisms? Why is it so “hard to see” (Maynard 
Smith, 2000, p. 186) things from a different perspective? I suggest two reasons. The first 
reason is the well-constructed biological fact known as the genetic code. The second 
reason is a specific way of thinking about biological phenomena. I will examine each in 
turn. 
2.3.2 The genetic code 
The expression ‘genetic code’ refers to the reliable correlation that usually holds between 
the sequences of triplets of bases in the DNA – or, more accurately, in the messenger 
RNA (mRNA) – and the sequences of amino acids in the proteins they take part in 
producing. Proteins are synthesized in the cells within a complex network of chemical 
processes that involve a great many number of enzymes, ribonucleotides, ATP, 
ribosomes, DNA, transport RNA (tRNA), messenger RNA, amino acids, etc, all in a 
solution with the appropriate pH, pressure, and temperature. Given the typical chemical 
composition of a cell, specific triplets of bases in the DNA correlate with specific triplets 
of bases (codons) in the mRNA and with specific amino acids in the protein, but if any of 
these processes fail to obtain or is altered, no protein will be produced or the end product 
might be altered (Alberts et al., 2008).  
The same set of predictable relations is observed in almost all living beings studied 
so far. For example, the triplet TAT in the transcribed portion of the DNA correlates with 
the codon AUA in the mRNA and this in turn correlates with an Isoleucine residue in the 
corresponding protein. These reliable associations can be represented in a table of 
correlations which is called the genetic code. The code is thus a condensed narrative 
about these molecular processes, about their reliability and robustness within organisms, 
about their similarity across taxa, and about the scientific practices that justify referring 
to them as a well-constructed fact in biology.  
In Dretske’s information-theoretic terms, for a suitably positioned observer with the 
relevant background knowledge, the fact that a sequence of bases in a DNA is such and 
such carries the specific information (sensu constraint between situations or what-it-is-
we-can-learn-from-it) that the expected sequence of amino acids is such and such. This 
does not imply or support the idea that the DNA carries instructions or programs that 
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control development, but only that DNA sequences covary with phenotypic outcomes and 
thus may serve as a more or less reliable index for the developmental processes that 
construct them. Reliable correlations such as these exist because the world is “knitted 
together by constraints” (Israel & Perry, 1990, p. 3) and might extend far beyond proteins 
to any aspect of the phenotype being tracked. 
The robust correlation between sequence of bases in the DNA and sequence of 
amino acids in the corresponding protein is a good candidate for the attribution of some 
special roles to genes. For example, Godfrey-Smith suggests that “the crucial features of 
gene expression mechanisms… motivate the introduction of a symbolic or semantic mode 
of description” (Godfrey-Smith, 2007, p. 110). Furthermore he argues that the reliable 
correlation, which is commonly referred to as genes coding for the primary structure of 
proteins, “is one kind of informational or semantic property that genes and only genes 
have” (Godfrey-Smith, 2007, p. 110). It is not entirely clear what sense of information is 
being referred to in this passage but in other passages it is referred to as a “richer sense… 
sometimes called ‘semantic’ or ‘intentional’ information (Godfrey-Smith, 2007, p. 106) 
and associated with the teleosemantic strategy I mentioned above (Sterelny et al., 1996). 
In any case, he argues that the fact that genes reliably correlate with (or, in the common 
parlance, ‘code for’) the sequence of amino acids does justify attributing intentional 
information to genes but does not justify the promiscuous use of the term in other 
contexts: “this relation [of coding or specificity] ‘reaches’ only as far as the amino acid 
sequence. It does not vindicate the idea that genes code for whole-organism phenotypes, 
let alone provide a basis for the wholesale use of informational or semantic language in 
biology” (Godfrey-Smith, 2007, p. 110). Sarkar (2004) makes a similar point. 
I suggest that, though the table of correlations or genetic code is a well-constructed 
fact, the attribution of intentionality and meaning to DNA is not straightforward. This is 
especially clear in relation to eukaryotes. I disagree with Godfrey-Smith’s suggestion that 
the complicated picture of protein synthesis in eukaryotes can be ignored as “mere 
details” (Godfrey-Smith, 2007, p. 110) that do not affect the attribution of intentional 
information to genes alone, and in support I cite four, equally well-constructed, textbook 
facts: (1) the ‘universal’ genetic code is not really universal, (2) the same DNA transcript 
can undergo alternative splicing depending on the local molecular context, (3) the 
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function of the polypeptides depend on more than their linear structure, and (4) properties 
of complex systems such as cells and multicellular organisms cannot be reduced to the 
properties of lower-level components (see below). All these facts blur the neat picture of 
DNA correlating with (or ‘coding for’) proteins as a special informational relation. I will 
expand on each in turn. 
Firstly, exceptions to the so-called universal genetic code are known in many taxa, 
especially in their mitochondria. For example, in vertebrates the triplet AUA in a 
mitochondrial mRNA that is translated inside the organelle (rather than in the cytoplasm) 
will correlate with Methionine instead of Isoleucine (Osawa, Jukes, Watanabe, & Muto, 
1992). The reason is because the mitochondrial tRNA that attaches to Methionine has a 
slightly different anticodon structure (Takemoto et al., 2009). In other words, imagine I 
conduct an experiment in which I put copies of the same DNA sequence to ‘code for’ 
proteins in two conditions: in the cytoplasm and in the mitochondria. What this design 
effectively does is keep the sequence of DNA bases constant while changing the chemical 
context. Once you know the location of transcription and translation, you can look at the 
appropriate table (either the ‘universal’ cytoplasmic code or the vertebrate mitochondrial 
code) and predict the linear structure of the protein that will be produced in each case. In 
this scenario, it is the location rather than the DNA sequence that covaries with the protein 
and therefore carries specific information (sensu constraint between situations or what-it-
is-we-can-learn-from-it) about its structure. The sequence of bases in the DNA is an 
invariant contextual condition that is a part of the ‘channel condition’. If DNA carried 
semantic information in some absolute sense, its meaning would not change depending 
on the surrounding molecular context. 
Secondly, consider alternative splicing. In eukaryotes (a major clade that includes 
all organisms with nucleated cells such as plants, animals, fungi, and protists), when DNA 
is ‘transcribed’, the initial RNA is further transformed (‘edited’) by chemical processes 
in which some parts (called ‘introns’) are removed and the others (‘exons’) are joined and 
become the mRNA. Which parts get removed and which are kept is context-dependent. 
Thus, within the same cell, the same stretch of DNA may correlate with several alternative 
mRNAs and proteins depending on what is going on in the rest of the cell at that point in 
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its ontogenetic history. As above, if DNA carried ‘information’ in some objective sense, 
its content should not change depending on the surrounding molecular context. 
Thirdly, the linear sequence of bases is a fundamental aspect of a protein but 
ultimately its function depends on its three-dimensional shape, and sometimes subunits 
aggregate to form the functional protein complex. These folding processes depend 
critically on the chemical context in which polypeptides emerge and may involve further 
modifications by other enzymes (e.g. glycosylation or phosphorylation). These folding 
processes are not specified as instructions in the sequence of bases and yet they are 
fundamental for the appearance of the final, functional form of the corresponding protein. 
Therefore, they have a legitimate role to play in causal accounts. 
Fourthly, the fact that organisms are internally heterogeneous brings about the 
question of how to conceive the relations among a collection of molecules and the whole 
organism they compose. Zoom in on a digital picture of a lion and you see a collection of 
static, discrete pixels that together compose the complete image. Zoom in on the lion itself 
and what you see (or what I imagine you would see according to current scientific models) 
is not a static spatial composition of molecules but a buzzing network of chemical 
transformations which correspond to the different, ever-changing structures of the lion as 
described at different scales: cells, tissues, organs, and the lion’s whole body. Now move 
your attention to the furry skin of the animal and what you see is not a solid surface but a 
dynamically stable boundary that is continually being constituted as molecules flow in 
and out of cells, as the animal moves about perceiving and acting in its environment. 
How one conceives the relations among scales and ‘levels of analysis’ is far from 
an easy question (DiFrisco, 2017). Yet it also constrains the kinds of narratives one is 
likely to produce about genotype- phenotype relations. If we start from the notion that all 
higher level features of the organism are reducible to the lower level properties of its 
molecules (the received reductionist position), than we are arguably more likely to 
produce narratives in which genes play a central role in development, heredity, and 
evolution (such as in Alberts et al., 2008; A. J. F. Griffiths, 2008; Maynard Smith, 2000; 
Mayr, 2004; Ridley, 2004); and in which the phenotype is seen as “the physical 
manifestation of a genotype (gene combination)” (Futuyma, 1998, p. 37). On the other 
hand, if we conceive of organisms as complex systems, as multiscale processes affecting 
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each other, then we are arguably more likely to produce narratives in which no single 
scale and no single class of components have primacy; in which the “gene combination” 
is not a set of instructions for the phenotype but rather one of its components; in which a 
shift from lower to higher level processes is conceived, not as a change from causes to 
effects, but rather as a change in “scale, vocabulary, concepts, and method” (Oyama, 
1985/2000, p. 164) and as a matter of finding possible correspondences (Gottlieb, 2007; 
Kauffman, 1993; Levin, 2006; Maturana & Varela, 1980, 1992; Oyama, 1985/2000; 
Rose, 1981; Thelen & Smith, 1994). 
The specificity in the relations between DNA and amino acids in proteins is what 
grounds the concept of a ‘genetic code’ and arguably what motivates the attribution of a 
special informational role to genes. The general conclusion I want to draw from the 
textbook facts briefly reviewed above is that this specificity cannot be attributed to the 
linear sequence of bases in the DNA structure independently of the biosynthetic processes 
they take part in. These processes are made possible by the structure and properties of 
both the DNA and the rest of the relevant chemical context, and this context is itself a 
dynamic process rather than a static set of ‘raw materials’ or ‘enabling conditions’. 
The ‘genetic code’ is an epistemic abstraction, a well-constructed fact and a very 
useful and compact representation of the complex relations involving DNA, mRNA, the 
produced polypeptide, and so many other molecules. These relations should not be reified 
– they are not substantively there but are continually being generated in the cells. This is 
far from saying something like ‘DNA does not matter’ for the structure of the final protein 
because of course it does. This is also far from saying that ‘all components play the same 
role’ because of course they don’t. DNA plays a different role than, say, RNA 
polymerase, in protein synthesis. This is also far from ignoring that sequences of DNA 
(as well as other components of the developmental matrix) have a rich history of 
‘selection’ that explains their current form. 
What this does imply is that there are no logical grounds on which to support the 
statement that DNA sequences carry ‘information’ in the sense of instructions, 
specifications, programs, or some other form of nature’s intention, that is independent 
from the very biosynthetic process in which they participate, and also from the epistemic 
relations established by the questions the experimenter is trying to address. To say that 
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the role DNA plays in development is that of the commander-in-chief, the locus of causal 
control, or the source of biological form is not only unnecessary to convey the idea of 
contingent specificity. It is empirically and theoretically unjustified. 
I am in good company here. “There are numerous important differences between 
what DNA does in development and the roles played by other causal factors”, says P. E. 
Griffiths (2001, p. 410), “but these differences do not map onto a distinction between 
informational and material causation. The present atmosphere, in which information talk 
is only applied to genes… misleads people about the forms of explanation in molecular 
biology”. In a similar tone, Godfrey-Smith (2007, p. 112) agrees “that there is something 
definite about informational description of genes that encourages fallacies about genetic 
causation.” Something is lurking behind such that “the inferential habits and associations 
that tend to go along with the use of informational or semantic concepts lead us to think 
of genes as having an additional and subtle kind of extra causal specificity” (Godfrey-
Smith, 2007, p. 113). 
Following Oyama (1985/2000, 2000b, 2015), I suggest that this asymmetry in how 
genes, compared to everything else, figure in information talk in biology has to do with a 
certain view of development, inheritance, and evolution that usually goes unquestioned 
and mostly even unsaid as part of the received view. This is a way of thinking about 
biological phenomena which starts from the premise that genes play a special causal role 
because they carry instructions or encode programs. This is a way of thinking in ‘nature’ 
and ‘nurture’ continue to be invoked even as authors indicate the inadequacy of the 
opposition. I will refer to this special role assigned to the genome as the “source of form”, 
for reasons that should become clear as we go along. I now must pick up a loose thread I 
had put to the side some time ago, and examine the reasons Maynard Smith gives to why 
“biologists draw a distinction between two types of causal chain, genetic and 
environmental, or ‘nature’ and ‘nurture’” (Maynard Smith, 2000, p. 189). 
2.3.3 The colloquial use of ‘information’ as ‘instruction’ or ‘source of form’ 
I had mentioned above that, in his attempt to justify current information talk in biology, 
Maynard Smith (2000) lists three reasons why the nature-nurture distinction has become 
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fundamental in biology. The reasons he gives, which are representative of the received 
view, are as follows (all quotes below taken from Maynard Smith, 2000, p. 189):  
1. “Differences due to nature are likely to be inherited, whereas those due to nurture 
are not” 
2. “evolutionary changes are changes in nature, not nurture” 
3. “traits that adapt an organism to its environment are likely to be due to nature”  
One way to criticize the reasons listed above is to acknowledge the growing 
literature on topics which stress the critical relevance of the ‘nurture’ side in the opposing 
pair to inheritance, development, and evolution. I will focus on social learning and 
‘culture’ given the context of this thesis. Empirical research, and mathematical and 
computational models, provide strong evidence that ‘cultural traits’, i.e. traits acquired 
through social learning, can ‘spread’ among individuals in a population and be inherited 
through countless generations (Fragaszy & Perry, 2003; Hoppitt & Laland, 2013; Laland 
& Galef, 2009; Richerson & Boyd, 2005; van der Post & Hogeweg, 2009; van Schaik et 
al., 2003; Whitehead & Rendell, 2015; Whiten et al., 1999). In other words, individuals 
growing in different social groups are likely to inherit differences due to nurture (cultural 
information) as well as differences due to nature (genetic information). This calls for an 
expanded notion of inheritance that questions the usually unquestioned premise that only 
genes play a special role as the carriers of information (sensu instruction, specification, 
or source of form, see below for the latter term). Now genes and something else act as 
carriers of such ‘information’. For example, Richerson and Boyd (2005, p. 61) suggest 
that “the main objects… capable of storing [the] information [that exists in every culture] 
are human brains and human genes”. 
‘Cultural traits’, which are aspects of the phenotype, can change across generations 
within an evolving population, and this can lead to a process of co-evolution between 
genes and ‘culture’ (Boyd & Richerson, 1985; Cavalli-Sforza & Feldman, 1981; Feldman 
& Laland, 1996; Richerson & Boyd, 2005). In other words, evolutionary changes involve 
changes in nature and changes in nurture. This calls for an expanded notion of evolution 
that questions the usually unquestioned premise that only genes play a special role in 
evolution since they are the only carriers of the information (sensu instruction, 
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specification, or source of form) that generates the evolutionarily relevant aspects of the 
organisms. 
Furthermore, there is also strong empirical evidence that behavioural patterns that 
develop within social relations can help organisms cope with, and species adapt to, their 
environment. Consider, for example, that many singing birds depend on social interaction 
to learn the local song dialect, which is crucial to finding a conspecific mate (Freeberg, 
2000), or that learning new foraging techniques from social partners can lead to the 
exploitation of otherwise ignored food items in primates (Navarrete, Reader, Street, 
Whalen, & Laland, 2016; van Schaik et al., 2003; Whiten et al., 1999). In other words, 
traits that play a role in adjusting the organism to its environment can be due to nature or 
due to nurture. 
Thus, studies of social learning and culture bring into question the primacy given 
to the ‘nature’ side of the opposition by stressing the importance of complementary 
processes that fall on the ‘nurture’ side. This literature suggests that the form of the adult 
phenotype, including its behavioural tendencies, ‘comes from’ information (sensu 
instruction, specification, or source of form) carried by the genes (‘nature’) and 
information acquired through social learning (‘nurture’). Note that ‘nature’ and ‘nurture’, 
though complementary to each other and interacting in some sense, are still seen as two 
domains or two potential sources of information (sensu instruction, specification, or 
source of form). Thus, this way to criticize the reasons why the nature-nurture distinction 
is fundamental does not lead us much far away from the conventional thinking. 
The second way to criticize Maynard Smith’s defence of the nature-nurture 
distinction as unproblematic is to question the premise taken for granted in the received 
view. The premise in question is that genes do play a special role in development, 
inheritance, and evolution, because they carry (most if not all) the information (sensu 
instruction, specification, or source of form) that builds the organism. Susan Oyama 
(1985/2000, 2000b, 2015) has thoroughly argued that the ordinary use of ‘information’ 
in biology reveals an underlying preformationist way of thinking. It is preformationist in 
the sense that it conceives of development as the unfolding of a form that is already there: 
if not in some homunculus, then encoded in the genome as instruction, specification, 
blueprint, or program. In contemporary parlance it is ‘information’ in this instructional 
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sense that accounts for the organization of mere formless matter into a living organism 
(such as in Alberts et al., 2008; Maynard Smith, 2000). 
Where did the information specifying the form come from? This is a common 
question in the context of investigating how morphological as well as behavioural form 
comes to be. I have pointed out above that many find it “hard to see where else the 
information is coming from” if not from the genome (Maynard Smith, 2000, p. 186) or 
from the genome and the brains of other organisms through ‘cultural transmission’ 
(Cavalli-Sforza & Feldman, 1981; Richerson & Boyd, 2005). This ordinary distinction 
between two complementary sources of information (sensu instruction, specification, or 
source of form) produces and is in turn supported by the nature-nurture complex of 
oppositions (genes-environment, biology-culture, instinct-learning, and so on). In 
philosophy, the idea that objects and living beings are a compound of form (hyle) and 
matter (morphe) is associated with Aristotle and is called hylomorphism (Ainsworth, 
2016). Thus, a version of hylomorphism and of preformationism seem to be present in 
the received view. 
How do we break this established habit of explaining form by pointing to a previous 
instance of the very form? The alternative I endorse is to conceive of form as residing in 
the phenotype itself and not in some prior instruction for it, and to explain form in terms 
of form-generating rather than form-imposing processes. This alternative involves 
shifting away from a view of causality and control in terms of linear relations between 
antecedent and consequent to one in terms of a multiscale network of causal relations 
among interactants. Consistent with this shift in mindset, I avoid the view of development 
as the execution of pre-existing instructions encoded in genetic programs, as well as the 
view of behaviour as the execution of pre-existing instructions encoded in motor 
programs. In their place, I embrace a relational, processual view of ontogeny as a 
multiscale, seamless history of transformations which includes changes in metabolism, 
morphology, physiology, and behaviour as aspects of each other. Finally, to be consistent 
with this view of ontogeny, social learning will not be understood as a process of 
‘transmission of information’ but rather as a process of development within fields of 
social relations. I will say a few words about the first point (joint causation and distributed 
36  Chapter 2 
control) below. The following points – about ontogeny, behaviour, and social learning – 
will be developed over the next three chapters. 
Genes can bring about changes in the organism of which they are a part by 
perturbing the current dynamics of ongoing, more or less stabilized, molecular processes, 
not by ‘imposing form onto matter’. Therefore, even if triggered by changes in the rate of 
transcription of some segment of DNA, the control of metabolism and of development 
cannot be localized ‘in’ the genome as information (sensu instruction, specification, or 
source of form) but is rather distributed in the whole organism-environment system. 
Control is constituted in the effective relations that keeps the cell (and the multicellular 
organism if it is part of one) going, stable in some features while changing in others, as 
long as these relations maintain its autopoietic organization (Maturana & Varela, 1973, 
1980). Control of metabolism and development, therefore, is always systemic, not 
‘genetic’. 
Incidentally, and important to the topic of this thesis, I point out that the same can 
be said about the control of behaviour. Neuronal activity can bring about changes in the 
organism by perturbing the ongoing dynamics of neuromuscular networks, not by 
‘instructing the muscles’. Therefore, even if triggered by changes in the firing rate of 
some neuronal assembly, the control of behaviour cannot be localized ‘in’ the brain as 
information (sensu representation, I will return to this in Chapter 4) but is rather 
distributed in the whole organism-environment system. Control is constituted in the 
effective relations that keep the animal behaving adequately in its changing environment; 
it is always systemic, not ‘neuronal’. I will return to this in the following chapters. 
Adopting this view of control as systemic and distributed, rather than localized, 
does not preclude one from making distinctions according to questions and scales of 
interest. The roles played by the linear sequence of nucleotides in the DNA are different 
from the roles played by the RNA polymerase; the roles played by parental care are 
different from those played by foraging opportunities, the roles played by neurons are 
different from those played by muscles, and so on. This understanding allows us to 
investigate the same phenomena that motivate questions of the kind “Is it nature or 
nurture?” without committing to unnecessary a priori assumptions. Using the term 
‘information’ as part of our descriptions or explanations does not amount to “introducing 
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some new and special kind of relation or property” but rather to “adopting a particular 
quantitative framework for describing ordinary correlations or causal connections” 
(Godfrey-Smith, 2007, p. 106). Or, as Oyama (2009) puts it in a rhetorical question: “Is 
it by invoking flows of immaterial information that we are most likely to gain 
understanding of the mechanisms by which these correlations are made, maintained, lost, 
or reconstructed? Or should we investigate the interactions themselves?” 
2.3.4 Information as a difference that makes a difference 
Writing in the context of cybernetics, Gregory Bateson defined a unit or ‘bit’ of 
information “as a difference which makes a difference. Such a difference, as it travels and 
undergoes successive transformation in a circuit, is an elementary idea" (Bateson, 1972, 
p. 321). In a famous passage about the limits of the mind he invites us to consider a man 
felling a tree with an axe, modifying or correcting each stroke as he goes along. He argues 
that the control of this emerging behaviour can be thought of as the transmission of 
information (sensu difference that makes a difference) in the circuit composed by “tree-
eyes-brain-muscles-axe-stroke-tree”, describing this process as “(differences in tree) - 
(differences in retina) - (differences in brain) - (differences in muscles) - (differences in 
movement of axe) - (differences in tree), etc.” (Bateson, 1972, p. 323). His unorthodox, 
ground-breaking point is that the mind is not confined to the organism (or brain) as a self 
or agent performing purposive actions but extends to the environment. 
In her seminal book, Oyama (1985/2000) endorses Bateson’s definition. In her 
words: “Information is a difference that makes a difference (Bateson, 1972, p. 315), and 
what it ‘does’ or what it means is thus dependent on what is already in place and what 
alternatives are being distinguished” Oyama (1985/2000, p. 3; note that my quote above 
from Bateson's definition came from a different edition). The comment that follows the 
defining statement points to history and context-dependency, two major themes in 
developmental systems theory. This definition is different from Shannon’s (1948a) 
conception that information (sensu Shannon entropy or reduction of uncertainty) is 
generated when a signal is distinguished from a set of alternatives.  
Translating to the present context, let us assume that the world consists of a multi-
scale manifold of components and processes – or differences – going on at the same time. 
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As the developmental system under study undergoes its history of transformations, some 
components or processes can become relevant for the system; when they do so they 
become interactants and effectively part of the developmental system. In other words, 
they become information for the system.  
I interpret Oyama’s endorsement of Bateson’s definition as implying that any 
component or process that is currently affecting or making a difference to the ontogeny 
of an organism (either sustaining or changing its current trajectory) can be said to 
constitute information for the organism’s developmental system. For example, a gene 
may be persistently present inside the cells of an organism, but it is not constituted as 
information for the system until and unless and as long as it makes a difference for the 
developing organism. The difference a gene or any developmental resource makes is not 
given in its structure independent from the rest of the ecologically embedded organism. 
This is so because it is the current state of the system (itself a product of its history thus 
far) that determines what can become relevant for its ongoing dynamics, i.e. what it can 
affect and what it can be affected by.  
Similar to Dretske’s notion of specific information (sensu constraint between 
situations or what-it-is-we-can-learn-from-it), information (sensu difference that makes a 
difference) is not substantial but relational – i.e. it refers to the relations among the 
components that constitute the organism’s developmental system. We now have a 
definition of information (sensu difference that makes a difference) that refers to the 
developmental system itself and not to an external cognitive agent such as a scientist or a 
partner in a communication event. This is therefore distinct from the concept of specific 
information as “that commodity capable of yielding knowledge” relative to an observer 
(Dretske, 1981, p. 44). 
Two further aspects that follow from this definition need to be acknowledged 
because of their relevance in the context of this thesis. First, information (sensu difference 
that makes a difference) can be applied to any causal influence in metabolism and 
development and does not grant any special in-formative role to genes. Second, 
information is not some quantity that exists objectively outside the system and is then 
‘put in’ it. Rather, information (sensu difference that makes a difference) is constituted in 
interaction. 
 Information in biology 39 
The idea that information (sensu difference that makes a difference) is constituted 
in interaction should not be confused with the idea that information (sensu instruction, 
specification, or representation) is distributed among factors (say, some of it encoded in 
the genes and some encoded in the brain). The former is a relational notion which follows 
from and invites a systems view of development as a multi-scale constructive process 
with no central organizer. The latter reifies information and localizes it in things rather 
than in relations – this would bring back nature and nurture as two distinct domains or 
causal pathways in development, which I want to avoid. 
2.4 Summary and conclusion 
This chapter aimed at providing critical answers to the following questions: 
• Are biologists justified in using information talk to describe and explain 
molecular and developmental processes? 
• Are biologists justified in attributing a special informational role to genes in 
molecular and developmental processes? 
To do so I took a long and winding road to clarify different meanings of the 
contentious term. According to Shannon (1948a), some amount of information (sensu 
Shannon entropy or reduction of uncertainty) is generated when one signal (message, 
state) is selected from a set of alternatives. This does not tell us anything about the content 
carried by a specific signal, i.e., what a signal means, is about, or points to. 
To deal with aboutness I presented Dretske’s (1981) semantic theory of information 
and, especially, a version of situation theory (Israel & Perry, 1990). This lead me to a way 
of understanding informational content as a lawful or normative constraint between 
situations. In this sense, the information carried by some situation is the what-it-is-we-
can-learn-from-it about other situations with which it is associated by regularities. With 
this notion I found a solid foundation for intentional claims such as (1) the fact that the 
sequence of bases in a segment of DNA is such and such conveys the specific information 
that the sequence of amino acids in the corresponding polypeptide will be such and such, 
given the usual constraints; and (2) the fact that an organism carries such and such allele 
conveys the specific information that it is likely to develop such and such phenotypic 
feature, given the usual constraints. 
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Notably, in this semantic sense information ‘flows’ in both directions and we are 
equally justified in saying that (1) the fact that some sequence of amino acids in a 
polypeptide is such and such conveys the specific information that the sequence of bases 
in the DNA that took part in producing it is such and such, given the usual constraints; 
and (2) the fact that an organism shows such and such phenotypic feature conveys the 
specific information that it likely carries such and such allele, given the usual constraints. 
I also discussed that this concept of information is observer-relative (although we might 
treat it as an absolute quantity if all persons involved in the communication event share 
the same background), and that the distinction between source and channel is 
fundamentally arbitrary. Thus, I concluded that this semantic concept did not justify 
attributing some special informational role to genes relative to other entities even as I 
acknowledged that different entities might well play different roles in metabolism and 
development.  
I have briefly examined the teleosemantic strategy (Maynard Smith, 2000; Sterelny, 
2000; Sterelny et al., 1996) which equates ‘intentional information’ with biological 
function deriving from a history of selection and similarly found no reason to conclude 
that this concept should apply only to genes and not to other aspects of the phenotype 
which form and function also result from a history of selection. 
As I reviewed these different notions of information I suggested that it is possible 
to use the term information in biology in consistent ways. However, using the term does 
not add any new relations to the causal accounts that are of interest, and none of the 
notions of information justify the idea that genes carry instructions or specifications, as 
ordinarily seen in biology. 
The answer to the first question above is ‘Yes, but’. There are several justifiable 
ways to use information talk in biology. However, to the extent that introducing the 
polysemic term invites misunderstanding and equivocation, one should be clear about 
what exactly one means when invoking it. For example, a DNA sequence has a specific, 
particular structure and thus might be said to generate information (sensu Shannon 
entropy or reduction of uncertainty). On the other hand, sequences of DNA may correlate 
with sequences of amino acids (or other features of the phenotype) as a result of 
biochemical constraints, and thus might be said to carry specific information (sensu 
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constraint between situations or what-it-is-we-can-learn-from-it) about these other 
features for observers with appropriate prior knowledge. 
The answer to the second question above is ‘No’. I argued that the persistent idea 
that ‘information’ in the genes is special (because of its instructive, form-imposing 
characteristic) follows, not from empirical or theoretical considerations, but rather from 
a worldview that I characterized as preformationist and hylomorphic, distinguishing form 
from matter and nature from nurture. 
I then questioned the usually unquestioned premise that DNA must play a special 
formative (and in-formative) role as a carrier of instructions and presented my motivation 
to search for an alternative framework that eschews preformationism and gives 
appropriate formative weight to all components that take part in form-generating 
processes. I argued that, while different scientists may focus their attention on different 
aspects of the multi-scale processes of inheritance, development and evolution, there is 
no need to commit a priori to a framework that might be characterized as hylomorphic, 
preformationist and that sustains the opposition between nature and nurture. The notion 
of information as a difference that makes a difference was then introduced. In this sense 
information is relational and constituted in interaction as developmental resources 
become relevant to the system, and it cannot be located in the genes or other components 
independently of the actual constructive processes in which they play their roles. 
This chapter has served several purposes relevant to the focus of the thesis. If 
successful it should have (1) clarified some aspects of information talk in biology; (2) 
identified the link between ordinary talk about ‘information’ in the genes and, on the one 
hand, a view of life associated with the nature-nurture disjunction, and, on the other hand, 
a hylomorphic, preformationist way of thinking about development and behaviour; and 
(3) cleared the ground for the following chapters in which I examine ontogeny, behaviour, 
and social learning.
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Chapter 3 The flow of ontogeny 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter has three main goals. The first goal is to present a view of ontogeny – by 
which I mean the entire lifespan of an organism – as a fundamentally historical, relational, 
constructive, and contingent process. Here the organism is not conceived of as the 
expression of a genotype and is not equated with a specific developmental stage in 
ontogeny (say, the adult). Rather, the organism is conceived of as a temporally extended 
process in which an existing organization or form, considered as the starting state of the 
lifespan (usually the zygote) persists under transformations forming a dynamical pattern. 
This pattern is the organism-as-process. The transformations result from the activity of 
many entities and the nonlinear interactions among them. This system of nonlinear 
relations is denoted by the concept of the developmental system. A developmental system 
is defined relative to the target entity under study, such as an organism, an organ, a tissue, 
a cell. It includes the target entity – the current result of a history of transformations – and 
all interactants and processes that are currently influencing or being influenced by it. The 
developmental system of a target entity can be operationalised in different ways 
depending on the spatiotemporal resolution in which observations are made and on the 
questions of interest. 
Given the topic of this thesis, I will pragmatically distinguish among metabolic 
processes, physiological processes, and behaviour, and the second goal of this chapter is 
to clarify the relation among them. These processes are understood as different ways to 
make figure-ground distinctions of what is, in fact, a single multiscale process flowing in 
time – namely ontogeny. The third goal is to note some consequences that follow from 
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the processual, developmental systems view of ontogeny that are relevant for this thesis. 
Thus, in this chapter I intend to clarify the basic framework that will inform the 
subsequent discussions about behaviour (Chapter 4) and social learning and culture 
(Chapter 5). 
3.2 A processual view of life 
I adhere to the ontological thesis that organisms are composed of a hierarchy of processes, 
not a hierarchy of substances. This processual view of life has its roots deeply embedded 
in empirical findings incorporated as part of the received view of biology, including the 
notions of metabolic turnover, tissue and organ regeneration, the sequence of changes that 
compose the typical lifespan of a species, all sorts of biological ‘processes’ in the usual 
sense, and, of course, evolution. For a recent manifesto for a process view of living 
systems, including a historical overview within biology, see Dupre and Nicholson (in 
press). 
Probably the easiest way to distinguish between substances and processes is in 
terms of how they persist in time (DiFrisco, in press), which can be done by using the 
distinction between endurance and perdurance proposed by Lewis (1986). Substances 
endure, i.e. they are constituted by a set of spatial parts which do not change as time 
passes. Thus, in the parlance of philosophers, substances are said to be wholly present 
whenever they are present. On the other hand, processes perdure, i.e. they are composed 
by spatial parts that may change in time. Because processes persist by having different 
stages or temporal parts, they are not said to be wholly present at any moment. 
One of the fundamental characteristics of organisms is that, over time, they change 
in some respects while remaining the same in others. This history of transformations can 
be observed at different spatiotemporal resolutions. At the scale of ions and molecules, 
for example, molecules may be taken in from the environment, change as they participate 
in physicochemical processes, and be eliminated to the environment. At the scale of cells, 
this is observed in the fascinating processes by which an initial zygote is transformed into 
a system of specialised cells which we call an embryo, foetus, baby, infant, and adult. At 
any moment, then, the organism is composed of a set of spatial parts (e.g. molecules, 
cells, organs, the whole body) which might change as the organism flows in time forming 
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a sequence of temporal parts, e.g. metabolic states, developmental stages, behavioural 
categories. 
The typical duration in which events occur varies across processes. Thus, depending 
on the focus of interest, some processes can be taken as given, as unchanging, as the 
context, or as part of the boundary conditions in which other processes occur. For 
example, molecules change more quickly (metabolism) than the cells they compose, thus 
the global cellular organization might be taken as given and unchanging for some 
biochemical analysis. Similarly, cells change more quickly (e.g. metabolic states, cellular 
turnover) than the tissues and organs they compose, thus the global organization of the 
tissue or organ might be taken as unchanging in some analysis of individual cells. This 
insight justifies why adopting a process or developmental systems view does not require 
one to focus on all the processes that are going on – just like in any empirical study, most 
of the processes will be left in the background. However, processes under study are here 
taken as dynamical, relational, constructive, and contingent. 
In the last chapter I rejected the idea that biological form pre-exists in the genome 
as information (sensu instruction, specification, or source of form) and I hinted at an 
alternative perspective focused on form-generating rather than form-imposing processes. 
In the following section I present the notion of self-organization in dynamical systems as 
a processual mechanism of how order can arise in nature spontaneously, i.e. with no need 
to invoke instructions (Haken, 1977; Kauffman, 1993; Nicolis & Prigogine, 1977). 
Because organisms realize a specific kind of organization, namely one that recursively 
generates the system’s components, it will be appropriate to distinguish the notion of 
autopoiesis or self-production (Maturana & Varela, 1973, 1980, 1987) from the notion of 
self-organization. I then explore two related aspects of the fundamental idea that 
developmental systems instantiate dynamic patterns. The first aspect is that, throughout 
ontogeny, multicellular organisms such as animals exhibit stabilised processes that 
biologists commonly categorize in a compositional hierarchy of nested spatial parts 
(molecules, cells, tissues, organs, whole body, multispecies communities). The second 
aspect is that the organism is not limited to a developmental stage (say, the sexually 
mature stage) but encompasses the entire lifespan or ontogeny. In any period, the spatial 
parts that compose the body of multicellular organisms change in some respects and 
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remains the same in other respects, thus the organism persists under transformations in a 
history in which, for example, the zygote becomes the embryo, which becomes the foetus, 
which becomes the infant, which becomes the adult, which becomes the elderly animal. 
These processes of historical transformations form a compositional hierarchy of nested 
temporal parts which taken together, compose the flow of ontogeny. 
3.2.1 Parts and whole co-emerge dynamically in systems of nonlinear 
relations 
In the past decades, the mathematical study of nonlinear dynamical systems and the study 
of open systems far from thermodynamic equilibrium have provided new ways to think 
about how patterns – spatial, temporal, spatiotemporal, functional patterns – can arise 
without the need to invoke a central organizer, but rather as a result of the system’s 
inherent dynamics, i.e. by self-organization (Haken, 1977; Kauffman, 1993; Kelso, 1995; 
Prigogine & Stengers, 1984; Strogatz, 2015). For a historical account, see Keller (2008, 
2009).  
Here are the basic ideas. In systems composed of many parts with nonlinear 
relations (mutualistic feedback), parts interact locally and, as a result of the cooperative 
and competitive effects of these local (or micro level or lower level) interactions, global 
(or macro level or higher level) dynamical patterns may appear in the distributed whole. 
The whole may become stabilised for some time and acquire a thing-like character, but 
its persistence depends on the continuous activity of, and interaction among, its 
component parts. The dynamical patterns may instantiate properties of their own, which 
are not specified by the parts but are inherent in the global dynamics. Thus, we can speak 
of emergent global processes and the properties they instantiate as being enabled by, but 
not reducible to, the component local processes. 
Because of these nonlinear relations, the parts suddenly become systemically 
associated as components of a distributed whole or a synergy, and the global dynamics 
constrain the activity of the parts. To constrain, in this context, means to reduce the 
degrees of freedom that would be otherwise available to the parts if they were still acting 
as independent entities. For example, local air flows can interact locally and 
spontaneously produce a distributed whole or global pattern we call tornado. The tornado, 
once formed, constrains the possible direction of the local air flows, which may have no 
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alternative but to be drawn into the global pattern (say, clockwise rather than counter-
clockwise), thus the form of the tornado is continually being generated by the system of 
nonlinear relations. Haken (1983) calls this top-down constraint, or whole-part 
relationship, the ‘slaving principle’. 
The reciprocal influence between parts and whole, or between local and global 
processes, or between lower-level and higher-level processes, is nothing like a linear 
relationship between antecedent and consequent, or cause and effect. Local air flows do 
not ‘cause’ the tornado in the same way that a billiard ball ‘causes’ another one to move 
by hitting it. Rather, this type of part-whole relationship is captured by Evan Thompson’s 
elegant expression “dynamic co-emergence”, which expresses that “part and whole co-
emerge and mutually specify each other” (Thompson, 2007, p. 38). 
Using relative terms such as parts and wholes, local and global, lower and higher, 
depend on the current focus of interest. Parts (or local, or lower-level processes) interact 
and form a whole systemic unity. Once stabilised, the whole (or global, or higher-level 
process) can act as a part and interact with other stabilised processes, thus possibly 
bringing about further, even ‘higher’, global processes. At all levels of such nested 
hierarchy, each process persists under transformations, at once dependent on the ‘lower 
level’ processes that compose it and constrained by the ‘higher level’ processes which 
they might in turn compose. 
It is possible to describe the process of spontaneous pattern formation in terms of 
the attractors and repellers in the phase space of the system under study. This terminology 
is useful, for the purpose of this discussion, because it provides an alternative vocabulary 
to that of computation with representations. Each degree of freedom of a dynamical 
system can be represented geometrically as an axis in a multidimensional space. Every 
possible state that the system can be in corresponds to a combination of values of these 
degrees of freedom and can be therefore represented as a point in this manifold or 
multidimensional space. The resulting volume defined by all possible values the system 
might exhibit corresponds to its phase space. The history of a system’s state over 
continuous time can be represented by a trajectory in its phase space. Because the global 
dynamics of the distributed whole constrains (i.e. reduces the degrees of freedom of) the 
local processes of the parts and their interactions, some regions in the phase space will be 
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visited with higher probability than others. The points or regions in the phase space to 
which the system’s trajectories tend to converge – which might be a fixed point, an orbit, 
or have some other shape in the phase space – are called ‘attractors’. The points or regions 
in the phase space from which the trajectories tend to move away from are called 
‘repellers’. 
The layout of the attractors and repellers, i.e. the topology of the system’s phase 
space, represents graphically the process of spontaneous pattern formation, i.e. how the 
inherent global dynamics constrain the possible trajectories that the system might follow 
over time. Given the state of the system at some moment, and its inherent dynamics, the 
system will tend to behave in a certain way. In other words, given the location of the 
system in its phase space and the attractors/repellers surrounding it, the system is more 
likely to follow one set of trajectories rather than another. Note that attractors and 
repellers are not concrete objects colliding with the system but theoretical abstractions 
that represent the inherent dynamics instantiated by the system. The global dynamics of 
a distributed system, represented in its trajectory in the phase space, co-emerge 
dynamically with the real-time activity of, and interaction among, the parts that compose 
the system. 
When the system is at or near a stable state, i.e. when its trajectory is within a ‘basin 
of attraction’, fluctuations are usually compensated by the cooperative activities of other 
components of the distributed whole. However, when the system is at or near critical 
points, perturbations can be spontaneously amplified by the local feedback processes and 
drive the system from one attracting region to another through a nonequilibrium phase 
transition. When this happens, the system exhibits a new qualitative global state after the 
transition. The perturbations that can trigger such phase transitions can be modelled 
mathematically by nonspecific control parameters. They are nonspecific in the sense that 
they do not specify or instruct what the new state is, they do not carry information (sensu 
instruction, specification, or source of form) about the characteristics of the new global 
dynamics the system instantiates. The new qualitative state – the form – self-organises in 
the sense that it appears spontaneously with no central commander specifying or 
instructing it. 
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Take the simple case of the Rayleigh-Bénard instability. A thin layer of liquid is 
heated from below and kept at a constant temperature from above, such that a temperature 
gradient is formed. Because portions of the liquid in the lower layer become warmer and 
less dense they tend to rise, forming tiny transient convection streams, but this tendency 
is damped by the molecules bouncing around it locally. When the system is in this 
dynamical regime or attractor, heat is dissipated through conduction and no macromotion 
is observed. However, as the temperature gradient is increased, the system reaches a point 
in which such fluctuations are no longer damped. At some point, one of these transient 
convection streams eventually becomes amplified by the local interaction among 
molecules and the entire system self-organises a new qualitative state or attractor – the 
liquid begins to move as a coordinated whole in a new dynamic regime called convection. 
Because the macromotion of the convection cells help dissipate the heat, they are called 
dissipative structures (Prigogine & Nicolis, 1967). In this case, the control parameter is 
the temperature gradient and it should be clear that there is nothing about it that could be 
said to specify or instruct the form of the spatiotemporal pattern that is formed (i.e. the 
convection cells). The concept of a trajectory in a multidimensional phase space might be 
useful when discussing the histories of different dynamic systems such as a single neuron, 
a neuronal assembly, a region in the brain, as well as different aspects of the ontogenetic 
history of the coupled animal-environment system. 
I did not mention organisms so far because the formation of dynamical patterns 
through self-organization is a phenomenon observed more generally in open physical and 
chemical systems that persist far from thermodynamic equilibrium. However, since the 
very beginning, it was clear that the study of self-organization was fundamental to 
understand morphogenetic processes in organisms (Eigen, 1971; Haken, 1977; Keller, 
2008, 2009; Prigogine & Stengers, 1984). The notion of dynamic-co-emergence of parts 
and the whole they compose, or between local and global processes, will be fundamental 
in my discussion of behaviour, social learning, and culture. 
3.2.2 Dynamic co-emergence of parts and whole in organisms  
Organisms can be conceived of as nonlinear dynamical systems, in the sense that they are 
composed of a huge number of heterogeneous molecules which interact locally 
influencing each other in a continuous history of physicochemical processes (Kauffman, 
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1993). From this perspective, a cell is conceived of as a distributed whole or dynamical 
pattern that appears as a result of the local interactions among the molecules that 
composed it. In turn, the global dynamics that we call ‘the cell’ constrain the molecular 
interactions that might take place locally. Cells persist even as individual molecules are 
incorporated from the outside, transformed in chemical reactions, and eliminated. Thus, 
the cell and the molecules that compose it co-emerge dynamically. In the case of a 
multicellular organism, the nonlinear relations among molecules throughout ontogeny 
compose a body, i.e. a distributed system of interacting cells. The multicellular body, in 
turn, constrains the local cellular processes, and the molecular processes that compose it. 
Later we will bring the environment explicitly into the picture. 
Rather than considering the whole body, we can also focus on some portion of the 
intricate network of (local) molecular processes which compose it. For example, within 
cells, a set of molecular components including phospholipids, structural proteins, 
enzymes, ATP, and so on, interact locally and form a global pattern we call a membrane 
vesicle. The vesicle, once formed, constrains further molecular interactions among its 
components. Individual molecules in the membrane will not be able to move around in 
all directions as they might if they were not caught up in the distributed whole. Rather, 
their hydrophobic portions are likely to remain embedded within the membrane, and their 
hydrophilic portions are likely to face the surrounding water, even in the absence of 
covalent bonds keeping them in place. 
This systematic behaviour of membrane molecules is neither specified nor 
instructed but arises spontaneously, by means of the local interactions occurring under 
the constraints instantiated by the structured whole they help create. In other words, 
vesicles and other membrane-based cellular structures persist, not as static, substance-
like things, but as perduring dynamical patterns. Note that the vesicle now separates an 
inside from an outside, since hydrophilic molecules in the surround are unlikely to pass 
from one side to another. This, in turn, influences other molecular processes in the cell 
because it changes the prior probability of certain chemical encounters. 
Some examples of studies in biology from the theoretical perspective of self-
organization processes include proteins folding (Gerstman & Chapagain, 2005), 
embryogenesis (Hernandez-Hernandez, Niklas, Newman, & Benitez, 2012; Newman & 
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Bhat, 2009), coordination of neurophysiological and behavioural activity (Di Paolo & 
Thompson, 2014; Haken, Kelso, & Bunz, 1985; Kelso, 1995; Schoner & Kelso, 1988; 
Varela, Lachaux, Rodriguez, & Martinerie, 2001; Varela et al., 1991), learning and 
cognitive development (Spencer, Perone, & Buss, 2011; Thelen & Smith, 1994), 
behavioural coordination in schooling and the formation of trails in army ants (Camazine, 
2001), and interpersonal coordination (Dale, Fusaroli, Duran, & Richardson, 2013; Kelso, 
1995; M. J. Richardson, Dale, & Marsh, 2014). 
In sum, living systems can be viewed as intricate dissipative structures and, in that 
sense, they are like tornados and eddies (Nicolis & Prigogine, 1977). But organisms are 
not just like tornados. Living systems are distinguished from other complex systems 
because they instantiate a specific kind of organization or relationship among their 
component processes. 
3.2.3 The autopoietic organization of organisms 
According to the theory of autopoiesis, what distinguishes living from other complex 
systems is that the network of chemical transformations going on within its boundaries 
leads, among many other things, to the recursive production of its own internal 
components and its boundaries (Maturana & Varela, 1973, 1980; Zeleny, 1981). Through 
their metabolic activity, organisms continually take part in regenerating the very 
conditions of their persistence, which involves exchanging matter and energy with the 
environment. When those conditions fail to meet, the system loses its coherence and the 
organism dies. This insight was developed by several authors. I will mainly follow the 
concept of autopoiesis developed by Chilean biologists Humberto Maturana and 
Francisco Varela (Maturana & Varela, 1973, 1980, 1992). Other researchers have 
proposed similar ideas (Eigen, 1971; Gánti, 2003; Mossio, Montévil, & Longo, 2016) and 
it is currently an exciting area of research.  
To quote one definition, autopoietic systems are “networks of productions of 
components that (1) recursively, through their interactions, generate and realize the 
network that produces them; and (2) constitute, in the space in which they exist, the 
boundaries of this network as components that participate in the realization of the 
network.” (Maturana, 1981, p. 21). The autopoietic organization persists under 
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continuous structural changes and can be realized in different ways. Many other 
metabolic processes can occur and even become stable or recurrent features of an 
organism and the lineage of which it is a part, as long as those processes do not disrupt 
its autopoietic organization. 
Differently from machines and other non-living systems, then, organisms are self-
producing or self-making. It is worth making explicit, at this point, that the expressions 
self-producing and self-making are not synonyms for self-organization. The former two 
refer to the theory of autopoiesis, while the latter to the spontaneous pattern formation in 
systems far from equilibrium. The persistence of organisms depends on the recursive 
generation of the processes of production – denoted by autopoiesis, self-production, self-
making – and this involves many instances of dynamic pattern formation through self-
organization. 
The use of the term ‘self’ in these expressions might suggest a primacy of ‘internal’ 
versus ‘external’ processes in ontogeny, or a primacy of the skin separating them as a 
fundamental boundary. This is not what I am implying. Ontogeny necessarily involves 
processes on either side of the organism-environment boundary, as well as processes that 
cut through this fluid boundary such as ingesting food, excreting waste, behaving, and 
communicating. The skin that distinguishes the body from its environment is not taken as 
a fundamental boundary either, but rather as one among other possibilities to draw 
distinctions within the organism-environment system given the focus of interest (Laland, 
Odling-Smee, & Turner, 2014). In the present approach, there is no such thing as a source 
of intelligence or form internal to the organism. There is no molecular homunculus 
(instructions in the genome) guiding its ontogeny from within, and there is no cognitive 
homunculus (instructions in the brain) guiding its behaviour from within. The self – the 
meshwork of interwoven processes that we distinguish as an individual – denotes the 
persisting organism and not an agent within it. 
3.2.4 Developmental systems and the interdependence of organism and 
environment 
The persistence of organisms as organised wholes is achieved through the constant 
activity among its components, and the network of processes of production they take part 
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in. This requires a constant exchange of matter and energy between organisms and the 
physical world around them. 
In other words, organisms are fundamentally open thermodynamic systems, rather 
than closed, and must do work in order to keep on living. The cell membrane exhibits 
selective permeability, i.e. some ions and molecules can pass from the environment into 
the cells, and some can pass from the cells into the environment. Because of this, living 
organisms are also necessarily situated in, and continuously interacting with, relevant 
features of the physical world. The possibility then arises that processes in either side of 
the boundary under consideration, as well as processes in the fuzzy boundary itself, affect 
each other. Especially relevant for this thesis is the fact that this leads to dynamical 
patterns of organism-environment relation such as in perceptually-controlled behaviour, 
ecological relations, or social relations (understood as a subset of ecological relations). 
Thus, the persistence of organisms depends on their surroundings providing the 
appropriate conditions – from the appropriate molecules to the appropriate social and 
ecological relations – or on the organism actively choosing or constructing those 
conditions (Odling-Smee et al., 2003). This makes ontogeny a fundamentally relational 
process. The moving, changing set of features of the physical world that are relevant for 
the ontogeny of the target organism corresponds to that organism’s environment (J. J. 
Gibson, 1979/2015; Lewontin, 1983; Oyama, 1985/2000). The system composed by the 
changing organism and its also changing environment correspond to that organism’s 
developmental system (Gottlieb, 2007; P. E. Griffiths & Gray, 1994; Oyama, 1985/2000). 
In other words, the organism, conceived of as an autopoietic system, is continually being 
generated as the nexus or the focal entity of an entire developmental system flowing in 
time. 
The concept of the autopoietic system is an attempt to define what it means to be 
alive. Therefore, if one accepts this definition, any subsequent statement about organisms 
and their behaviour should be consistent with its being an autopoietic system. Organisms 
can only maintain their autopoietic organization as long as they are situated within and 
co-construct an appropriate environment, thus as part of a changing developmental 
system. This suggests that developmental systems theory and the theory of autopoiesis 
can be aligned in a harmonious way. 
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On the one hand, the abstract notion of a developmental system captures the 
empirical evidence that living systems are continually produced within a larger field of 
(changing) relations among components on either side of their fluid boundaries. On the 
other hand, researchers must always restrict their attention and define the spatial and 
temporal scales at which observations will be made; the specific questions being 
addressed as opposed to what is kept in the background; the methods employed to collect 
and analyse data; and so on. The abstract notion might be useful in guiding scientific 
practice, and it is a necessary part of any empirical investigation to find out what the 
relevant components of the developmental system are that make a difference in explaining 
the phenomenon of interest. 
I will now explore two complementary aspects related to the view of organisms as 
processes which instantiate dynamic patterns. The first is the stabilisation of processes 
into thing-like entities which form a hierarchical compositional organization. The second 
aspect is that these spatial parts are not static but persist within histories of 
transformations. 
3.2.5 Molecules, cells, tissues, organs, and the whole body form a nested 
hierarchy of composition 
It is an established notion in biology that the body of a multicellular organism such as an 
animal is composed of organs, which in turn are composed of tissues, which in turn are 
composed of cells, which in turn are composed of molecules. The spatial relationships 
that hold among these individualized parts (say, organs) are not like the spatial 
relationship among the parts of a machine. Parts of a constructed machine are juxtaposed, 
maybe even glued or welded together. Their shape and relative positions are 
fundamentally determined by external agents – the people involved in their design and 
production. 
In contrast, the different parts that compose the body of an animal at some moment 
do not originate independently from each other. When dissecting an organ, such as a bone, 
we have to quite literally cut it out from other organs and tissues to which it connects. 
Observed under the microscope, the tissues that compose an individual bone would reveal 
to be continuous with, not simply attached to, the tissues that form tendons and muscles, 
blood vessels, the nervous system, and so on. Organisms, in sum, are not assembled by 
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having parts put together. Rather, organisms grow and differentiate from previous forms 
within the seamless flow of ontogeny, a historical process which necessarily occurs 
within an environment and as part of a lineage of genealogically related organisms. 
The notion of “dynamic co-emergence” is useful here to make sense of the part-
whole relationships present in this hierarchical composition (Thompson, 2007). Take, for 
example, the relationship between molecules (parts) and a cell (the whole they compose). 
Molecules are not in the cell they compose in the same way that my socks are in the top 
drawer which contains it. Rather, the (global) process we distinguish as an individual cell 
just is the phenomenal manifestation of the dynamical patterns produced by the 
cooperation among metabolic processes. Once the cellular organization is established, it 
constrains (reduces the degrees of freedom of) the chemical processes that can occur 
among the molecules that compose it. That is, some chemical reactions are more likely to 
take place than others because of the global patterns that are already established. In other 
words, the cell (whole) and the entire metabolic network of chemical processes that 
compose it (parts) co-emerge dynamically.  
Another important aspect is that the persistence of the cell does not depend on the 
persistence of the individual molecules that compose it at any point in time. This is 
because the relationship between the cell and the molecules that compose it is not one of 
identity but one of composition. Molecules come and go and may be transformed as they 
become part of chemical relations. The cell persists under metabolic turnover, and in fact 
depends on it, as long as the global organization persists. 
In the case of multicellular organisms, individual cells (and individual tissues and 
organs) are not independent from each other but rather form a systemic whole. In this 
case, it is coherent to say that the network of molecular processes and the cells they 
compose, the network of cellular processes and the tissues they compose, the network of 
tissues and the organs they compose, the network of organs and the whole body they 
compose – all of these interdependent processes co-emerge dynamically as aspects of the 
same ontogeny. Of course, the lifespan of a multicellular organism might start with a 
zygote (a single cell) in its environment, and for some time the developing organism 
might have no tissues, no organs, and indeed no ‘body’. These higher levels of 
composition are not there from the beginning of the lifespan but become stabilised at 
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different temporal stages of the ontogeny. Nevertheless, this does not mean that the 
molecular processes going on in these initial stages are unaffected by processes going on 
at ‘higher’ levels. This is because processes at these higher levels (say, whole bodies in 
their environment) are composed of molecular processes too. I will return to this point 
below. I should also mention that this hierarchy of composition is not bounded at the level 
of whole bodies. We might even go further ‘up’ since organisms compose populations, 
populations compose multispecies communities, and so on.  
What I want to focus on now is the fundamentally historical and relational 
characters of organisms. Molecules, cells, tissues, organs, and the whole body, not only 
form a compositional hierarchy but co-emerge in time and within an environment. Given 
my interest in behaviour and learning, in the next section I focus on metabolic processes, 
physiological processes, and behaviour. These processes, I suggest, are three different 
ways of making figure-ground distinctions of the unitary, seamless flow of ontogeny, in 
which organisms and their environment are continually being produced. This is relevant 
for this thesis because it paves the way to conceive of social learning in a way that avoids 
the metaphor of ‘transmission of information’ between individuals. 
3.2.6 The relationship among metabolic, physiological, and behavioural 
processes 
The processes that compose organism-environment systems unfold at different 
timescales. In other words, events occurring within different processes can have typically 
different rates and durations. This idea is commonly expressed in the distinction between 
metabolism (higher rate, shorter duration of molecular processes) and development 
(lower rate, longer duration of morphogenetic processes), or between individual 
ontogenies (one lifespan) and evolutionary lineages (multiple lifespans). 
The flow of metabolic processes refers to the astronomic number of 
physicochemical relations going on among molecules and similarly-sized components 
including ions, electrons, and photons. Depending on the question being addressed, 
relevant components might be located on either side of the boundaries that roughly 
separate a cell from its local surroundings, or the whole organism from its environment. 
The very production of the boundaries, as well as the transport of substances and particles 
in either direction, might be of interest too. Examples of environmental components that 
 The flow of ontogeny 57 
take part in metabolic processes include food particles, hormones, pheromones, enzymes, 
photons, odorants, molecules and ions present in the medium (water, air, soil) and on 
surfaces of the relevant materials with which the organism interacts.  
The flow of physiological processes involves the activities of distributed wholes 
(parts of the organism) which lead to the dynamic stabilisation of spatial structures such 
as organs, tissues, cells, organelles, and functional structures such as metabolic pathways. 
They also involve the functioning of these stabilised structures which tends to maintain 
the body within appropriate ranges in relevant parameters given the environmental 
situation. In animals, this includes processes such as digesting food, changes in the global 
activity of neuronal networks, moving muscles and the body parts attached to them, the 
circadian rhythms, regulating body temperature and heart rate. The processes denoted by 
physiological processes are composed of the processes denoted by metabolic processes 
and in turn constrain them. The relationship between metabolic and physiological 
processes is here seen, not in terms of linear cause and effect relations, but of dynamic 
co-emergence of parts and the whole they compose. 
Behaviour implies a living, active animal going about engaging with aspects of its 
environment, as denoted by terms such as walking, grasping, and eating. Instances of 
behaviour are commonly described in terms of the movement of body parts relative to 
each other and relative to relevant features of the environmental situation (Drummond, 
1981; J. J. Gibson, 1979/2015; Hogan, 2017). The animal might also be engaging with 
aspects which are not immediately present to the senses, such as in planning, 
remembering, or imagining. As Drummond (1981, pp. 3-4) summarises, “ethologists and 
behaviorists, though frequently divided on explanatory principles, have always 
recognized implicitly or explicitly that the term [overt behaviour] encompasses all 
observable activities of an organism” thus highlighting “the integration of organism and 
environment” that underlies the “stream of behavior”. This general characterisation of 
behaviour is consistent with the approach to social learning that I am beginning to develop 
in this thesis. 
However, cognition is commonly described from a computational perspective, and 
the form of some observed behaviour is commonly explained by pointing to a previous 
instance of that form. Similar to how ‘information’ encoded in the genome is commonly 
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assumed to be the source of biological form, ‘information’ encoded in the nervous system 
(as a program, representation, algorithm, and the like) is commonly assumed to be the 
source of behavioural form. These claims express a prior commitment to a theoretical 
view about what cognition is about and how behavioural control is to be understood. It 
is, however, a theoretical choice, and not a necessity, to describe cognition in such terms. 
My theoretical choice, in contrast, is to start with the idea that cognitive events unfold in 
the animal’s real time coupling with the environment rather than in the runtime evaluation 
of computational algorithms. 
What, then, one might ask, is the relationship between the activity of the nervous 
system and the flow of behaviour? The flow of neurophysiological activity in the nervous 
system is, of course, one aspect of the animal-environment system relevant to 
understanding how behaviour is produced, and the role of the nervous system in 
coordinating behaviour can and should be studied. The critical point, though, is that 
neurophysiological processes refer only to a part of the system of nonlinear relations 
involved in cognition and behaviour. Rather than adhering to the representational-
computational approach to cognition, my goal is to investigate behaviour and social 
learning from the perspective of radical embodiment. 
The stream of behaviour and the stream of physiology flow in time as aspects of the 
same ontogeny. The movement of a body part during, say, extending a leg, occurs during 
the exact same period as the (physiological) changes in the contracting state of the 
relevant muscle fibres and the exact same period as the (neuro)physiological changes in 
the activity of the relevant neuromuscular networks (Kelso, 1995; Thelen & Smith, 1994). 
Talking about behaviour, metabolism, or physiology, are different ways to make figure-
ground distinctions relative to the ontogeny under study. In discussing behaviour, a ‘big 
picture’ description of the activity of the whole body-in-the-environment – with a coarser 
spatial resolution and with a special interest in what is going on between the surface of 
the animal and its environment – is brought to the foreground of the analysis while other 
aspects of the ontogeny are kept in the background. On the other hand, in discussing 
(neuro)physiology, a small set of the activity of the nervous system is brought to the 
foreground instead. In discussing metabolic processes, a small set of physicochemical 
relations are brought to the foreground. What distinguishes the flow of behaviour from 
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the flow of physiological adjustments is mainly the focus of interest of the observer and 
the spatial scale of the relevant components being invoked. 
This view of the relation among these related processes is preferable, I argue, 
because it does not mistake changing scales and focus of interest for going from causes 
to effects. It will be noted that this suggestion is not an answer to the question, “What, 
then, causes behaviour if not the activity of the nervous system?”. I will return to this 
question in the next chapter. 
3.3 Consequences of a processual view of life 
In the last part of the chapter I focus on some of the consequences that follow from the 
processual, relational-historical, or developmental systems view of ontogeny presented 
above. 
3.3.1 Development is a possible consequence of ontogenetic processes 
Development refers to morphogenesis, i.e. changes in form (including morphological, 
physiological, and behavioural form) that organisms undergo throughout their lifespan 
(Gilbert, 2010). Development might refer to changes in entities and processes observed 
at any spatiotemporal resolution, including changes in the molecular composition of cells, 
in the size and state of tissues and organs, in the abilities to perceive and act, and so on. 
The relatively stable patterns that appear in ontogeny are commonly denoted as 
developmental stages. 
Rather than describing major changes in the historical process of zygote-in-its-
environment becoming body-in-its-environment, we might narrow our focus on some 
specific aspect of interest – the target trait in the study – and investigate the processes that 
compose its history of becoming. For example, we could trace and investigate the 
temporal parts or developmental stages of a bone such as a femur from the embryonic 
tissues, or the embryonic stem cells, or the initial zygote. We could also trace and 
investigate the temporal parts or developmental stages of abilities underlying behavioural 
patterns (Spencer et al., 2011; Thelen & Smith, 1994). Learning, therefore, might be 
considered a class of developmental changes in the bodily structures underlying 
behaviour (Hogan, 2017). In dynamic parlance, learning can be conceived of as changes 
in the layout of attractors in the behavioural phase space defined by the animal-
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environment system (Schoner, Zanone, & Kelso, 1992; Smith & Thelen, 2003; Thelen & 
Smith, 1994). 
Developmental changes appear as consequences of certain causal relations among 
relevant components of the organism-environment system, and they can be triggered by 
entities located on either side of the boundary. Whatever developmental effect an entity 
may have – a hormone, a nutrient, a DNA segment, a volatile substance dissolved in the 
olfactory mucus, a pattern of neuronal firing as a result of behaviour, and so on – depends 
not only on the structure of the entity itself but on the relation it instantiates with the part 
of the organism it affects, the current state of the organism, the timing of the influence, 
and so on. Activating ‘the same’ gene can have different effects in different tissues and 
in the same tissue at different times. Perceiving ‘the same’ environmental situation – 
including the presence and behaviour of facilitators in the context of social learning, can 
have different effects depending on the state of the organism and its history of behavioural 
events thus far. 
3.3.2 Ontogenies are nested within evolutionary lineages 
The events of interest in this chapter occur within the period of individual lifespans, but 
we should note that ontogenies are nested within higher-order processes. A collection of 
ontogenies of the same species living together compose a population, and usually 
populations form multispecies communities with mutual involvement, as their individual 
ontogenies become woven together in time by ecological, social, and genealogical 
relations. Any individual ontogeny begins as a transformation of some part (e.g. gametes) 
of one or two other, parental ontogenies. Individual ontogenies interact locally and the 
global spatiotemporal patterns they produce constrain (reduce the degrees of freedom of) 
the historical trajectories of individual ontogenies. In other words, individual ontogenies 
and multispecies communities co-emerge dynamically. The resulting evolutionary flow 
is therefore not orthogonal to the ontogenetic flows, but composed of them, and unfolds 
at a larger timescale. 
3.3.3 Ontogeny is a fundamentally historical, relational, constructive, and 
contingent process.  
One of the starting points of this chapter was a commitment to process ontology and 
developmental systems thinking. One of the fundamental characteristics of processes is 
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that they persist over time as a sequence of temporal parts, rather than by being 
numerically identical. Organisms are never finished or fixed entities but undergo 
continuous transformations as they keep on living. Ontogeny, as used here, refers to the 
sequence of temporal parts that compose the entire lifespan of an organism. In the case 
of most animals, ontogeny begins with a zygote and ends only when the organism dies. 
Ontogeny is therefore a historical or dynamical process.  
Ontogeny is a relational process because this history of transformations results 
from the real-time interaction among the many components of the organism’s 
developmental system (Gottlieb, 2007; P. E. Griffiths & Gray, 1994; Oyama, 1985/2000). 
These components might be detected and described by us observers at different scales of 
size, and they might be located on either side of the fuzzy boundary between an organism 
and its environment. They include non-living as well as living entities. Therefore, an 
organism and its environment are interdependent aspects of the same ontogenetic process 
and one cannot be defined without implying the other. The term developmental system 
denotes the moving set of components defined by the changing organism and its changing 
environment. 
Ontogeny is a constructive (or emergent) process not only because many of the 
components which take part in this relational history of transformations are constituted in 
the process, but because the (changing) form of the whole organism and the (changing) 
form of its environment are themselves constituted in the very process. Ontogeny is 
contingent because there is no script laid out in advance for this history of 
transformations. The ontogeny trajectory of any organism is enabled and constrained by 
the available developmental resources – some reliably present across generations, others 
less so – but these resources do not specify the emergent form from the outset. The 
availability of similar resources – e.g. because they are recurrent or persistent features of 
the physical world, or because they are somehow passed on between organisms – may 
lead different organisms to undergo similar ontogenetic trajectories, but it would be a 
logical mistake to conclude that any of those resources contain something like instructions 
or a script for ontogeny (Kay, 1998; Keller, 2000; Oyama, 1985/2000; Sterelny & 
Griffiths, 1999). 
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3.3.4 Ontogeny unfolds from phenotype to phenotype 
Ontogeny is commonly said to be a process that goes from genotype (or genes, or the 
genome) to phenotype, but this way of speaking is misleading. It is conventional 
biological knowledge that genotypes, or genomes, are never found except as a part of an 
already organised organism and cannot make things happen in the organism except as 
constrained by a system of relations with other molecules which they causally interact. It 
is also a robust empirical fact that even zygotes are much more than just a collection of 
DNA molecules ready to start constructing the future organism out of inert raw materials 
– indeed, the zygote is the initial form of the organism, i.e. a temporal part of the 
organism-as-process. The initial molecular composition of the zygote –including its DNA 
and much more – plays a fundamental, constructive role in development. And if zygotes 
are to keep on living, the chemical environments around them must also exhibit an 
appropriately changing composition and organization. 
Rather than saying that an ontogenetic trajectory goes from genotype to phenotype, 
then, it would be more precise to say it goes from phenotype to phenotype – or, to be 
more precise, from an early and younger version of the phenotype (with all that comes 
with it, including of course its DNA) in its environment (with all that comes with it, 
including other organisms and their stabilised patterns of relating to each other) to a later 
and older version of the now transformed phenotype in its also transformed environment. 
3.3.5 The social zygote 
The initial temporal parts of the organism (e.g. the zygote, the blastula, and the morula) 
have no organised tissues or organs, but that does not mean that ontogeny, at these early 
stages, is not constrained by what is going on at ‘higher’ levels of organization. In the 
case of placentary mammals, for example, the zygote is formed within the reproductive 
system of the female parent. The parental organism is not an abstract bucket of genes but 
a material, living system already organised into cells, tissues, organs, and a body. Parents 
are already actively engaging in their environment. Therefore, the activities of parental 
organisms co-determine the molecular composition inside and outside of the zygote, thus 
constraining the possible ontogenetic trajectories available to the zygote-becoming-
embryo-becoming-baby. While their offspring are developing, the caregiving parents are 
still busy living their lives, their own ontogenies unfolding in an ongoing history of 
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interactions with other organisms in the social group and the multispecies ecological 
community of which they are a part (Ingold, 2000; Toren, 2012).  
Therefore, the patterns of relations that are already established in a social or 
multispecies community, at the same time, both enable and constrain the ontogenetic 
trajectories of the arriving organisms. The notion of dynamically co-emerging 
ontogenetic flows offers a way to understand how stabilised spatiotemporal patterns of 
social relations, even those denoted by the term social institutions, can play relevant, 
constructive roles in codetermining the developmental trajectories of a person or 
nonhuman animal. They do so not as a reified, “superorganic” (Kroeber, 1917) thing – 
society or culture – acting on the animal from the outside but by co-determining the 
components and processes that can become part of its developmental system, and 
therefore co-determining the interactions that are effectively available to the living 
animal. This is the case even if, at the youngest stages, the newcoming animal has very 
limited possibilities to engage with old-timers in the communities of which it is now a 
part. 
3.3.6 No place for genetic programs 
When the development of a feature is robust (i.e. its development is not affected by the 
manipulated developmental conditions), similar across organisms, and stable across 
generations, it may give the impression of being programmed, of being directed by an 
internal homunculus. The notion of genetic programs has been widely criticised (Keller, 
2000; Neumann-Held & Rehmann-Sutter, 2006; Oyama, 1985/2000, 2015; Oyama, 
Griffiths, & Gray, 2001; Sterelny, 2000; Sterelny & Griffiths, 1999) and it is here 
assumed to provide an inadequate account of morphogenetic processes. Problems 
involving this notion include its preformationist logic; how it helps the “mirage of a space 
between nature and nurture” (Keller, 2010) to persist; how it is linked with a failure to 
distinguish between sources of variation and sources of form (Keller, 2010; Oyama, 
2000a); and how it is linked to an ignorance of not-so-recent-anymore advances in the 
formal study of complex systems, which present an alternative view of how form may 
arise out of disorder in a system of nonlinear interactions (Haken, 1977; Hernandez-
Hernandez et al., 2012; Kauffman, 1993; Kelso, 1995; Newman & Bhat, 2008; Prigogine 
& Nicolis, 1967; Prigogine & Stengers, 1984). 
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However, the habit of invoking the genetic program metaphor as a seeming 
explanation for development is a common behavioural pattern among biologists; it seems 
to be robust relative to the available critiques and to be reliably recurrent since its initial 
development (F. Jacob & Monod, 1961; Mayr, 1961). It is indeed impressive how the 
development of this habit seems an almost inevitable outcome of the process in which 
young people become biologists. It would be an interesting question to ask which learning 
processes are involved in its remarkably reliable recurrence within our educational 
systems. 
3.3.7 No place for nature-nurture 
The distinction between two types of developmental processes – one to reveal 
programmed traits and another for everything else – has no place in the current view of 
development as a dynamic, relational, and constructive process. As a result, the nature-
nurture conundrum, in its many forms (including open programs-closed programs, 
instinctive-learned, innate-acquired, biology-culture) simply does not arise. 
3.3.8 Traits as histories 
The empirical fact that organisms have temporal parts (as well as spatial parts) has a 
profound impact on the notion of biological traits. At any moment, an organism has a 
current form which is the result of the ontogenetic history that has brought it thus far. 
Like the whole organism of which they are a part, traits – i.e. any observable features of 
the organism that are of interest, at any scale of size, including behavioural patterns – also 
have a history. This is necessarily the case even if we abstract a snapshot from this history 
in scientific practice. The term that we use as a label for, say, a trait that is dynamically 
stabilised in the adult animal, implies that ontogenetic history and its fundamentally 
relational, constructive, and contingent character. Labels for traits, then, are like 
condensed narratives of the contingent history of interacting processes which made them 
what they are at the time of observation. 
3.4 Summary and conclusion 
Organisms are open systems far from thermodynamic equilibrium. To say that organisms 
are open systems rather than closed ones refers to the constant exchange of matter and 
energy with the environment. Thus, organisms and their environment are interdependent 
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aspects of the same system – the developmental system. To say that organisms are 
systems far-from-thermodynamic equilibrium, rather than at or close to it, refers to the 
ability of organisms to persist as incredibly organised wholes even in the face of the 
universal tendency of systems to disintegrate and to lose their internal organization. 
Organisms, that is, perform work (in the physical sense) as they keep on living. 
What distinguishes a living from a non-living system is that the network of chemical 
transformations going on within its boundaries leads, among many other things, to the 
recursive generation of its own internal components and its boundaries. Thus, cellular 
metabolism realizes a specific molecular organization which entails the continuous 
generation of itself. This requires that organisms find and, in many cases, participate in 
creating suitable environments in which to live. 
In systems far from thermodynamic equilibrium such as organisms, when many 
parts constrain each other’s activity, these (local or micro-level) relations may lead the 
system to spontaneously organize (global or macro-level) spatial, temporal, or 
spatiotemporal patterns which instantiate new properties. These new or emerging 
properties are measured by variables which distinguish those aspects of the whole which 
are not reducible to ‘lower-level’ variables describing the components. In turn, once these 
global patterns are established, they constrain (i.e. reduce the degrees of freedom of) the 
local parts. In this process of spontaneous pattern formation, the relation between parts 
and whole are not captured by the notion of linear causality. Instead, this relationship is 
better captured by the notion of dynamic co-emergence. This notion was invoked to make 
sense of part-whole relations in organisms. 
The individual ideas presented above are not new. Arguably, the originality of this 
chapter lies in the way in which I consistently weave them together to highlight their 
relation and clarify points of potential conflicts. I started this chapter with a processual 
and relational view of organisms. The spatial form of organisms at any moment was here 
conceived of, not as a nested hierarchy of juxtaposed, independent substance-like things, 
but rather as a nested hierarchy of stabilised processes that co-emerge dynamically. And 
the history of transformations that organisms undergo in their environments throughout 
their lifespan was conceived of, not as a sequence of juxtaposed, independent states, but 
rather as temporal parts of a temporal whole. I distinguished aspects of the flow of 
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ontogeny – metabolic processes, physiological processes, and behaviour – that will be 
relevant for the topic of social learning. Within this view, an individual ontogeny unfolds 
as a network of fundamentally relational, constructive, and contingent processes, going 
on at different scales of size and time. I ended by noting some consequences that follow 
from this view of ontogeny. In the next chapter, I expand on the topic of behaviour before 
finally turning to social learning and culture.
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Chapter 4 The flow of behaviour 
4.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter I presented a view of ontogeny as a dynamical, relational, 
constructive, and contingent process, and I distinguished behaviour as one aspect of the 
flow of ontogeny. In the parlance of dynamical systems, the flow of behaviour is a process 
of dynamic pattern formation. To exhibit a behavioural category is to enact a trajectory 
in the phase space defined by the organism-environment system. To describe overt 
behaviour is to describe this process from a certain viewpoint (as external observers), 
with reference to a specific scale of spatiotemporal resolution (e.g. distinguishing units 
such as limbs and objects rather than individual cells and molecules) and with a specific 
epistemic interest (e.g. the movement of body parts in relation to each other and in relation 
to features of the environment, rather than cellular metabolism). 
To say that behaviour is a trajectory in phase space is admittedly vague. It is, I 
suggest, just as vague as saying that behaviour is the output of computations with 
representations. These suggestions are, in a way, meant to be vague, since they express a 
general metaphor or starting assumption about what behaviour is. One difference between 
these two suggestions might be that we behavioural scientists are likely to be much more 
familiar with computers, with the common-sense notion of ‘processing information’, and 
with the idea that we are centralized agencies controlling our bodies from the inside. It is 
therefore not surprising that the computational metaphor might feel more familiar than 
the dynamic system metaphor. However, it is not familiarity, but harmony with a 
relational-processual approach, that guides my preference for the latter. By making this 
methodological choice, my intention is to highlight the mutual support among 
developmental systems perspective (Oyama, 1985/2000; Oyama et al., 2001), radical 
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embodiment (Chemero, 2009; J. J. Gibson, 1979/2015; Varela et al., 1991), and relational 
thinking (Ingold, 2000, 2011a; Ingold & Pálsson, 2013; Lave & Wenger, 1991; Toren, 
2008, 2012). 
Conceptually, then, I view behaviour as a dynamic pattern produced by the animal-
in-its-environment, rather than as the expression of the activity of the nervous system. 
This should not be taken as a suggestion that the nervous system plays no role in 
producing behaviour, but as an acknowledgement that the activity of the nervous system 
not only influences but is influenced by the activity of other components. Some 
components are located inside the body, e. g. bones, joints, muscles. Others are located 
outside the body (e.g. rocks, water bodies, other organisms). Others are found in the fuzzy 
boundaries between the animal and its environment (e.g. photons interacting with the 
retina, volatile molecules interacting with the olfactory epithelium). The mutual 
constraints among these components reduce the degrees of freedom that would otherwise 
be available to each if they were not part of a distributed whole. Neurons could be firing 
at a different rate if they were not interacting with other neurons and with sensory 
stimulation. Skeletal muscles could be in another state of contraction if they were not 
connected to neurons and bones. Bones could be in a different relative position if they 
were not pulled by muscles and constrained by joints. The movement of body parts is also 
constrained by the medium in which the animal lives (e.g. air or water) and the surfaces 
with which they interact mechanically (e.g. the ground, objects). 
Because these components form a system of nonlinear relations, and because all 
these components influence the form of the behaviour that animals end up exhibiting, it 
is not possible to single out one component – the nervous system – as ‘the’ central 
controller. It is, however, certainly possible to try and distinguish the different roles 
played by different components and to study how each constrains, and is constrained by, 
the others as they produce the dynamic pattern we call behaviour. 
The goals of this chapter are to (1) present a non-representational, non-
computational view of behaviour that is original in its attempt to be consistent with a 
processual, developmental systems view of ontogeny and in its link with social learning; 
(2) clarify how I understand the relationship between the activity of the nervous system 
and other components of the developmental system with respect to behaviour, (3) suggest 
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how the flow of behaviour is produced (if not controlled by the nervous system), and (4) 
conceptualise learning as a possible consequence of behaviour. This will set the 
conceptual context for the discussion about social learning and culture in the remaining 
chapters. 
4.2 What cognition is about 
To achieve the goals of this chapter, I need a view of behaviour – indeed, of cognition in 
general – that is consistent with my premise, that is, one in which behaviour and cognition 
can be conceived of as thoroughly historical, relational, constructive, and contingent 
processes. In other words, I need a view of behaviour and cognition that takes the 
changing animal-in-its-environment as the fundamental unit of analysis. This will not be 
the dominant, representational-computational view of cognition. The cognitivist view is 
based on the representational theory of the mind (Fodor, 1975). It starts with the 
theoretical suggestion that cognition involves the operation of mental processes on mental 
states. Mental processes refer to activities such as thinking, remembering, comparing, 
judging, and inferring. Mental states refer to thoughts, beliefs, desires, perceptions, 
memories, and so on. These states are said to have intentionality because they are about 
or refer to things other than the states themselves. For example, the perception of a red 
apple may be about a fruit that exists in the world, and a memory state might be about an 
event which occurred some time ago. The representational view of cognition explains 
intentional states in terms of representations, and explains their intentionality in terms of 
the semantic properties of representations (Pitt, 2017).  
In its contemporary, computational version, mental representations are taken to be 
analogous to computer data structures, and mental operations are taken to be analogous 
to computational algorithms (Thagard, 2014). Mental representations, like data structures 
in the computer, are considered to be information-bearing structures (Pitt, 2017). That is, 
they carry information (sensu what-it-is-we-can-lean-from-it) about that which they 
represent. For this reason, mental or cognitive processes are, like computational 
processes, commonly characterised in terms of the ‘processing of information’ (although 
it would be more coherent to say processing of data). Most behavioural biologists work 
from this perspective and commonly conceive of learning in terms of the acquisition of 
task-relevant ‘information’, and social learning as a process of ‘transmission of 
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information’ from one animal to another (Boyd & Richerson, 1985; Mesoudi, 2011; 
Whiten, Horner, Litchfield, & Marshall-Pescini, 2004). In these cases, the term 
‘information’ is used somewhat loosely to mean, in fact, ‘representation’, possibly as a 
shorthand for ‘information-bearing structure’. It is therefore intimately associated with 
the notions of (mental) representation and computation. 
4.2.1 Changing the basic metaphor: from computation to dynamics 
In this thesis I reject representational-computational views of cognition as a starting point. 
However, my intention in the rest of this section is not to argue against it but simply to 
contrast it with an alternative which is non-representational and non-computational and 
therefore consistent with the approach I am developing.  
In a paper titled “What might cognition be, if not computation?” Tim Van Gelder 
(1995) famously discussed the operation of the governor of steam engines, developed by 
Scottish engineer James Watt, to argue that cognition can be understood in dynamical 
rather than computational terms (see also a relevant discussion of this paper in Chemero, 
2009, chapter 4). The answer Van Gelder gives to the question in his title is the following. 
“Rather than computers, cognitive systems may be dynamical systems; rather than 
computation, cognitive processes may be state-space evolution within these very different 
kinds of systems.” (p. 347). 
I will follow this suggestion and side with the alternative view known as radical 
embodied cognitive science. I use this term after Chemero (2009) to refer to two 
traditions. One is the ecological psychology developed by James J. Gibson and Eleanor 
J. Gibson, and followers (E. J. Gibson & Pick, 2000; J. J. Gibson, 1966, 1979/2015; Kelso, 
1995; Lee, 2009; Turvey, Shaw, Reed, & Mace, 1981) The other is the enactive approach 
initially proposed by Varela et al. (1991), following the insights from the theory of 
autopoiesis which Varela developed with his former professor Humberto Maturana 
(Maturana & Varela, 1973, 1980, 1992). Although the two approaches developed as 
different traditions, it has been increasingly recognised that they share more similarities 
than differences, and that it might be possible to bring them closer together conceptually 
(Chemero, 2009; McGann, 2014; Thompson & Varela, 2001). 
 The flow of behaviour 71 
I am less interested in what sets these two traditions apart than in what makes them 
natural allies and for the most part I will treat them together under the banner of radical 
embodiment, still making distinctions where appropriate for clarity. This is how  Chemero 
(2009, p. 160) summarises the approach: 
Here, then, is radical embodied cognitive science: animals are 
active perceivers of and actors in an information-rich 
environment, and some of the information in the environment, the 
information to which animals are especially attuned, is about 
affordances. Unified animal-environment systems are to be 
modelled using the tools of dynamical systems theory. There is 
no need to posit representations of the environment inside the 
animal (or computations thereupon) because animals and 
environments are taken, both in theory and models, to be coupled. 
This is, indeed, consistent with my purpose. The use of the term information in the 
context of radical embodiment is different from its use in the computational approach. I 
will return to this point below. For now, I want to consider a few issues to illustrate how 
the dominant approach (computational, representational, cognitivist) and the alternative 
approach (non-computational, non-representational, ecological, enactive, radical 
embodiment) diverge. According to the cognitivist view, perception involves forming 
meaningful representations from the meaningless stimuli that arrive at the sensory organs 
by means of computational processes operating on them. In contrast, according to the 
radical embodiment alternative, perception occurs in the dynamics of the coupled animal-
environment system and it is therefore unnecessary to posit representations of the world 
inside the animal. In saying this I do not mean to be providing an explanation for how 
perception occurs but only to clarify how the different approaches suggest different 
starting points for theoretical and empirical studies of perception. 
In the cognitivist approach, action (overt behaviour) is taken to be the expression 
of motor programs, the output of rule-based manipulations of representations both 
obtained in perception and retrieved from memory. This implies that the form of overt 
behaviour – how the animal moves in space and time during a period of time – is somehow 
given in advance in the posited motor program prior to its appearance in actual bodily 
movements. The alternative perspective rejects this version of preformationist thinking. 
The form of behaviour cannot possibly be given in the nervous system prior to its 
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appearance because, in addition to the nervous system, other components – on either side 
of the skin – play causal roles in determining the flow of behaviour in real time. 
The suggestion that behavioural form is already encoded in a previous motor 
program prior to its appearance in the actual behaviour is analogous to, and as problematic 
as, the notion that phenotypic form is already encoded in a genetic program prior to its 
appearance in ontogeny (Oyama, 1985/2000). From a developmental systems 
perspective, biological form – including behavioural form – is neither pre-existent nor 
ever finished. Rather, form appears and persists under transformation as the result of 
historical, constructive interactions going on among the components of the organism’s 
developmental system, as ontogeny unfolds. In a nutshell, behaviour does not appear in 
the runtime execution of an already computed algorithm, but in the real-time engagement 
of the animal with its environment. 
4.3 What behaviour is about 
Behaviour involves perceiving relevant aspects of the physical world and acting upon 
them and in relation to them. It might also involve awareness of aspects of the 
environment that are not immediately present to the senses, such as remembering 
situations lived in the past, planning, or imagining. To make sense of how the flow of 
behaviour is produced (if not by manipulating mental representations), I will discuss the 
notion of ‘environmental information’, its relation to abilities to perceive and act, and the 
role of intentions. I hope to show that the notion of environmental information is quite 
different from ‘information’ (meaning representation) as used in the cognitivist approach. 
4.3.1 The information available in the environment 
The environment of an animal usually includes non-living components such as the 
medium (water for aquatic animals, air for terrestrial animals), the ‘natural’ objects and 
materials such as mountains, hills, rocks, and water bodies, as well as the objects and 
materials produced by the niche-constructing activities of organisms such as body fluids 
and waste materials, oxygen and carbon dioxide, nests, bee hives, termite mounds, 
shelters, and the myriad of human-made artefacts. These objects and materials furnish the 
different places in the environment which might provide animals with different 
behavioural opportunities or affordances. 
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Consider how the ‘information’ available for visual perception is created (J. J. 
Gibson, 1979/2015). In an illuminated environment, light coming from the sun or other 
sources of illumination is thoroughly scattered by bouncing back and forth between 
reflective surfaces and the medium, and it achieves an equilibrium or steady state. 
Usually, the light arriving at a fixed point of observation is different from different 
directions in a way that is specific to the surfaces surrounding that point. In other words, 
there is a structured rather than a homogeneous flux of photons arriving at any point of 
observation. 
In his ground-breaking work, James Gibson conceived the structure of the optic 
array as a nested set of solid angles, with their apices at the point of observation and their 
bases at distinct surfaces. Neighbouring surfaces, or environmental texture elements, can 
be distinguished by the intensity and/or spectral composition of the light they reflect. The 
structure or pattern at the proximal point of observation specifies – is specific to, and thus 
can inform about – the distal surfaces which constrained its structure. It is in this sense 
that the ambient light array reaching a fixed point of observation and, especially, the 
systematic changes in the array produced by moving along a path of observation (the 
visual flowfield), can be said to create ‘environmental information’. If there was no 
structure in the light arriving at the point of observation, as in a room filled with white 
fog, there would still be stimulation of the sensory neurons but there would be no stimulus 
information available to be detected. 
According to J. Gibson, “Information… refers to specification of the observer’s 
environment” (J. J. Gibson, 1979/2015, p. 131, emphasis in the original). It emphatically 
should not be taken to mean a piece of knowledge conveyed in communication, a 
representation, or a computer-like data structure. He was very much aware that the 
computer metaphor was becoming increasingly popular, with the expression information 
processing being used in place of the traditional notion of input processing by mental 
operations. J. J. Gibson (1979/2015, p. 240) argued that the move was hardly innovative: 
But it seems to me that all they [researchers using the computer 
metaphor in the study of perception] are doing is climbing on the 
latest bandwagon, the computer bandwagon, without reappraising 
the traditional assumption that perceiving is the [mental] 
processing of [meaningless, sensory] inputs. I refuse to let them 
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pre-empt the term information. As I use the term, it is not 
something that has to be processed. The inputs of the receptors 
have to be processed, of course, because they in themselves do 
not specify anything more than the anatomical units that are 
triggered. 
Environmental information should also be distinguished from how the term 
‘information’ is commonly used in the context of communication technology. “The 
information for perception is not transmitted, does not consist of signals, and does not 
entail a sender and a receiver” (J. J. Gibson, 1979/2015, pp. 56-57). In another passage, 
Gibson explicitly distances his use of the term from the mathematical concept. “The 
information for perception, unhappily, cannot be defined and measured as Claude 
Shannon’s information can be” (J. J. Gibson, 1979/2015, p. 232). 
Gibson’s use of the term ‘information’ has influenced later work by situation 
theorists, which I mentioned in Chapter 2. Barwise and Perry (1981, p. 668), for example, 
explicitly say that their view “was profoundly influenced by [ecological psychologist 
Michael] Turvey and others working in the tradition of ecological realism”. According to 
situation theory, information is created by ‘situations’ and informational relations 
between situation tokens should be understood in terms of ‘constraints’ (lawful or 
normative regularities) between situation types. To use Dretske’s (1981) expression, the 
informational content of a situation is the ‘what-it-is-you-can-learn’ about one part of the 
world (situation, signal, state of affairs) by consulting or detecting some other part of the 
world. Situation theorists were initially interested in linguistic phenomena. Translated to 
perception, we can say that the structure of the environment and the structure of the 
ambient array of light (as well as sound, chemicals, surfaces, and so on) are linked by 
regularities or constraints. Thus, the animal can learn about, or become aware of, its 
environment by detecting the ambient arrays that specify it. 
4.3.2 Environmental information guides behaviour 
When an animal occupies a point of observation, its sensory organs can be stimulated by 
the structured ambient arrays of light, sound, chemicals, surfaces, and so on. Moreover, 
its body takes part in structuring the ambient light together with the other objects and, 
therefore, the information available at that point is as much about the situations it involves 
as it is about the animal itself. That is, “the perceptual systems are propriosensitive as 
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well as exterosensitive” (J. J. Gibson, 1979/2015, p. 108). The vague boundaries of the 
field of view, for example, specify the body occupying that location – more specifically, 
the nose, the edges of the eye socket, the eyebrows, and the cheekbones. Other parts of 
the body such as arms, hands, abdomen, legs, and so on, are also directly specified in the 
ambient light array. Information about the animal is available to all perceptual systems: 
“An individual not only sees himself, he hears his footsteps and his voice, he touches the 
floor and his tools, and when he touches his own skin he feels both his hand and his skin 
at the same time. He feels his head turning, his muscles flexing, and his joints bending.” 
(J. J. Gibson, 1979/2015, p. 108). 
Suppose you look at a rectangular table by keeping one eye shut and positioning 
the open eye on a line perpendicular to its surface. The form of the envelope of the solid 
angle arriving at the retina, which specifies the outline of the face of the object as seen 
from this point of observation, will be rectangular (or nearly so, for the retina is not a 
plane). If you now move a bit to the side, the form arriving at the retina is no longer 
rectangular but trapezoidal. This is the case because the angles at the table corners and 
the proportions of the sides change from one point of observation to another. At the same 
time, there are relations among the angles and relations among the proportions, described 
by projective geometry, that remain unchanged under transformations. These invariants, 
as Gibson argued, are specified in the optic flowfield and available to a moving observer. 
The suggestion is that, by looking at the table along a path of observation, your perceptual 
system can detect the underlying invariants and you therefore perceive the form of the 
table as a persistent feature of the environment. 
This perception is direct in the sense that the patterns are present in the visual 
flowfield and therefore it is not necessary to posit mental operation such as representing 
the table’s angles and side lengths and then performing computations to derive the 
invariant quantities. Rather than computing the invariants, perceiving is about detecting 
them. More recently it has been suggested that pattern detection can be achieved, without 
recourse to algorithmic operations, by spontaneous (self-organising) processes of 
dynamic pattern formation in nonequilibrium systems (Haken, 1996; Kelso, 1995). In the 
case of visual perception, such processes may result from the perturbations produced in 
the ongoing neurophysiological dynamics by the causal interactions between photons and 
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photoreceptors in the retina. Saying this does not solve the problem of how visual 
perception occurs but it offers an alternative way to conceive the problem in non-
representational, non-computational terms. Much more empirical and modelling work is 
required to understand the details of how direct perception is achieved. It should be noted 
that saying that the brain really computes the invariant quantities (instead of sensing it 
directly) does not solve the problem either, but rather defines the alternative 
computational framework which might be used to investigate it. 
When an observer moves along a path of observation, the optic structure arriving at 
the retina (i.e. the environmental information thus made available to be picked up by the 
visual system) changes in some respects – what Gibson called the ‘perspective structure’ 
– and remains unchanged in other respects – the ‘invariant structure’. Each unique point 
of observation in the environment is specified by a corresponding perspective structure. 
Each line segment connecting adjacent points of observation, i.e. each path of possible 
displacements in the environment, is specified by a corresponding set of transformations 
in the perspective structure. Therefore, the information made available in the time-
evolving perspective structure, which in part depends on the activity of the animal, 
specifies the current position and the path of locomotion of the observer in the 
environment. That is, a perspective structure flowing in time means locomotion along a 
specific path, and an arrested perspective structure means rest. The optic structure that 
remains invariant under transformation requires activity to be made available and sensed. 
This invariant structure is common to a set of points of observation and specifies, not the 
observer, but the persisting features of the environment.  
Events occurring in the environment are specified by local disturbances in the 
ambient structured arrays. For example, the displacement of an object against a 
background is specified by the progressive deletion of optic structure at one border and 
accretion of structure at the opposing border. The approach of an object is specified by 
looming, i.e. the magnification of the optic form that specifies the object with progressive 
deletion of optic structure outside its contour. Elastic events such as the overt behaviour 
of other animals are specified by the deformation of the optic form that specifies their 
body parts. Vocalisations structure the mechanical waves in the medium and are therefore 
specified in the sound array. The elimination of substances, such as releasing pheromones 
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in the atmosphere or leaving chemical trails on the ground, structure the available 
chemical arrays. And so on. It is invariants such as these that animals have available to 
detect the presence and activity of other animals, and which they might use to guide their 
own behaviour. J. J. Gibson (1979/2015) argued and reviewed empirical evidence that 
people are indeed able to detect invariants, and research programs inspired by Gibson 
have provided further support (Lee, 1976, 1998; Lee & Reddish, 1981; Turvey & Carello, 
2011). 
Note that the information available in the perspective structure is propriospecific, 
i.e. is about the relative position of the animal in the environment. In contrast, the 
information available in the invariant structure is exterospecific, i.e. is about the 
components in the environment, including other animals. They are concurrent and each 
imply the other. By picking up both kinds of information, animals might perceive the 
environment and themselves in it at the same time. 
Animals in different locations, and animals following a similar path at different 
times, might detect the same patterns. The fact that environmental information is thus 
publicly available to animals with similarly tuned perceptual systems is crucial to 
understand processes of social learning without recourse to the metaphor of ‘transmission 
of information’ (representations) between animals. Animals that are closely related 
genealogically, and whose ontogenies unfolded in similar developmental niches, might 
develop functionally similar perceptual systems. Consequently, they might detect the 
same information available in their common environment. 
Also crucial to social learning is that animals playing the role of facilitators can, by 
means of their presence and activity, direct the learners’ attention to information 
specifying task-relevant aspects of the environment as well as create information that 
would otherwise not be available to them. When facilitators perform the target task, 
vocalize in response to a perceived threat, or provide verbal instructions, for instance, 
they structure the ambient arrays of light, sound, etc, thus creating information that might 
be perceived by others around them. In this view, social learning is a historical and 
relational process of developing abilities, in which ontogenies unfold in time and are 
intertwined, rather than a computational process of acquiring representations. I will return 
to this below. 
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In the ecological approach, perception is conceived of as a continuous activity of 
sampling the ambient arrays of light, sound, chemicals, materials, and so on, that specify 
features of the environment and the perceiver at the same time. Some of the information 
available in the environmental situation is especially relevant for behaviour because it 
specifies the affordances of surfaces, objects, places, and events. For example, if we 
perceive that an object has opposing faces separated by a distance smaller than our hands, 
we perceive that the object affords grasping. The affordance graspability is specified in 
the flowing optic array and can be perceived directly, i.e. without invoking algorithmic 
transformations of representations. To argue that affordances can be perceived directly 
does not imply that animals ‘just do it’. The abilities required to detect environmental 
information and perceive affordances, like all abilities, must of course develop, and can 
also be changed consequent on experience, i.e. through learning (E. J. Gibson & Pick, 
2000). 
Animals with appropriately tuned perceptual systems can sample the patterns 
available in their current environmental situation and use them to adjust their flow of 
behaviour accordingly. This includes guiding their behaviour in relation to aspects of the 
environment that are currently present to their senses. For example, the optic flowfield 
being such and such might inform the animal about the presence of a fruiting tree ahead. 
The skilled animal can use the patterns in the optic flowfield to adjust the direction of its 
locomotion towards it. Similarly, when linguistically skilled people engage in 
conversation, the mechanical (sound) waves being such and such inform them about what 
the other wants to convey and they can adjust their own utterances in response. 
Animals can also use the patterns available in their current situation to become 
aware of the past, present, and future situations they imply, because of the regularities 
linking them. Skilled animals can therefore guide their behaviour in relation to aspects of 
the environment that are not currently present. Imagine a group of hunters searching for 
game as they move along a path in their environment. On the one hand, the (proximal) 
patterns in the optic flow as they move along specify, and can therefore inform them 
about, the (distal) patterns in the mud on the ground. Depending on their previous 
experience, detecting these patterns might inform them about the nearby presence of a 
deer, even if they cannot see it at that moment. This way people (and other animals) can 
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plan and guide their behaviour in relation to an expected situation (the presence of a deer), 
in ways that might be influenced by past, remembered situations (previous hunting 
expeditions, stories told and heard about similar hunting situations, and so on) and also 
by imagined situations. 
4.3.3 Behaviour as dynamic pattern formation 
The hypothesis put forward by Haken (1996) and Kelso (1995) is that the detection of 
spatiotemporal patterns in the flowing energy arrays, i.e. perceiving the environment, is 
achieved by the formation of spatiotemporal patterns of neuronal activity. This involves 
moving the body parts that compose the perceptual systems around to sample the ambient 
arrays (J. J. Gibson, 1966, 1979/2015). These global patterns of neuronal activity are 
enabled by the constructive interactions that occur in the sensory surfaces, and how they 
become integrated in the on-going activity of the rest of the brain-body-environment 
system. In the case of visual perception, pattern detection/formation might result from the 
perturbations, i.e. the structured flux of photons arriving at the retina, to the ongoing 
(neuro)physiological dynamics of distributed neuronal assemblies. 
Sensing a pattern available in the structured ambient array corresponds to settling 
on an attractor. Making this theoretical suggestion does not explain all aspects of what 
we might want to know about perception. Rather, it offers an alternative starting point for 
theoretical and empirical studies. The study of spontaneous pattern formation in 
nonequilibrium systems, as formalised using the mathematical tools of dynamic systems 
theory, offers a metaphor or framework that is an alternative to the representational-
computational framework, one that is consistent with Gibson’s notion of perceptual 
systems ‘tuning in’ or ‘sensing’ or ‘resonating to’ the patterned energy and material arrays 
available in the environment by which animals might pick up the invariants that specify 
relevant environmental features. 
Similarly, the production of spatiotemporal patterns of body movements, i.e. 
controlling overt behaviour, is also achieved by the formation of spatiotemporal patterns 
of neuronal, and neuromuscular, activity (Kelso, 1995). This involves perceiving the 
relevant affordances. These global patterns of activity are enabled by the constructive 
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interactions that occur in the motor surfaces, and how their (feedback) effects in the 
sensory surfaces become integrated in the on-going activity of the rest of the system. 
The cognitivist view commonly describes behaviour in term of a linear sequence 
such as sense-compute-act. From the radical embodiment view, this suggestion makes no 
sense. It is certainly the case that some specific perceptual exploration may occur before 
some specific course of action. For example, a commuter might see the train arriving at 
the platform before boarding it. However, visually perceiving the train depends on her 
moving her eyes, head, etc, to sample the visual flowfield and detect the invariants that 
specify the arriving train. Thus, perception involves action. On the other hand, 
successfully boarding the train depends on her perceiving the position of the train relative 
to her own body and on her skilfully moving different body parts relative to each other 
and relative to the ground and the train door. Thus, action involves perception. What this 
illustrates is that perceiving and acting are aspects of the same behavioural flow, always 
occurring simultaneously in sensorimotor loops rather than in linear logical, 
computational sequences of sense-compute-act. In the next section I focus on the relation 
between abilities to perceive and act and affordances. 
4.3.4 Abilities and affordances are relational and dynamical features of the 
developmental system 
The notions of abilities and affordances are intimately related. Abilities refer to what the 
animal can perceive and do in its environment, and therefore depend on the organization 
of the animal’s body (the current product of its ontogeny) as much as they depend on 
what the current situation affords. On the other hand, affordances refer to the behavioural 
opportunities that the current situation provides the animal, and therefore depend on the 
structure of the environment (the current product of its history) as much as they depend 
on the animal’s current abilities. Chemero (2009, p. 151) argues that “affordances and 
abilities are not just defined in terms of one another… but causally interact in real time 
and are causally dependent on one another.” 
This view of affordances and abilities is thoroughly relational and processual. It is 
sensible, for the purpose of communication, to say that ‘the animal’ has the ability to X, 
but this is not accurate and must be qualified. Abilities are not something that animals 
‘have’ in the same sense that they might have four legs and a tail, for example. Rather, 
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abilities are here understood as relations inherent in the animal-environment system. 
When we say that some animal ‘has the ability to X’, what that means is that the animal 
has the relevant bodily organization on which the abilities depend. On the one hand this 
includes bones, joints, tendons, muscles, and so on, and the biomechanical properties they 
instantiate. On the other hand, this also includes neuromuscular networks and the 
coordinative properties they instantiate. Note that saying that an animal has the bodily 
organization that supports the ability to X plays a similar epistemic role to saying that it 
has the ‘information’ (meaning representations) required to solve some task, however 
framed from the perspective of radical embodiment. 
The counterpart to abilities are affordances. Gibson and some of his followers 
argued that affordances are properties of the environment (J. J. Gibson, 1979/2015; 
Turvey, 1992; Turvey et al., 1981). More recently, Chemero argued for a dynamical 
account in which “affordances are relations between abilities to perceive and act and 
features of the environment” (Chemero, 2009, p. 150). Because an animal’s abilities and 
the features of the environment are not static but change over time, I agree with Chemero 
that a dynamical and relational account is more appropriate here. The dynamics of the 
affordances available to animals can be studied over developmental and behavioural 
timescales. Additionally, the dynamics of the common affordances available to a group 
of individuals can also be studied over evolutionary timescale, for example in terms of 
the similarities and differences in the affordances that appear across genealogically 
related lifespans. 
We say that an animal has the ability to perceive A (or the ability to do B) when, 
given that the environmental situation affords perceiving A (or doing B), the animal might 
perceive A (or do B). Note that this is not a lawful but a normative regularity. That is, 
even when the appropriate situation is the case, the animal might not A. I have the ability 
to climb stairs and walk through doors, but I do not climb every staircase and walk 
through every open door I happen to come across. More generally, at any moment animals 
are likely to find themselves in situations which afford several different behaviours but 
end up exhibiting one behaviour rather than the others. The reason for this is that there 
are other determinants of behaviour such as the intentions of the animal as well as random 
or unpredictable fluctuations. 
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4.3.5 The role of intentions from a dynamical perspective 
I explicitly include intentions as playing relevant roles in the determination of the flow of 
behaviour. However, intentions are here conceived without invoking representations. 
Juarrero (1999) suggested that intentions could be understood in dynamic terms, as global 
patterns of firing activity in distributed local networks of neurons (neuronal assemblies). 
A prior intention (to do A rather than B, C, or D) is formed in the course of moving about, 
in response to what is being perceived as well as the animal’s overall physiological state 
such as the animal is asleep or awake, hungry or satiated, cold or comfortable, and so on. 
Once formed, it become integrated in the rest of the neural dynamics, making some 
behaviours more likely to appear than others. 
Many intentions can be instantiated in the same period, their corresponding neural 
activities cooperating and competing in the global coordination dynamics. Formulated in 
words, an intention can be anything from vague (e.g., ‘forage’) to specific (‘go to that 
patch of fruiting tree’) to even more specific (‘eat this fruit now’). Even though the 
examples above are represented as written orders, intentions are not assumed to be 
algorithmic instructions but dynamic patterns of firing activity in distributed neuronal 
assemblies. 
In a similar theoretical suggestion, Kelso and colleagues argued and presented 
empirical evidence that intentions play the role of specific control parameters perturbing 
– stabilizing or destabilizing – existing behavioural attractors i.e. preferred modes of 
coordination (Kelso, 1995; Scholz & Kelso, 1990; Schoner & Kelso, 1988). 
4.4 What produces the flow of behaviour? 
I can now turn to one of the main points of this chapter, bringing together the notions of 
abilities, affordances, and intentions. The flow of behaviour is here conceived of as 
resulting from the moment-to-moment interaction among several processes that are co-
occurring as aspects of the flow of ontogeny. These processes do include the activity of 
the nervous system, but the nervous system alone does not produce behaviour. 
Specifically, I suggest that the flow of behaviour results from the interplay of: 
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1. The (changing) environmental situation in which the target animal is involved and 
what it affords given the animal’s abilities. The situation might include the presence 
and activities of other animals, and the product of those activities. 
2. The (changing) current organization of the animal’s body and what abilities to 
perceive and act they support given the environmental situation. 
3. The animal’s (changing) prior intentions, which can be more or less specific. The local 
dynamics that correspond to prior intentions might change the prior probabilities of 
different behavioural attractors and therefore influence what the animal ends up 
doing. Alternatively, this can be framed with a stronger reference to the environment. 
Different aspects of the environment afford different behaviours, and they differ in 
terms of valence, i.e. in terms of how strongly they invite or discourage the animal to 
perform the corresponding behaviour. 
4. Random or unpredictable fluctuations in any of the above processes. 
All determinants listed above should be taken as processes, i.e. as persisting under 
transformation in time. Each of these constrains and is constrained by the others, and it is 
in this history of constructive interactions that the flow of behaviour is continually being 
produced. Conceived of as an aspect of the flow of ontogeny, behaviour is therefore a 
historical, relational, constructive, and contingent process. 
One consequence of this view is that the analysis of any behavioural event should 
assume, as its starting point, that the animals involved already have a certain organization 
(the result of their ontogeny thus far) and are already actively engaging with their 
environment as a function of their existing abilities and intentions, as well as the 
affordances of the environment, and the encompassing history which has brought about 
the current situation under analysis.  
Every behavioural event is a unique occurrence in space and time. However, 
different events can share enough similarity or family resemblance to justify grouping 
them in the same category and giving it a name, allowing for scientific generalisation. 
Thus, even though no two people ever walk in exactly the same way, and even though no 
two steps are ever exactly identical even for the same person, we are justified in speaking 
of ‘walking’ or ‘lifting a leg’ as behaviour categories that may recur throughout an 
animal’s ontogeny and that may be instantiated in different ontogenies. 
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Behaviour categories can be defined by the regularities across the instances that 
compose them. According to Drummond (1981), these regularities include (1) the 
location or places where the behaviour typically occur; (2) the general orientation of the 
body in the environment; (3) the posture or changes in posture of body parts in relation 
to each other and in relation to relevant features of the environment; (4) other 
physiological adjustments which do not involve overt movement such as adjustments in 
alertness, body temperature, bioluminescence, electric discharges, glandular secretion, 
and so on; and (5) physical changes brought about in the environment as a consequence 
of bodily movement, such as the displacement of objects, the consumption of food, the 
release of bodily materials (e.g. pheromones, waste products, small body parts such as in 
moulting or cell renewal). 
4.5 Learning is a possible developmental consequence of behaviour 
Throughout ontogeny, animals continually perceive and act in their environment, in a 
seamless sequence of behavioural events. When we use terms such as walking, looking 
at a tree, reaching for a fruit, and so on, we are distinguishing some aspect of the animal’s 
ontogeny that implies a specific spatial resolution (body parts, objects in the 
environment), a specific temporal resolution (e.g. seconds and minutes), and a specific 
epistemic interest (e.g. in terms of perception and action). At a finer spatiotemporal 
resolution, and with a focus on metabolism, these behavioural events would correspond 
to a sequence of physiological events – including neurophysiological events (Rose, 1981). 
On the one hand, behavioural events – and thus (neuro)physiological events – are enabled 
by the network of metabolic processes which compose them. On the other hand, the global 
behavioural dynamics – and thus the global (neuro)physiological dynamics – constrain 
(reduce the degrees of freedom of) those metabolic processes. This two-way relation 
between the parts and the whole they compose is not mysterious but a general 
characteristic of nonlinear dynamical systems (Haken, 1983; Kelso, 1995; Strogatz, 
2015). 
By reducing the degrees of freedom of ‘lower-level’ processes, such as cellular 
metabolism within neurons and muscle fibres, behavioural events may, over time, lead to 
systematic changes in the organization of the animal’s body – especially in the 
organization of different parts of the nervous system. These changes can be more or less 
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persistent, more or less reversible, more or less influential in the global behavioural 
dynamics, more or less robust to perturbations which might come from the environment, 
from the activity of other neuronal networks, from other body parts such as bones, 
muscles and joints, or from local fluctuations. Such changes might, in turn, affect the 
animal’s capacity to synthesize certain behaviours. When behavioural scientists associate 
such behavioural changes with improved performance in some target task under scrutiny, 
they commonly say that animals have learned something about the task from their 
experience. 
Learning refers, not only to certain behavioural events within the animal’s flow of 
ontogeny, but also to a specific consequence of those events, namely some change in the 
tested ability that we observers might consider to be an improvement. In other words, the 
verb ‘to learn’ refers, not simply to the performance of a task, but rather to the 
performance of a task and the occurrence of an anticipated outcome. To use the distinction 
put forward by philosopher Gilbert Ryle (1949), the verb ‘to learn’ is not a “task verb” 
but rather a “success verb” or an “achievement verb”. 
To see the difference between a task verb and a success or achievement verb, 
consider the example of a person running and winning a marathon. From start to finish, 
she is exercising several abilities such as steering away from obstacles, adjusting the pace, 
following the landmarks to stay on track, grabbing bottles of water and drinking from 
them, and so on. She is behaving in many ways, but we will only know if she won the 
race retrospectively, depending on her performance relative to her competitors. In this 
example, ‘to run’ is a task verb and ‘to win’ is a success or achievement verb. Winning a 
marathon implies both running and achieving an outcome – namely, arriving at the finish 
line before the competitors. 
Similarly, a person or an animal might be engaging with a task and exercising 
different abilities, thus behaving in many ways. However, we will only be justified in 
saying that they were learning something in the process if there is evidence suggesting 
that some relevant change occurred as a result. In line with this rationale, learning is 
commonly conceptually defined in terms of developmental changes in the animal’s body 
that underlie performance, and operationalized in terms of changes in some performance 
measure (Hogan, 2017). From a representational-computational perspective, the changes 
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that correspond to learning are considered in terms of representations encoded in the 
nervous system (Heyes, 1994; Hogan, 2017; Hoppitt & Laland, 2013) From the 
perspective advocated here, the changes that correspond to learning are considered in 
terms of the body parts involved in abilities, especially neuromuscular networks and their 
inherent coordination dynamics, but also any other body parts such as muscles and joints. 
Here, then, is another main point of this chapter. Conceptually, I view learning as 
changes in the organization of the body parts involved in behaviour that are consequent 
on the animal’s practical engagement with some task (broadly conceived), and that are 
reflected in improved performance in that task over repeated attempts. I believe this 
characterisation is consistent with the general idea underlying how behavioural scientists 
use the term, at the same time as it points to a clear theoretical divergence, with no 
mention of the formation of association between representations. “Learning”, in the 
words of Maturana (1980, p. 45), “is not a process of accumulation of representations of 
the environment; it is a continuous process of transformation of behaviour through 
continuous change in the capacity of the nervous system to synthesize it”. 
Similarly, Gibson characterises perceptual learning as “the improvement of 
perceiving with practice and the education of attention” (J. J. Gibson, 1979/2015, p. 243). 
When learning occurs, the animal has become “attuned to [environmental] information 
of a certain sort. The [perceptual] system has become sensitized. Differences [in the 
ambient arrays] are noticed that were previously not noticed. Features become distinctive 
that were formerly vague” (id). 
A note on learning and memory 
Learning is intimately associated with memory, i.e. with how past events can affect 
present behaviour. From a representational-computational approach, memory is 
understood similarly to how computers store data. The animal’s experience can lead to 
the formation of short- or long-term structures that represent some aspects of those 
experiences. These representations can be retrieved and manipulated, together with new 
representations coming from perception of the present situation. The animal can thus 
compute an output that is (hopefully) adequate to its current situation. Remembering is 
then understood in terms of the animal retrieving some representation of past experience. 
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Following the computer metaphor, this implies that some agent, an internal homunculus, 
must interpret what these representations mean. 
The account above is inconsistent with a radical embodiment approach. An 
alternative way to understand memory and remembering is in terms of organizational 
changes consequent on experience. I have suggested above that behaviour is controlled 
by the historical and constructive interplay between abilities, intentions, and affordances 
(as well as unpredictable fluctuations). Abilities and intentions depend, among other 
things, on the biomechanical properties of body parts such as bones, muscles, joints, etc, 
as well as the coordinative dynamics of neuronal networks. 
The biomechanical properties of different body parts and the coordinative dynamics 
of neuronal networks are a function of their organization, i.e. the relations among a set of 
material components that persist even as individual components might be incorporated, 
transformed, or eliminated (e.g., due to cellular turnover and metabolism). Experience – 
the flow of behaviour – can lead to developmental changes in the organization of different 
body parts because the global patterns constrain the local processes that compose them. 
Thus, the current biomechanical properties and coordinative dynamics of different body 
parts are linked to past experience by a history of causal relations and therefore informed 
by them. 
This way, past experience can affect present behaviour – not because the animal 
formed representations about past events, but because past events played a role in 
determining the present organization of the animal’s body. In sum, past experience is not 
‘represented’ but ‘embodied’. Remembering can then be understood in terms of the 
enactment of patterns of activity (such as neuronal activity) that are not only similar to 
past activity but causally linked to them. Because of this constraint between them, the 
current activity can inform the animal about its past experience. 
4.6 Summary and conclusion 
The motivation for this chapter was to present a view of behaviour from the perspective 
of radical embodiment, as an historical achievement of the system composed of the whole 
animal-in-its-environment. I rejected the theoretical suggestion that cognition is about 
obtaining and manipulating ‘information’ (meaning representations) about the 
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environment. In its place, I sided with the suggestion that cognition is about detecting 
relevant environmental information (sensu constraint between situations or what-it-is-we-
can-learn-from-it) and using it to guide behaviour, including planning, remembering, and 
imagining (conceived of as enacted dynamical patterns, not computations with 
representations). I have also rejected the theoretical suggestion that behaviour is the 
expression of the activity of the nervous system and sided with the suggestion that 
behaviour is a dynamic pattern or a trajectory in phase space that involves the entire 
animal-environment system (including but not restricted to its nervous system). 
The ambient arrays of light, sound, chemicals, surfaces, and so on, are rich in 
patterns or structure. Animals also play their part in creating such patterns by their 
presence and behaviour. Because the structure of the ambient arrays is linked to other 
situations, including past and future situations, by constraints, they can inform the 
perceiving animals about them. Skilled animals can thus sample and explore the ambient 
arrays with their perceptual systems and use the information they detect to guide their 
behaviour in relation to the immediate context but also in relation to situations that are 
distant in space (located elsewhere) and time (past and future). These patterns are publicly 
available and might be detected directly (i.e. without the mediation of mental 
representations). 
Some of the information available in the environmental situation is especially 
relevant for behaviour because it specifies opportunities for action or affordances. 
Affordances refer to what abilities animals might exercise, given the situation in which 
they find themselves. Abilities refer to what animals might perceive and do, given their 
bodily organization and the affordances currently present. These notions are intimately 
related. In any situation there are possibly several abilities that the animal might exercise 
or, in other words, several affordances that the animal might engage. What it ends up 
doing depends on many things. I suggested that the flow of behaviour results from the 
dynamic, real-time interplay of (1) the current (changing) affordances of the environment; 
(2) the current (changing) abilities of the animal; (3) the (more or less specific) intentions 
of the animal (or, alternatively, differences in the valence associated with aspects of the 
environment); and (4) random or unpredictable fluctuations. 
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Finally, I distinguished learning from behaviour. I did so by defining learning as a 
possible consequence of behaviour, namely the occurrence of developmental changes in 
the body parts involved in abilities. This includes changes in neuromuscular networks and 
their inherent coordination dynamics, but also in any other relevant body part such as 
muscles and joints. In the next chapter I will explore how this view of behaviour leads to 
an alternative approach to social learning and culture.
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Chapter 5 Living and learning socially 
5.1 Introduction 
In chapter 3 I presented a view of ontogeny as a dynamic, relational, constructive, and 
contingent process. In chapter 4 I proposed that the flow of behaviour is produced by the 
historical interplay between the abilities and intentions of the animal and the affordances 
of the environmental situation (as well as unpredictable fluctuations). I distinguished 
learning as a possible consequence of the flow of behaviour – not in terms of the 
acquisition of representations but in terms of organizational changes in the body parts 
involved in controlling behaviour. 
Oftentimes, an animal’s environment includes other animals. The bodies of animals 
reflect light, produce mechanical waves in the medium, eliminate substances, irradiate 
heat, exert mechanical forces, and so on. Thus, by their presence and activity, animals 
make environmental information available in the form of specific patterns in the ambient 
arrays of light, sound, chemicals, and so on. It is this information that skilled animals 
might detect (not ‘represent’) when perceiving and acting in relation to, or together with, 
others around them. 
The goal of this chapter is to discuss some consequences that assuming this 
relational, historical, developmental systems view of ontogeny and behaviour might have 
for the study of how animals live and learn socially. I will first discuss the notion of 
behavioural coupling and its role in social living more generally before I focus more 
specifically on social learning. 
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5.2 Living socially 
When two or more animals live together, however briefly, they bring their histories, their 
abilities, and their intentions, to the common situation in which they find themselves. If 
they can detect each other’s presence, and if they can act towards each other, the 
behavioural flow of each might, as a consequence, influence and be influenced by what 
the others are doing; they become (statistically) correlated and (mechanistically or 
informationally) coupled, at least transiently (De Jaegher & Di Paolo, 2007; De Jaegher, 
Di Paolo, & Gallagher, 2010; Fogel, 1993; Kelso, 1995; King, 2004; Maturana & Varela, 
1992). 
Behavioural coupling can involve mechanical forces, such as when parents carry 
their offspring around. It can also involve informational relations by means of perceiving 
each other, even if animals are not in direct physical contact. Informational relations do 
not refer to acquiring representations but refer to the existence of (lawful or normative) 
regularities among situations. For example, a skilled predator might detect the patterns in 
the optic array that specify the presence of a prey. According to its abilities, it can use the 
optic form that specifies the prey’s body to steer locomotion towards it, until the prey is 
close enough to be captured (J. J. Gibson, 1979/2015; Lee, 2009). 
I suggest that behavioural coupling can be unidirectional or bidirectional. If the 
unfortunate prey, in the example above, is oblivious to the approaching predator, the 
behavioural coupling that is instantiated between them is unidirectional: the prey’s 
behaviour influences the predator’s behaviour but not vice versa. Suppose, on the other 
hand, that only the prey detects the optic (or auditory, chemical, and so on) invariants that 
specify the presence of a predator and rushes to a safe hiding place. In this case, the 
behavioural coupling between them is also unidirectional but in the other direction: 
predator affects prey, but not vice versa. 
Now consider the case in which both animals detect each other and, as a result, each 
adjusts its behaviour according to what the other is doing, in real time. Suppose the prey 
rushes away from the predator and that the predator chases after it, each monitoring the 
other and adjusting their path of locomotion accordingly, in relation to each other and in 
relation to the obstacles and passages in the cluttered environment which they co-inhabit. 
 Living and learning socially 93 
In this case, the behavioural coupling is bidirectional: the predator’s behaviour affects the 
prey’s behaviour and the prey’s behaviour affects the predator’s. One animal affects the 
other even if they do not exert mechanical forces on each other. They are coupled by a 
form of mutual sensitivity to the informational relations they both detect and produce. 
Other examples of bidirectional behavioural coupling include animals displaying in 
competition for access to females, verbal and nonverbal communication, mating, 
caregiving/caretaking, dancing, playing music, among others (King, 2004). 
A common phenomenon in nonlinear dynamic systems is that mechanical or 
informational coupling between different systems can lead to the appearance of global 
spatiotemporal patterns of relation at the level of the dyad (or group). Once established, 
these global patterns constrain (reduce the degrees of freedom of) further local 
behavioural encounters among the individual participants (De Jaegher & Di Paolo, 2007; 
Fogel, 1993). Individuals become more likely to do some things rather than others given 
the wider relational and historical whole which their ontogenies help compose. 
5.2.1 Consequences of living socially 
There are four possible consequences of living together that follow from the above that I 
want to emphasise. The first consequence is rather general. Because the flow of behaviour 
of a target animal might be constrained by what others are doing, living together (as 
opposed to isolated) might affect the abilities to perceive and act the target animal ends 
up developing. This underlies the notion that learning can be a ‘social’ rather than an 
‘individual’ process. 
The second consequence is slightly more specific. By perceiving the behaviour of 
others and the effects produced in the world, the target animal might be informed about 
the affordances being (intentionally or inadvertently) demonstrated, which they might 
otherwise have missed or taken longer to detect. The target animal might thus become 
more likely to engage in similar tasks to the one observed. Provided their bodies are 
similar enough (for example, because they are closely related by genealogy and undergo 
similar ontogenetic trajectories), the target animal might develop similar task-related 
abilities to those of the observed animal. In this scenario, the development of similar 
abilities depended on how the target animal was influenced by the presence and behaviour 
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of the other animal. This is commonly considered as a case of “social transmission” or 
“cultural transmission” of behaviour (Hoppitt & Laland, 2013). 
The third consequence I want to point out is related to the problematic notion of 
culture. It is also related to learning, but it involves a longer time scale than that implicit 
in the second consequence I just mentioned. Animals living socially can continually shape 
or co-regulate each other’s behaviour by perceiving and responding to what others are 
doing in their common environment. Such recurring behavioural feedback loops can 
constrain developmental changes such that animals living together might become 
sensitive to their history of interactions. They may acquire habits (behavioural patterns 
described with reference to the individuals) that lead to the appearance of normative 
patterns of social relations within the dyad or group (Fogel, 1993; Lave & Wenger, 1991; 
Maturana & Varela, 1992). 
For example, when newcomers join an established research group for their graduate 
studies, their individual behaviour influences, and is influenced by, the behaviour of their 
colleagues. By participating in activities such as collecting and analysing data, going to 
journal clubs, presenting at conferences, and so on, students are gradually introduced to 
the normative ways of doing science. If all goes well, they become skilled at the relevant 
practices that characterize the community of researchers in which they participate. In 
time, they move from the peripherical position of “newcomers” to the more central 
positions of “old-timers” (Lave & Wenger, 1991).  
When a mutual sensitivity is established among partners, their individual 
ontogenies no longer flow independently from each other. Rather they become 
systematically correlated in “histories of mutual engagement”, as Oyama (1999) put it. 
Similarly, Maturana and Varela (1992, p. 193) argue that animals living together in this 
way instantiate “a particular internal phenomenology; namely, one in which the 
individual ontogenies of all participating organisms occur fundamentally as part of the 
network of co-ontogenies that they bring about”. I argue there is no a priori reason why 
we should assume this phenomenon is restricted to relations among conspecifics. After 
all, organisms typically live in multispecies communities and might influence, and be 
influenced by, each other to varying degrees. The fact that we scientists might classify 
them in different taxonomic groups does not impede them from perceiving and interacting 
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with each other as they go about living. Thus, living socially can imply relations among 
different species. Other examples include patterns of relation that arise between 
playmates, friends, mating partners, lovers, predators and prey, parents and offspring, co-
workers, employers and employees, dogs and dog owners, shepherds and their animals. 
Different groups of animals (including people) vary in the characteristics of their 
individual flows of behaviour, in the contingencies of their historical interaction, and in 
the global dynamics they create. Different normative patterns of behaviour might appear 
in different groups as a result. It follows that animals that participate in the same group 
might show stronger behavioural similarity compared to animals in different groups. I use 
the term ‘groups’ loosely here, as a heuristic term that indicates, on the one hand, the 
existence of historical relations among their components and, on the other hand, the focus 
of interest of the researcher. This is one aspect of the intricate notion of ‘culture’ (Descola 
& Pálsson, 1996; Geertz, 1973; Ingold, 2000, 2011a; Kroeber & Kluckhohn, 1952; 
Latour, 1993). 
5.3 Communication as co-regulation of behaviour 
Communication is a case of special interest in terms of how animals make environmental 
information publicly available to be perceived by others with already tuned perceptual 
systems. For some purposes, such as engineering, it might be useful to treat 
communication as the systematic correlation of signals between a source and a destination 
regardless of what they might mean (Shannon, 1948a). However, for the purpose of 
studying behaviour, this view of communication is arguably less useful analytically. 
Similarly, but with an explicit interest in what signals might mean, verbal communication 
in humans is commonly characterized in terms of the transmission of ‘information’ 
(meaning ‘representation’ or ‘knowledge’) (e.g., Csibra & Gergely, 2009). 
However, to be consistent with a relational, historical perspective, here I side with 
a view of communication as a continuous process of co-regulation of inherently 
meaningful behaviour (Fogel, 1993; King, 2004; Thompson, 2007). Behaviour is 
inherently meaningful in the sense that it is associated by (lawful or normative) 
constraints with the situations they involve, including past and future situations, as well 
as the broader context in which they occur. 
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This notion of communication applies to any form of coordinated behaviour, not 
only human-like language. The ability to use articulate language, such as seen in humans, 
expands the possibilities of communication but does not inaugurate it. Communicative 
abilities persist under transformations from the early stages of the lifespan until death, as 
the bodily structures that enable them persist and change. Vocalising, gesturing, speaking, 
writing, drawing – all these behaviours structure the ambient arrays of light and/or sound 
in meaningful ways and can play central roles in how humans and other animals behave 
and acquire skills. 
When animals vocalize, their actions produce mechanical waves in the medium (air 
or water), thus creating environmental information that is publicly available. Because 
such sound patterns are lawfully associated with the actions that produced them, they can 
inform skilled listeners about the presence of the vocalizing animals. Animals with 
appropriately tuned auditory systems and that happen to be close enough might detect the 
sound patterns. Depending on their own abilities and intentions, listeners might use this 
environmental information to, for example, adjust their path of locomotion towards the 
sound source. This way, predators can find prey and conspecifics can stay within close 
proximity as they forage. 
Suppose that animals commonly vocalize upon finding a food source, as is the case 
in many species of primates (Rapaport & Brown, 2008). In this case, the sound patterns 
that appear in the environment are not only lawfully associated with the actions that 
produced them but are also normatively associated with the presence of the food source 
that motivated those actions. Thus, the sound patterns can inform skilled listeners about 
the presence of the vocalizing animal and also about the presence of food. It might be 
that, initially, the young animal is motivated to move in the direction of the calls with the 
intention to be reunited with its mother. However, by moving to the new place, it might 
also learn that the objects it sees her manipulating there afford eating. Additionally, in 
such situations the young will also be exposed to the normative association between the 
specific vocalization and the presence of food. Thus, if the animal is able to abstract 
(detect higher-order relations among different situations), it might discover that those 
sound patterns mean or indicate food. Later on, in similar situations, this knowledge or 
awareness can play a role in guiding their behaviour. 
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Similarly, the movements in the vocal tracts of human speakers and singers produce 
mechanical waves in the medium, the movements of the hands of human writers and 
drawers produce traces of pigment on a surface, and the movements of the fingers of a 
typist produce patterns of contrasting pixels on the monitor. It is the environmental 
information thus made available in the ambient arrays of sound and light that might be 
picked up by skilled listeners, viewers, and readers (J. J. Gibson, 1966). The meaning of 
such patterns of sound and light, just as in the case of primate food calls, cannot be 
transmitted. Rather, they must be discovered. This depends on, at the same time as it 
sustains and potentially transforms, the abilities developed by the animals within their 
history of engagements in similar communicative contexts. 
Imagine two adults are fluent speakers of the same language and one intends to 
communicate a ‘piece of knowledge’ to the other by saying that ‘X is the case’. The 
speaker’s behaviour creates mechanical waves in the environment that the listener might 
detect. These waves are linked to the speaker’s movements by lawful constraints and 
therefore can inform the listener about those movements. Moreover, the movements of 
the speaker are linked to her communicative intentions by a set of causal processes and 
by normative constraints (the norms of language use). Therefore the sound waves can 
potentially inform the listener about the speaker’s communicative intentions, too 
(Dretske, 1981). However, to interpret the meaning associated with the sound waves, the 
listener would have to be aware of the constraints linking the speaker’s intentions and the 
form of the communicative behaviour. This is not straightforward. Detecting the sound 
patterns is not the same as making sense of what they mean. The listener has no alternative 
than to hear and make sense of the sounds she hears according to her own abilities, which 
depend on the contingencies of her own prior history in similar situations. Thus, the 
meaning of what she hears might be quite different to the meaning of what he spoke and 
intended her to hear. 
However, speakers and listeners, or writers and readers, are not isolated individuals 
but part of the same group (say, British nationals), or possibly part of different groups 
correlated by historical contingencies (say, British and US nationals). Therefore, the 
communicative abilities people already have when they eventually meet – their ways of 
speaking or writing – might be functionally similar. These abilities need not be identical 
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but need only be similar enough to create a common ground, such that the sound or light 
patterns might have roughly equivalent meanings to each partner. This common ground 
allows the communication event to unfold in relative harmony. In this case, the individual 
flow of behaviour of those involved in the communicative situation might seem more or 
less coherent (to themselves as well as to us observers). In such situations, we might feel 
we understand what the other is saying – at least enough to keep the conversation going. 
5.4 An ecological view of learning socially 
In his last book, James Gibson writes about how living socially might influence learning. 
The following passage (J. J. Gibson, 1979/2015, p. 246) is worth quoting in full: 
The child becomes aware of the world by looking around and 
looking at, by listening, feeling, smelling, and tasting, but then 
she begins to be made aware of the world as well. She is shown 
things, and told things, and given models and pictures of things, 
and then instruments and tools and books, and finally rules and 
short cuts for finding out more things. Toys, pictures, and words 
are aids to perceiving, provided by parents and teachers. They 
transmit to the next generation the tricks of the human trade. The 
labors of the first perceivers are spared their descendants. The 
extracting and abstracting of the invariants that specify the 
environment are made vastly easier with these aids to 
comprehension. But they are not in themselves knowledge, as we 
are tempted to think. All they can do is facilitate knowing by the 
young. 
Writing in the 1970s, it is probably not surprising that Gibson referred to humans 
only. However, his ideas, as well as the others reviewed above, suggest the basis for an 
ecological approach to social learning that might be expanded to other species. In this 
passage, Gibson acknowledges that learning can be influenced or facilitated by other 
persons such as parents and teachers who, by their activity, make it easier for children to 
extract (detect) and abstract (detect higher-order relations among) the invariants that 
specify features of their common environment. While it makes sense to describe this, in 
loose terms, in terms of transmitting “the tricks of the human trade”, he goes on to note 
that knowledge is not transmitted. Rather, parents and teachers act as facilitators in the 
processes that might lead the young to learn about the world in particular ways. Two 
paragraphs later he seems to contradict himself by referring to “culturally transmitted 
knowledge” (p. 247). Later, when writing about how language mediates knowing, he says 
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that “We transmit information and convey knowledge. Wisdom is handed down.” (p. 
248).  
The choice of words might be somewhat inconsistent. However, Gibson 
characterises this transgenerational phenomenon in terms of “ways to facilitate knowing” 
without recourse to representations. His use of ‘transmission of information’, in this 
context, is related to verbal and written language. This probably reflects the common-
sense use of the term information and the mathematical theory of communication 
(Shannon, 1948a). “But we should never forget”, Gibson adds, “that this is information 
that has been put into words. It is not the limitless information available in a flowing 
stimulus array” (J. J. Gibson, 1979/2015, pp. 248-249). 
Words are linked to the invariants they indicate by the conventional regularities 
established among language users. Thus, words can inform skilled speakers-listeners, 
whose linguistic abilities have been shaped by those very regularities, about those 
invariants. Thus, by perceiving the words and pictures that others produced, we might 
become aware of the features of the environment they refer to. As Gibson argues, words 
and pictures allow people to perceive, and gain knowledge ‘at second hand’, as contrasted 
with perceiving and knowing ‘at first hand’. The latter requires that the perceiver-knower 
extracts the relevant invariants from the ambient arrays by him- or herself. The former 
implies that the relevant invariants have already been extracted and put into words or 
pictures. 
In the previous chapters and in the first part of the present one, I have laid out some 
of the main ideas that form the basis for a processual, developmental systems view of 
organisms, and a radical embodiment view of cognition. So far, I have said little about 
the current literature on social learning and it is finally time to do so. In the second part 
of this chapter, I elaborate on how the insights developed thus far might be used to study 
social learning in humans and nonhuman animals from an alternative theoretical 
framework. Then, in Chapters 6 and 7 I will report two empirical studies I conducted 
motivated by this framework. 
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5.5 Categories of social learning 
Drawing on an earlier, influential definition by Heyes (1994), Hoppitt and Laland (2013, 
p. 4) defined social learning as “learning that is facilitated by observation of, or interaction 
with, another individual (or its products).” Social learning comes in many flavours and 
different typologies have been proposed – see, for example, Galef (1988); Heyes (1994); 
Hoppitt and Laland (2013); Whiten and Ham (1992); Whiten et al. (2004). These works 
are extremely valuable in that they help synthesize and make sense of an enormous 
literature spanning over a century. 
Table 5-1 provides the definitions of twelve categories of social learning processes 
endorsed or proposed by Hoppitt and Laland (2013, all definitions quoted below were 
taken from p. 64). I also included the suggested mechanism thought to bring about 
learning in each case, as well as the typical behavioural events they involve, described in 
simple (theoretically poor) terms. Teaching is absent from this table as the authors argue 
it is orthogonal to learning (I will return to this below). 
The first thing to note is that some categories provide rather generic 
descriptions/explanations while others are more specific. For example, ‘social 
facilitation’ is defined in broad terms as occurring when “the mere presence of a 
demonstrator affects the observer’s behaviour”. In contrast, ‘observational conditioning’ 
is defined more specifically as “a subset of stimulus-stimulus learning in which 
observation of a demonstrator exposes the observer to a relationship between stimuli at 
t1, and exposure to this relationship effects a change in the observer detected, in any 
behaviour, at t2.” 
The second thing to note is that some definitions are clearly tied to a specific 
theoretical framework, namely the associative learning theory, where in others this is not 
the case. This is reflected in the different mechanisms proposed as explanations. The third 
thing to note is that, often, more than one ‘mechanism’ is proposed as an explanation for 
the same category of social learning process. The fourth point to note is that the categories 
are not always mutually exclusive, such that the same observed phenomenon might fall 
within more than one category. 
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The authors themselves discuss some of the points I raised above and note that their 
primary intention was to clarify how the terms are being used in the literature rather than 
to provide a pristine classification scheme. Terms like imitation, emulation, and stimulus 
enhancement acquire a more or less precise meaning from the specific experimental or 
observational context in which they are invoked as descriptive or explanatory categories. 
Some imprecision is to be expected among authors and papers and can even be 
constructive in the continuous constitution of scientific knowledge. Ambiguity and 
misunderstandings might be avoided by pointing to the specific epistemic practices which 
provide the context and frame of reference for interpretation in any case. 
Thus, by raising these issues I do not mean to be criticizing their efforts. Rather, I 
mean to indicate that typologies such as this reflect the history of the discipline and are 
thus written from a theoretical perspective that is not fully consistent with the one I am 
developing in this thesis, especially due to their commitment to the theoretical notion of 
representations and its role in controlling behaviour. For example, one possible 
mechanism of ‘response facilitation’ is the “priming of brain records corresponding to an 
action” (Hoppitt & Laland, 2013, p. 69). In other cases, the mechanism is unclear or 
frustratingly vague. For example, in “production imitation”, which is historically one of 
the most prominent categories of social learning, the novel action, or the novel sequence 
of actions, is simply said to be “acquired by the observer directly through observation”(p. 
73). 
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Table 5-1. Classification of social learning mechanisms according to Hoppitt and Laland (2013), with definitions taken from page 64. L: learner; F: facilitator. 
Social learning 
process 
Definition Suggested mechanism 
Typical behavioural events 
associated with learning 
Stimulus 
enhancement 
Stimulus enhancement occurs when observation of a 
demonstrator (or its products) exposes the observer to a 
single stimulus at time t1, and single stimulus exposures 
effects a change in the observer detected, in any behaviour, 
at t2. 
(1) F’s behaviour draws L’s attention to the 
situation; (2) F’s behaviour makes the 
stimulus more accessible to L. 
F behaves in relation to some 
situation. L’s attention is drawn to the 
situation. 
Local 
enhancement 
Local enhancement occurs when, after or during a 
demonstrator’s presence, or interaction with objects at a 
particular location, an observer is more likely to visit or 
interact with objects at that location. 
(1) Stimulus enhancement of a specific 
location; (2) aggregation effect; (3) L tends 
to move around with other animals; (4) the 
products of F’s behaviour draw L’s 
attention to the place. 
(1) F behaves in some place. L’s 
attention is drawn to the place. (2) L 
is part of a group. The group moves 
around in the environment. L’s 
individual movement is constrained 
by the group-level pattern of 
movement. 
Observational 
conditioning 
Observational conditioning is a subset of stimulus-stimulus 
learning in which observation of a demonstrator exposes the 
observer to a relationship between stimuli at t1, and 
exposure to this relationship effects a change in the observer 
detected, in any behaviour, at t2. 
A variation of Pavlovian conditioning. F behaves. L observes F. 
Response 
facilitation 
Response facilitation occurs if the presence of a 
demonstrator animal performing an act (often resulting in 
reward) increases the probability of an animal that sees it 
doing the same. 
The “priming of brain records 
corresponding to an action” (p. 69). 
F behaves. L observes F. 
Social 
facilitation 
Social facilitation occurs when the mere presence of a 
demonstrator affects the observer’s behaviour. 
F’s presence reduces L’s neophobia. F and L are present at some place. L 
behaves differently than it would 
otherwise. 
Contextual 
imitation 
Contextual imitation occurs when, directly through 
observing a demonstrator perform an action in a specific 
context, an observer becomes more likely to perform that 
action [which might or might not be novel for the potential 
learner] in the same context. 
A variation of stimulus-response learning. F behaves. L observes F. 
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Table 5-1 (continued). 
Social 
learning 
process 
Definition Suggested mechanism 
Typical behavioural events associated 
with learning 
Production 
imitation 
Production imitation occurs when, after observing a 
demonstrator perform a novel action, or novel sequence 
or combination of action, none of which are in its own 
repertoire, an observer then becomes more likely to 
perform that same action or sequence of actions. 
Unclear. The novel action, or the novel 
sequence of actions, is said to be "acquired 
by the observer directly through 
observation" (p. 73). 
F behaves. L observes F. 
Observational 
R-S learning 
Observational R-S learning is a subset of response-
reinforcer learning (R-S) in which observation of a 
demonstrator exposes the observer to a relationship 
between a response and a reinforcer at t1, and exposure to 
this relationship effects a change in the observer 
detected, in any behaviour, at t2. 
A subset of response-reinforcer learning F behaves. L observes F. 
Emulation Emulation occurs when, after observing a demonstrator 
interacting with objects in its environment, an observer 
becomes more likely to perform any actions that have a 
similar effect on those objects. 
(1) L "could try and recreate the movements 
of objects with which the demonstrator 
interacted; this is termed object movement 
re-enactment" (p. 77); (2) L "could try and 
recreate the final state resulting from a 
demonstrator’s behavior" (p 77-78) 
F behaves. L observes F. 
Opportunity 
providing 
Opportunity providing occurs when the products of the 
behaviour of the demonstrator provide the observer with 
an opportunity to engage in operant learning that would 
otherwise be unlikely to arise - for example by providing 
an easier, less dangerous or more accessible version of 
the task. 
(1) "operant learning (i.e. learning the 
connection between aspects of their 
behavior and reward)" (p. 78) 
F behaves in some way that modifies 
task-relevant features of L’s 
environment. L engages with the 
modified version of the task. 
Inadvertent 
coaching 
Inadvertent coaching occurs when the response of a 
demonstrator to the behaviour of the observer 
inadvertently acts to encourage or discourage that 
behaviour. 
F’s behaviour punishes or reinforces L’s 
behaviour. 
L engages with a task. F monitors L’s 
behaviour and responds to specific 
behaviour events with either a positive or 
a negative emotional overtone. 
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The last point I raise is related to the behavioural events typically associated with 
the different categories of social learning processes. I included these data in Table 5-1 to 
indicate how the different theoretical suggestions (of definitions and proposed 
mechanisms) relate to empirical observations described in common-sense terms implying 
less theory. In many cases, the behaviours associated with learning can be re-described 
in simple terms as ‘the facilitator behaves in some way and the learner observes the 
facilitator’. In other cases, the literature suggests a more elaborate sequence of 
behavioural events that lead to learning. For example, Hoppitt and Laland (2013) identify 
two sequences associated with local enhancement. In the first, the facilitator behaves in 
some place and the learner’s attention is drawn to that place. Alternatively, the learner is 
part of a group; the group moves around in the environment; the group-level pattern of 
movement constrains the individual-level pattern of movement of the learner. 
The point in question here is simply that the passage from the (less controversial) 
empirical description of observed behaviours to the (possibly more controversial) 
proposal of definitions and mechanisms inevitably implies working within a theoretical 
framework. My intention is not simply to find new, eco-friendly, terminology to refer to 
the same categories listed in Table 5-1, but to revise how the phenomena of interest can 
be understood. What I want to do is to explore what difference it might make to start from 
an alternative perspective that is motivated by, and hopefully consistent with, a 
processual, developmental systems perspective of living systems, and a radical 
embodiment perspective of cognition. This is the goal of the remainder of the chapter. 
5.6 Characterizing cases of social learning: an initial suggestion 
It might be theoretically useful, as Hoppitt and Laland (2013, p. 63) suggest, “to devise a 
new classification scheme from scratch” and avoid some of the issues listed above. 
Arguably, a theoretically useful classificatory scheme should use a set of clearly defined 
criteria and use them to identify similarities and differences among cases of social 
learning grouped in different classes. While it is too early to propose a new typology, I 
would like to take a first step in this direction. I suggest some aspects of the phenomena 
that fall under the general category of social learning that might inform a future 
classification scheme. Then, I turn to teaching in the last part of this chapter. 
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A quick note on terminology. I will refer to the target animals or persons, i.e. those 
whose performance in a task of interest is being tracked, as the ‘potential learners’ (or 
‘learners’, for brevity). This captures the idea that learning is a possible consequence of 
behaviour more clearly than the more common term observer. The term observer is 
misleading because it refers to the performance of a behaviour – when learning is not a 
behavioural category but a developmental consequence of behaviour. It is also misleading 
because learning can be influenced in other ways than by perceiving another animal 
perform a task, for example, by engaging in joint activity or by staying together and/or 
moving together in a common environment. I will refer to the animals or persons 
influencing the potential learners as the ‘facilitators’ to indicate their overarching role in 
the process. The more common term demonstrator indicates one out of several possible 
cases of roles that facilitators might play, many of which do not involve performing the 
target task. While mainly a matter of personal taste, I believe these terms capture the spirit 
of common definitions of social learning with more precision. 
5.6.1 Clarifying the scope of the study 
I suggest three criteria which can be used to clarify the focus of the study of social 
learning: the time scale, the spatial scale, and the outcome of interest. I expand on each 
below. 
Different processes can have different rates or duration. Therefore, the choice of 
the time scale affects the number and type of events included in the study with possible 
consequences for how we theorize about them. For example, consider the study about 
nutcracking in capuchin monkeys, reported by Fragaszy et al. (2017). When a skilled 
capuchin monkey engages in cracking palm nuts by striking them with a stone hammer, 
younger monkeys that happen to around the facilitator become more likely to spend time 
near an anvil, more likely to manipulate nuts (and less likely to manipulate other objects), 
and more likely to percuss a nut on a hard surface and to strike a nut with a stone. All 
these influences on the behavioural flow of the potential learners might have 
consequences related to their learning the target task. 
The units abstracted from the behavioural flows included in this study lasted a few 
minutes and included only a few behavioural events. Similarly, many lab-based studies 
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also involve analysing short periods of ontogeny (such as in this thesis, chapters 6 and 7). 
On the other hand, researchers might be interested in much longer time scales extending 
over years and involving many more relevant behavioural events. This is illustrated by 
developmental studies in primate tool use (Corp & Byrne, 2002; De Resende, Ottoni, & 
Fragaszy, 2008), anthropological studies of learning in children (Toren, 2008, 2012) and 
studies of learning as resulting from participation in communities of practice (Lave & 
Wenger, 1991). 
Different processes involve different components. Therefore, the choice of the 
spatial scale also affects the number and type of events included in the study with possible 
theoretical consequences. Apart from the potential learner, the study might focus on only 
a few task-relevant objects in the environment. Alternatively, it might include other 
animals playing the role of facilitators. For example, young capuchin monkeys might 
encounter places which include the products of past nut-cracking activities, such as pieces 
of broken nuts and rocks that were used as anvil or hammer. Potential learners can explore 
those places according to their abilities to perceive and act and, in the process, they might 
learn what stones and broken nuts afford, even if no animal is performing task-related 
actions in that period. Alternatively, the researcher might decide to include more places, 
objects, and other animals as relevant components in the developmental system of the 
potential learner. 
Learning is a possible (developmental) consequence of the behavioural flow. 
Therefore, researchers must define what is the outcome of interest. What is the target task 
(broadly conceived) that researchers expect to be learned or identify as being learned? 
For example, research might focus on perceptual learning, i.e. on how animals change 
with respect to their abilities to detect environmental information (E. J. Gibson & Pick, 
2000; Kellman, 2002). Alternatively, it might focus on skill learning, i.e. in how animals 
change with respect to their abilities to engage in a target task such as sawing a plank 
(Ingold, 2011b) or using a stone tool to crack open hard fruits (Resende, Nagy-Reis, 
Lacerda, Pagnotta, & Savalli, 2014). In place learning, animals explore the affordances 
of different places and, as a result, become oriented to, and able to navigate in, their 
environment (J. J. Gibson, 1979/2015). Another study might focus on language learning 
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(Tomasello, 2003). Clarifying the spatial scale, temporal scale, and the target task might 
help identify phenomena that should be grouped as cases of the same category. 
5.6.2 Clarifying the ‘social influence’ under focus 
Social learning is a possible developmental consequence of the influence that facilitator 
(or facilitators) might exert on the learner. Hoppitt and Laland (2013, p. 5) suggest that 
“a researcher’s primary task is to investigate the manner in which learning is social, rather 
than to answer whether learning is social or not”. I suggest five criteria to characterize 
social influences on learning. These criteria refer to (1) the environmental information 
the facilitator makes available by means of its presence and behaviour; (2) the general 
role played by the facilitator in the learning process; (3) whether the influence is 
unidirectional or bidirectional; (4) whether the influence is direct or indirect; and (5) the 
prior intentions involved in the process. I expand on each below. 
The facilitator’s presence and behaviour create environmental information available 
to learners 
The body of the facilitator reflects (and, in some cases, produces) light, creates 
mechanical waves, eliminates chemicals, and so on. These patterns in the ambient arrays 
are linked to the facilitator’s body by regularities and can therefore inform skilled 
observers about the presence and behaviour of the facilitator, the affordances being 
engaged, and the consequences of that behaviour. If the potential learners are near the 
facilitators (or ‘virtually’ near, such as by means of a video monitor), they have the 
opportunity to directly perceive and use this information to guide their behaviour. 
However, the presence and activity of the facilitators might have persisting effects in the 
environment. In this case, the information thus created might be detected by the potential 
learners, and influence their behaviour, at a later moment even if they never meet. 
In addition to investigating what environmental information is made available by 
the facilitator, we might also ask what information is, in fact, perceived by potential 
learners, and how they might use it to control their behavioural flow. We might also 
investigate how this influence facilitates learning the target task. 
In Chapter 7, I will investigate the effects on learning of three types of 
environmental information created by the facilitator: (1) the optic information specifying 
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his manipulative actions; (2) the optic information specifying his face; and (3) the 
auditory information produced by his speech. 
The two basic roles played by the facilitator 
I suggest a pragmatic distinction between two basic roles that the facilitator might play. 
The first is to engage in the target task, i.e. the same task in which we are testing or 
probing the potential learners. For example, birds might perceive the song of conspecifics 
and this might influence the development of their own abilities to sing, such that they end 
up singing similarly (Janik & Slater, 2000). Naïve bumblebees might be encouraged to 
observe other bumblebees which had been previously trained to reach an artificial food 
source by pulling a string (Alem et al., 2016). In the study reported in Chapter 6, a human 
facilitator shows children how to use a novel tool in the context of using simple materials 
to make a toy vehicle. In Chapter 7, adult learners are exposed to videos of a human 
facilitator demonstrating how to solve different puzzles. 
The second basic role of the facilitator is to engage in some activity other than the 
target task. Examples include cats bringing live prey to their offspring, thus influencing 
the development of their abilities to hunt (Caro, 1980), adult meerkats bringing scorpions 
to their offspring with different degrees of previous manipulation depending on their age 
(Thornton & McAuliffe, 2006), humans telling stories or providing verbal or written 
instruction about a task, and scientists giving talks describing the results of their studies. 
The influence between facilitator and learner can be unidirectional or bidirectional 
In terms of the direction of influence that is relevant for the ability under study, I also 
suggest two basic cases. The influence is unidirectional if the facilitator influences the 
behavioural flow of the potential learner, but the behaviour of the potential learner does 
not influence the behaviour of the facilitator (relative to the context of interest). This is 
implied in all categories listed in Table 5-1. 
On the other hand, the influence is bidirectional in case the facilitators not only 
influence but are also influenced by the presence and behaviour of the potential learners, 
in which case they co-regulate each other’s behaviour. Consider the case in which animals 
in a group tend to move around together in a common environment. Animals might 
explore the environment while, at the same time, attending to where the others are and 
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adjusting their own locomotion in response. As a consequence of this co-regulation, even 
if the companions do not engage in some ‘target task’ themselves, they might influence 
the places that the potential learners end up visiting, where they might have the 
opportunity to detect and use the environmental information available in those places and 
possibly improve in the task of interest. 
This is observed in schooling in fish (Atton, Hoppitt, Webster, Galef, & Laland, 
2012), agents in computer simulation (Van der Post & Hogeweg, 2008, 2006), and friends 
visiting a new town together and casually discovering a coffee shop. Incidentally, these 
cases also illustrate the facilitator engaging in some activity other than the target task. I 
will also discuss learning-type behaviour, which involve bidirectional influence, below. 
The influence between facilitator and learner can be direct or indirect 
The influence between potential learners and facilitator is direct if it occurs in real time 
through informational coupling. This is the case whenever the learner perceives (i.e. 
detects the environmental information specifying) the facilitator’s behaviour as it occurs, 
which is the general rule (see Table 5-1). Alternatively, the influence between potential 
learners and facilitator is indirect if it occurs by means of the persisting effects in the 
environment brought about by their behaviour, which might be considered cases of niche 
construction (Laland et al., 2001; Odling-Smee et al., 2003). For example, as they forage, 
primates might leave behind partially processed food items and tools which others might 
later perceive and explore (Fragaszy et al., 2013). 
Consider how buildings can influence the behaviour of those that use them. For 
example, much of formal learning, in so-called industrialised or developed countries, 
occurs within constructed places (schools) in which potential learners (schoolchildren) 
meet the facilitators (teachers, the administrative staff, the cleaning staff, and so on), 
generating normative patterns of social relations. These places are usually designed, built 
and furnished with the explicit intention to facilitate learning. The physical structure of 
museums, workshops, assembly rooms, and maker spaces also constrain the behaviour of 
those who visit them, thus possibly influencing what they learn in there (Lave & Wenger, 
1991; Sheridan et al., 2014). 
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Once constructed, these places become persisting features of the environment, and 
can be used by many generations. Commonly the people who visit and learn in these 
places will never meet with those involved in their construction, and most of them will 
never learn how to construct buildings themselves. However, the ontogeny of the 
potential learners is indeed influenced by the people involved in constructing these places, 
as well as by those involved in keeping them in order and those whose job title explicitly 
includes ‘teaching’. Each of these social influences play different roles and can be 
included or excluded in the analysis depending on the focus of interest. 
The role of intentions in social learning 
The question whether intentions constrain the flow of behaviour of humans and other 
animals, and can therefore influence learning, merits investigation. To do this consistently 
with the current approach, however, I suggest we must adopt a radically embodied view 
of intentional behaviour, i.e. one that does not involve assuming representations or a 
“complex mental calculator” as Caro and Hauser (1992, p. 169) put it. While a fully 
satisfactory account is still ahead of us, here I follow the suggestions by Kelso (1995, 
2016), and especially the innovative proposal by Juarrero (1999), in which the study of 
complex systems play the role of a theory-constitutive metaphor. 
The formation of a prior intention can be conceived of as the appearance of a 
spatiotemporal pattern of firing activity in a distributed neuronal assembly which alters 
the landscape of attractors and repellers in the behavioural phase space. This effect in the 
global dynamics of the animal-environment system constrains (reduces the degrees of 
freedom of) the possible behavioural trajectories that the system might exhibit. The 
appearance of an intention produces a ‘contrast set’ distinguishing between the 
behaviours that are more likely to appear (the current attractors in the behavioural phase 
space) and those that are less likely to appear (the current repellers). For example, when 
I intend to buy groceries, this impacts the global dynamics and produces a contrast set. 
As I walk along, I am more likely to adjust my path of locomotion and enter the 
supermarket or the local store (if I happen to see it first) instead of the dentist surgery or 
the church. 
Future work should focus on proposing operational criteria to identify intentions 
constraining the behaviour of facilitators and learners. These criteria should allow us to 
 Living and learning socially 111 
answer the following questions: (1) What do the facilitators intend when performing the 
behaviours relevant to the learning process? and (2) What do the potential learners 
intend when performing the behaviours relevant to the learning process? 
In the last part of this chapter, I draw on the ideas developed thus far and focus on 
teaching. I will present a view that has become influential among behavioural biologists 
and discuss what difference it would make to investigate this phenomenon from the 
alternative perspective being developed. In doing so I will suggest a way to locate 
teaching within the context of social learning that is fundamentally different from the 
currently dominant view. 
5.7 Teaching in humans and nonhuman animals 
In their bold and influential work, Caro and Hauser (1992) provided a working definition 
“that attempts to unify both functional and mechanistic considerations” (p. 152), with the 
explicit goal to foster research on nonhuman animals. In their words (Caro & Hauser, 
1992, p. 153): 
An individual actor A can be said to teach if it modifies its 
behavior only in the presence of a naive observer, B, at some cost 
or at least without obtaining an immediate benefit for itself. A’s 
behavior thereby encourages or punishes B’s behavior, or 
provides B with experience, or sets an example for B. As a result, 
B acquires knowledge or learns a skill earlier in life or more 
rapidly or efficiently than it might otherwise do, or that it would 
not learn at all. 
This working definition has been rightfully praised as providing a framework with 
which to investigate teaching-like phenomena in nonhuman animals (Franks & 
Richardson, 2006; Thornton & McAuliffe, 2006; Thornton & Raihani, 2008) and it has 
been adopted by other leaders in the field. For example, another group of influential 
authors endorsed Caro and Hauser’s (1992) operational definition and suggest a 
conceptual definition to accompany it: “we view ‘teaching’ as a class of behaviour 
patterns that are adaptations for transmitting knowledge and skills to others” (Hoppitt et 
al., 2008, p. 488). 
One central aspect of Caro and Hauser’s definition is that the facilitator modifies 
its behaviour in the presence of the potential learner, by which they mean “that there must 
112  Chapter 5 
be a change in behaviour from what would otherwise take place under the same conditions 
if the naive observer was not present.” (p. 153). In meerkats, for example, evidence 
suggests that the behaviour of the ‘teaching’ adults vary systematically in relation to the 
acoustic invariants picked up in the sound patterns or begging calls produced by pups of 
different ages (Thornton & McAuliffe, 2006). 
There is, however, a second relevant sense in which facilitators might modify their 
behaviour in the presence of another individual. This refers to when the facilitators not 
only influence but are influenced by the potential learner’s flow of behaviour as they 
interact in real time. In this case, both partners modify their behaviour to some extent, 
contingent on what the other is doing. Caro and Hauser reduce the question of sensitivity 
to the modification of behaviour that is performed when the other is present, arguing that 
a focus on a more dynamic adjustment can be ignored because “there is no a priori reason” 
why it should be relevant to the reproduction and survival of the learner (Caro & Hauser, 
1992, p. 155). I suggest it would be more productive to treat this as a matter of empirical 
study rather than a priori reasoning. But even if one accepts this in the context of a 
comparative approach, the question of sensitivity remains relevant, I suggest even central, 
to our understanding of the behavioural processes underlying teaching-learning 
phenomena. After all, there is much more about how animals live their lives than 
reproduction and survival, however important these may be. 
Another important aspect of Caro and Hauser’s (1992) influential definition is the 
absence of reference to intentions. The authors offer two arguments to justify this choice. 
The first argument is that, “if teaching facilitates skill acquisition, then it should be 
favored by natural selection irrespective of the extent of attribution of mental states” (p. 
169). The second argument is that, while the ability to attribute mental states to others 
might enhance the utility of teaching, this ability need not be taken as a requisite. A 
distinction could be made, they suggest, between teaching which involves the facilitator 
attributing mental states to other animals, and teaching “that is guided by a less complex 
mental calculator” (Caro & Hauser, 1992, p. 169). 
These arguments point to a confusion between ‘intention’ and ‘attribution of mental 
states’. The intention of a person or nonhuman animal to do X (rather than Y or Z) refers 
to a specific ‘state of mind’ – or, in dynamical terms, a specific neuronal dynamics – that 
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“play a distinctive role in the etiology of actions” (P. Jacob, 2014). I suggested above, 
following Juarrero (1999), that this distinctive role lies in how intentions change the 
layout of attractors and repellers in the behavioural phase space defined by the animal-
environment system. In other words, the intention to do X (rather than Y or Z) changes the 
global dynamics of the system such that some behaviours become more likely to be 
performed than others. 
A person or nonhuman animal need not ‘attribute mental states’ to other animals in 
order to intend to do something. Some people – notably those people whose lives unfold 
within the specific historical context commonly called Western – do indeed assume that 
the behaviour of other people (and possibly nonhuman animals as well) is guided by 
mental states. This habit is so ubiquitous in our (‘Western’) experience such that it might 
seem not to require justification. The representational-computational framework both 
thrives on, and further supports, this theoretical construct. I have been doing my best to 
avoid it, along with the corresponding notion that behaviour is controlled by a “mental 
calculator”, but I welcome including intentions in the study of social learning. 
For researchers interested in a functional approach, the suggestion to ignore 
questions of sensitivity and the attribution of mental states to others might have proven 
liberating. However, avoiding the question of sensitivity by an a priori argument is a poor 
justification and we should do better. In addition, questions about intentions should not 
be confused with questions about ‘attributing mental states’. Moreover, students of 
animal teaching generally view cognition and learning as involving representations and 
computations thereupon. With these concerns in mind, I now want to suggest an 
alternative strategy with which to frame teaching in relation to social learning processes. 
5.7.1 Teaching-learning as a relational, historical phenomenon 
I take it that the following two related ideas are not unreasonable but instead capture 
central features of the phenomena denoted by the term teaching. The first is the idea that 
human teachers commonly have the explicit intention to facilitate learning – for example, 
because it is in their job description. The second is the idea that human teachers can be 
more or less sensitive to the changing needs of their pupils as they engage in teaching-
learning relations. I suggest that explicitly bringing sensitivity and intentions back into 
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the discussion might prove equally productive in expanding our understanding of 
teaching-related and learning-related behaviour in humans and nonhumans towards a 
unifying framework in which to study social learning. 
In common parlance, when we say that someone is teaching us, we are referring, 
among other things, to some sequence of behavioural events that the facilitator is 
performing. The behavioural events that are relevant to their teaching us and to our 
learning from (rather, with) them are precisely those which influence, and are influenced 
by, our own behavioural flow. Teaching, as learning socially, implies a relation unfolding 
in time and within specific environmental situations. 
Additionally, when we talk about teaching, we are not only referring to a set of 
behavioural events, but also to a specific developmental consequence that they might 
have for the learner. The consequences that indicate learning are changes in some of the 
learner’s abilities in a predicted direction which we observers judge to be improvements 
in the ‘task’ of interest. The teachers might also change in the process but, given the focus 
of interest, we might choose to ignore this in the analysis. Thus, it should be noted that 
‘to teach’ is also a success or achievement verb rather than a task verb. We only know if 
some behaviour was indeed an instance of ‘teaching’ (as opposed to just behaving in some 
way) retrospectively, by examining whether learning has occurred in the target individual. 
Two steps towards a definition of teaching-learning processes 
Conceptually, I view teaching-learning processes as a subset of the broader class of 
facilitating-learning (i.e., social learning) process. I must now suggest what distinguishes 
teaching-learning relations from other ways in which learning can be facilitated “by 
observation of, or interaction with, another individual (or its products)” (the definition of 
'social learning' by Hoppitt & Laland, 2013, p. 4). I will do this in two steps. The first step 
is the following. In all cases of learning socially, the behaviour of the potential learner is 
influenced by the behaviour of the facilitator (Heyes, 1994; Hoppitt & Laland, 2013; 
Whiten & Ham, 1992). I suggested above that this influence can be characterized as direct 
(by real-time informational coupling in perception-action) or indirect (by means of 
persisting environmental effects). I now suggest that the category of teaching-learning 
processes refers to cases involving bidirectional influences. To account as teaching, 
facilitators must coordinate their behaviour in space and time with respect to whatever 
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the potential learner happens to be doing, and the potential learners must be influenced in 
the abilities they develop by what the facilitator does. If the facilitator demonstrated the 
target task in the presence of the learner but facing the other way, to give a simple 
example, the partners would not be teaching-learning much about that task. 
In other words, the facilitator performs teaching-related behaviours and the learner 
performs learning-related behaviours, as each influence the other’s flow of behaviour in 
real time. Because this mutual influence is not incidental but fundamental to the form that 
these behaviours end up having, they should be conceived of as mutually implicated 
aspects of a unitary phenomenon, as poles within the relational, historical process of 
teaching-learning. This is conceptually radically different to the suggestion, by Hoppitt 
et al. (2008), that teaching-related behaviours are “orthogonal” to (i.e., that they are 
fundamentally independent from) social learning processes. 
This perspective opens up empirical questions about how this mutual influence is 
instantiated that might not even be considered in the dominant perspective. How is this 
mutual sensitivity and behavioural coupling achieved, sustained, and dissolved, as 
animals engage in unfolding teaching-learning situations? What are the mechanisms 
involved in the coordination of behaviour, in space and time, with respect to the 
contingencies of the situation which they help compose? Does behavioural coupling lead 
to the appearance of spatiotemporal patterns of collective behaviour which, once 
established, constrain (reduce the degrees of freedom of) further behavioural events at the 
individual level? I will examine some of these questions empirically in Chapters 6 and 7. 
I now take the second step in defining teaching. I do this by bringing to the 
foreground precisely an aspect that is neglected in the currently dominant approach. I 
suggest that the intentions constraining the behavioural flow of the participants is a 
reasonable criterion to distinguish teaching from other cases of social learning. 
Furthermore, it might also be a reasonable to distinguish among cases of teaching, 
depending on how we answer the questions I raised above: (1) What do the facilitators 
intend when performing the behaviours relevant to the learning process? and (2) What 
do the potential learners intend when performing the behaviours relevant to the learning 
process? 
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Researchers who view teaching through the lens of adaptation use terms such as 
‘active’ to characterise teaching-related behaviour, as well as terms such as ‘passive’ or 
‘inadvertent’ to characterise non-teaching-related behaviours. Note that the latter term is 
a common-sense antonym for ‘intentional’, which seems inconsistent with the neglect of 
intentions. “Use of the term ‘inadvertent’”, say Hoppitt et al. (2008, p. 490), “signifies 
that the demonstrator’s behaviour is not adapted to the function of transmitting 
knowledge, and does not imply that teaching requires any intentionality on the part of the 
tutor”. 
It is unclear why the authors move from a statement about adaptation to one about 
intentionality. This might indicate a confusion between the notions of intention and 
intentionality. “Intentionality is the power of minds to be about, to represent, or to stand 
for, things, properties and states of affairs (P. Jacob, 2014). I have already mentioned a 
similar confusion above when presenting Caro and Hauser’s influential paper. 
Intentionality and the attribution of mental states are related ideas. A more appropriate 
expression here might be ‘intention to teach’. If this is the case, the authors would be 
suggesting that teaching does not require that the facilitator has the intention to facilitate 
learning. 
The important point, however, is that questions about the phylogenetic causes and 
consequences of the abilities involved in teaching and learning (which are implicit in the 
reference to adaptation) are conceptually distinct from questions about intending to do 
one thing or another and should be treated separately. On the one hand, we might ask if 
and how a past phylogenetic history has constrained the development of the facilitator’s 
behaviour currently observed. On the other hand, we might also ask if and how the current 
intentions of the facilitator affect the teaching-learning process. 
Defining teaching 
I can finally suggest the following working definition of teaching-learning relations. 
Teaching-learning processes are a subset of social learning processes characterised by (1) 
the mutual influence between facilitators and potential learners and (2) the intention of 
the tutor to facilitate learning. All cases of teaching involve the facilitators being more or 
less sensitive to the presence and activity of the potential learners and adjusting their 
behaviour in their presence. This mutual influence is integral to bringing about learning, 
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and not an incidental accompaniment to it. Moreover, all cases of teaching involve the 
facilitators intending to bring about learning, albeit to varying degrees and in different 
ways that can be further investigated in each case. 
5.8 Summary and conclusion 
In this chapter I presented a relational, historical view of living and learning socially. 
Animals living socially can affect each other’s environment and each other’s behaviour. 
I referred to this mutual influence as behavioural coupling or co-regulation. This coupling 
can be mechanical (by physically moving one another) and/or informational (by 
perceiving each other). The influence between two individuals can be unidirectional 
(when one affects the other but not vice versa) or bidirectional (when each affects the 
other). The influence can also be direct (by real-time behavioural coupling) or indirect 
(by means of persisting effects in the environment). When animals live socially, their 
ontogenies are systematically coupled and therefore cannot be considered as independent 
from each other. 
The contingencies of behaviour can have developmental consequences for the 
organization of the animal’s body, including the appearance of new abilities to perceive 
and act. Therefore, when animals influence each other’s behaviour systematically, they 
might be influencing each other’s development. This is captured by the broad notion that 
learning is ‘social’ rather than ‘individual’ when it is “facilitated by observation of, or 
interaction with, another individual (or its products)” (Hoppitt & Laland, 2013, p. 4). I 
retained the general spirit of the definition of social learning but viewed it from a 
processual, developmental systems approach to ontogeny and a radical embodiment 
approach to cognition. From this view, social learning is conceived of as a possible 
developmental consequence that might occur when the flow of behaviour of the potential 
learner is influenced by the flow of behaviour of the facilitator either directly (through 
real-time mechanical and/or informational coupling) or indirectly (by the persisting 
effects of the facilitator’s behaviour in the environment). The consequence in question is 
a change in the organization of body parts that underlies abilities that lead to improved 
performance in the task of interest.  
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Thus, conceptually, social learning processes are here taken to be relational 
histories of development of abilities rather than processes of transmission of behaviour. 
Consistent with this, while authors writing within a representational-computational 
framework commonly use the vocabulary related to acquiring and using ‘information’ 
(meaning ‘representation’ or ‘knowledge’), the current approach prefers the vocabulary 
related to detecting and using information (sensu constraint between situations and 
specification of the environment in ambient structured arrays), abilities, affordances, and 
intentions. 
I briefly presented a classification of categories of social learning processes, 
identified some of its shortcomings, and then suggested a set of criteria that might, in the 
future, be used to produce a principled classification. I started by suggesting that the focus 
of any study might be clarified by pointing to the specific time scale, spatial scale, and 
learning outcome of interest. I then suggested a set of criteria that might help clarify what 
‘social influence’ means in each case. These criteria were meant to clarify (1) the role of 
the environmental information made available by the facilitator; (2) the basic role played 
by the facilitator (to perform the target task or something else); (3) whether the influence 
between facilitator and learner is unidirectional or bidirectional; (4) whether the influence 
is direct or indirect; and (5) what intentions are involved. 
I finished by focusing on teaching-learning relations. I briefly reviewed an 
influential definition, identified some shortcomings and inconsistencies with the present 
approach, and suggested an alternative definition of teaching as a relational, historical 
process in which mutual sensitivity and the intention to bring about learning were 
fundamental. 
In the following chapters I present the results of two empirical studies in which I 
investigated cases of learning socially motivated by the perspective developed here. In 
the study reported in Chapter 6, children visiting a science museum in Newcastle upon 
Tyne (UK) were invited to participate in a making activity with a skilled facilitator. I 
analysed some aspects of how they coordinated their behaviour with each other during 
the activity and attempted to investigate its association to learning. In the study reported 
in Chapter 7, I recruited adults to the joint eyetracking lab at the University of Edinburgh. 
They watched videos in which an adult facilitator demonstrated the solution to a set of 
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puzzles and subsequently attempted to solve them. For the main analysis, I manipulated 
the stimuli such that some learners could see the facilitator’s face and others could not, 
and some learners could listen to what the facilitator was saying and others could not. I 
analysed aspects of how leaners coordinated their visual attention to the stimulus on the 
screen and its relation to learning.
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Chapter 6 Learning through making together: 
coordinating behaviour in a joint making 
task. 
6.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, a joint making activity provides the context for a case of social learning. 
My primary goal is to use this example as an opportunity to flesh out, in more concrete 
terms, what it means to view social learning as a relational developmental process rather 
than as a linear transmission of information (sensu represented knowledge) between 
individuals. 
Throughout this thesis, I argue for a processual, relational view of ontogeny 
according to which morphological and behavioural form is continually generated in real 
time by the set of interacting causal processes that compose the developmental system. 
This view was offered as an alternative to the more common view of form as pre-existing, 
at least partially, in the information (sensu instructions) encoded in the genes and 
expressed in development and in the information (sensu represented knowledge) encoded 
in the brain and expressed in overt behaviour. The term developmental system denotes 
the interdependence of the (changing) organism under scrutiny and its (changing) 
environment. For many animals, the environment includes tools and materials that can be 
manipulated in different ways. Thus, making can be understood as a process unfolding 
within the flow of ontogeny, as an aspect of the changes in the developmental system that 
manipulative behaviour can bring about. In a making activity, the maker, the tools, and 
the materials affect each other over time in different ways. Making is here conceived of 
as being achieved, not by the maker projecting a mental representation onto materials, but 
rather by the maker engaging with tools and materials as enabled and constrained by his 
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or her abilities and intentions, as well as by the physicochemical properties of the relevant 
set of tools and materials. In sum, making, as ontogeny, is here seen as a form-generating 
process rather than a form-imposing one (Ingold, 2013). 
Making a toy vehicle as a context for learning socially 
The Life Science Centre in Newcastle upon Tyne (UK) is a fun place to visit, especially 
designed to instigate the curiosity of the visitors with a set of interactive installations and 
supervised activities. In addition to their main exhibition area, their staff routinely 
conduct activities with visiting schoolchildren. In one such activity, children use common 
materials, such as discarded milk bottles, plastic lids, glue, and coloured paper, to produce 
toy vehicles. The task in this study is a simplified version of this activity. Modifications 
were made in common agreement between the experimenter (myself, MP) and the 
facilitator (the maker-in-residence at the time) so that children would engage individually 
rather than in groups, and a hand drill was included as a tool which we expected would 
be novel to the children, thus possibly allowing us to investigate implicit learning. The 
facilitator agreed to conduct the activity in a way as similarly as possible to the regular 
making activities, thus producing an interaction that was naturalistic and rich in stimuli, 
similar to a short-lived, small-scale apprenticeship relationship. I will refer to the adult 
maker as the facilitator or by using the female pronouns, and I will refer to the children 
makers as children, learners, or, to avoid ambiguity, using the male pronouns. I will also 
refer to the facilitator and the learners collectively as the participants of the study. 
The way I describe the task below is inspired by a version of Russian Activity 
Theory presented by the social psychologist Saadi Lahlou (2011b). The task is a 
continuous history of causal relations in which an initial situation is transformed into a 
final situation. The term ‘situation’ refers to parts of the world, i.e., to how objects and 
materials relate to each other in specific locations. I use the term intentionally as a 
reference to “situation semantics” mentioned in previous chapters (Barwise, 1983; 
Barwise & Perry, 1981; Barwise & Seligman, 1997; Chemero, 2009; Israel & Perry, 
1990). The basic idea is that situations may be linked by lawlike and/or normative 
constraints. Therefore, as the activity unfolds, perceived aspects of the time-evolving 
situation can inform skilled observers about aspects of past, present, and future situations 
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to which they are linked, and affect their behaviour in ways consistent with the current 
goal. 
For example, in the making activity examined here, perceiving an attentive child 
and a set of unassembled, circular lids can inform the skilled facilitator that she should 
instruct the child to transform them into wheels by drilling holes in them. This might 
increase the probability that she will reach for the hand drill rather than, say, the scissors 
nearby. Later, perceiving the child and the assembled vehicle can inform the facilitator 
that she should instruct the child to decorate it. This might increase the probability that 
she will point at the scissors rather than at the hand drill. In addition, makers may be able 
to remember previously lived sequences of linked situations and use this understanding 
to guide present behaviour. For example, children may remember how they used a pair 
of scissors to cut a specific pattern from a sheet of coloured paper at school, and this might 
affect how they end up decorating the vehicle in the present activity. Makers may also be 
able to imagine (i.e., simulate perceptual experience of) possible sequences of situations 
and use this to guide present behaviour. For example, when asked about the steps they 
would take to produce a toy vehicle (see below), children may imagine a sequence of 
situations, informed by their previously lived experience, and use this to guide their 
answer. 
In the current task, the components of the initial situation include the facilitator and 
the child with their existing abilities, as well as the tools and materials in their initial shape 
and spatial arrangement. The components of the final situation include the facilitator and 
the child, as well as the tools and materials in their final shape and spatial arrangement. 
Crucially, some of the materials should have been transformed to become a toy vehicle 
by then. It is possible that the child’s bodily organization that underlies task-relevant 
abilities will also have transformed in the process in a manner which we might 
characterize as improvement in task performance consequent on practice. Although the 
task is a continuous process (leading to its overall goal), for analytical purposes it is 
segmented into a sequence of subtasks or steps (each leading to its respective subgoal). 
Each subtask begins with its corresponding initial situation, unfolds as this initial state of 
affairs is transformed into a corresponding final situation and becomes the initial situation 
for the following step, and so on, until the overall goal is reached, and the task is 
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considered completed. The unfolding situation can also be understood as the combination 
of two developmental systems – one focused on the facilitator and the other focused on 
the current child – which partially overlap during the period in which they engage in the 
activity together. This partial overlap indicates that the facilitator and the child may 
influence each other’s ontogeny as they live (and possibly learn) together.  
In the making activity, participants exercise their existing abilities to perceive and 
act as they manipulate tools and materials and influence each other’s behaviour. In this 
process, their abilities are at once invoked and possibly transformed. For example, 
children might learn about what their own bodies are capable of, the properties of different 
materials, and how to operate the different tools. They might also learn about how to 
interact with other people and behave in a public space, how scientists conduct studies, 
how to deal with frustration and surprise, and so on. Here I focus on two possible aspects 
of learning, as described below. While I acknowledge that the facilitator might also 
change as a result of engaging in the activity, the focus here is more explicitly on the 
children as potential learners. Thus, the case study offered the opportunity to focus on 
possible roles that behavioural coordination may play in social learning. 
In this activity, the facilitator’s role is to assist each one of the different children. 
To accomplish this, she must be attentive to what each child is doing and make sense of 
it; she must anticipate and/or identify his or her specific struggles and provide the 
appropriate, context-specific support. All of this depends on her accumulated professional 
experience as a facilitator in similar activities and her abilities to coordinate her attention 
to each child’s behavioural flow, adjusting her own behaviour accordingly. Similarly, 
children are not just making an abstract toy, but each is making their own toy in this 
particular day and setting, with these tools and materials, and together with this facilitator. 
Children bring their existing skills and preferences to the activity and explore the 
materials creatively while attending to the facilitator’s behaviour and responding to her 
instructions and interventions. Thus, in a joint making activity such as this, there is plenty 
of room for improvisation and coordination of behaviour and attention between 
participants, and the skills that children already have at the start of the activity might 
change consequent on their experience. It is precisely this real-time coordination between 
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the improvised behaviour of both the facilitator and the children, and the possible 
association between behavioural coordination and learning, that I want to capture. 
Previous studies have examined the association between visual attention and 
performance in tasks involving social learning. Here I will mention only two studies to 
highlight an important methodological aspect of the present approach. M. Carpenter, 
Tomasello, and Savage-Rumbaugh (1995) reported a comparative study involving 
imitation tasks with three captive, mother-reared chimpanzees between 3 and 21 years of 
age, three captive, human-reared (“enculturated”) chimpanzees between 4 and 10 years 
of age, and six 18-month-old children. In each trial, the potential learners first had the 
opportunity to observe the facilitator (experimenter) perform a target action on an object 
(“model period”). Subsequently, the facilitator gave the object to the learners and 
observed their behaviour, sometimes prompting and directing them to perform the target 
action (“response period”). The authors operationalized joint attention episodes as the 
periods of time in which participants alternated between looking at the target object and 
looking at the experimenter’s face. They reported a positive correlation between a 
measure of imitative performance and the average length of joint attention episodes 
during the response period (the corresponding result for the model period was not 
reported). This correlation was observed for the participants taken together as well as 
within each group separately. The authors concluded that “the alternation or coordination 
of attention to both object and E [experimenter] was associated with higher levels of 
imitative learning.” (M. Carpenter et al., 1995, p. 231). In their study, the expression 
“coordination of attention” refers to how potential learners alternated their visual 
attention between different targets (the object manipulated or the experimenter’s face) 
over time, but does not capture how that relates to the visual attention of the facilitator in 
the same period. In the present study, on the other hand, the expression “coordination of 
attention” refers to how potential learners alternate their visual attention between different 
targets (their own manipulation, the facilitator’s manipulation, their joint manipulation, 
or the facilitator’s face) explicitly in relation to how the facilitator also alternates between 
the same set of targets in the same period. 
The second study I want to mention, reported in Vivanti, Nadig, Ozonoff, and 
Rogers (2008), used eye-tracking to compare patterns of visual attention in 18 children 
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with autism and 13 children with typical development, between 8 and 15 years of age. 
Participants were instructed to watch a set of video recordings of the facilitator 
demonstrating a target action and to imitate what they saw the facilitator do after each 
clip. Among children with autism, but not among children with typical development, the 
authors reported a positive correlation between a measure of imitation precision of 
nonmeaningful gestures and the proportion of time children spent looking at the region 
where the action was performed (as opposed to time spent looking at the facilitator’s face 
or other regions in the video). While the proportion of time may be a sensible index of 
visual attention, it does not capture any dynamical patterns or the time-evolving relation 
between the visual attention of the learner and the behaviour of the facilitator. Here I 
examine whether these time-evolving patterns and relations are relevant to the social 
learning process under examination. For clarity, below I refer to the time-evolving, 
relational character of joint attention as coupled visual attention. 
How to capture behavioural coordination in real time? 
The point I want to make is that it is difficult, if not impossible, to capture the dynamical 
or historical interplay between the learner’s and the facilitator’s behaviour using solely 
measures such as the average length of joint attention episodes or the proportion of time 
spent looking at different targets, because variables such as those aggregate behaviour 
over time. As an alternative methodological approach, here I explore nonlinear methods 
from recurrence analysis, which make no assumptions about the size, distribution, or 
stationarity of the data (Webber & Zbilut, 2005). These methods permit considering 
temporal variability not as noise to be averaged over but as intrinsically informative about 
the underlying biological processes that generate the data. Eckmann, Kamphorst, and 
Ruelle (1987) introduced recurrence plots (RPs) as a tool to visualize the trajectory of a 
dynamical system in its phase space by means of recurrences, i.e. repetitions of a system’s 
states over time. The RP is useful to examine the time evolution of a system because 
differences in the patterns that appear in the RP indicate differences in the underlying 
dynamical process. Moving beyond visual inspection, Zbilut and Webber (1992) and 
Webber and Zbilut (1994) initially suggested how some of these patterns could be 
extracted for recurrence quantification analysis or RQA. The cross recurrence plot (CRP) 
is a bivariate extension of the RP used to compare the simultaneous trajectories of two 
systems and its patterns can also be extracted and quantified using cross recurrence 
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quantification analysis or CRQA (Marwan & Kurths, 2002; Shockley, Butwill, Zbilut, & 
Webber, 2002; Zbilut, Giuliani, & Webber, 1998). Marwan, Romano, Thiel, and Kurths 
(2007) provide an extensive review of recurrence and cross recurrence analysis and 
Webber and Zbilut (2005) offer a more accessible introduction. 
Though still relatively new in the analytical toolkit of researchers working on social 
learning, a growing empirical literature has applied these methods to the study of intra- 
and interpersonal coordination. Shockley, Santana, and Fowler (2003) reported that 
participants who engaged together in a conversation task coordinated their postural sway 
trajectories. A subsequent study suggested that this shared postural activity was mediated 
by convergent speaking patterns between participants (Shockley, Baker, Richardson, & 
Fowler, 2007). Perhaps more relevant to my discussion is another set of studies which 
focused specifically on gaze coordination. D. C. Richardson and Dale (2005) recorded 
the speech and eye movements of participants while they looked at a set of pictures of 
famous cast members of a TV sitcom (either ‘‘Friends’’ or ‘‘The Simpsons’’) and spoke 
spontaneously about them. They then played unedited one-minute segments to a separate 
set of participants who were looking at the same pictures and also recorded their eye 
movements. Speakers and listeners synchronized their gaze direction above chance with 
a peak at a 2 sec lag, consistent with the speaker leading the listener’s attention; and a 
stronger coupling was associated with higher scores in a comprehension test applied to 
the listeners. 
Two subsequent studies are reported in D. C. Richardson, Dale, and Kirkham 
(2007). The first study used the same task and stimuli as that of Richardson and Dale 
(2005) but allowed pairs of participants to interact in real time in a two-way conversation 
about the cast members of the TV shows. Results showed a similar coordination except 
that the peak recurrence was found at lag zero. This was interpreted as evidence that 
participants took turns in leading and following each other’s attention. The second study 
reported in D. C. Richardson et al. (2007) examined live unscripted conversation between 
participants about a painting by Salvador Dali. Before their conversation, pairs of 
participants heard either the same or different passages about the painter. Results 
confirmed the prediction that the partners who had listened to the same passage prior to 
the conversation, compared to different passages, showed greater coordination of their 
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eye movements. Louwerse, Dale, Bard, and Jeuniaux (2012) reported that participants 
engaging in an unscripted face-to-face collaborative communication task synchronized 
their behaviour across several modalities simultaneously, including linguistic 
expressions, facial expressions, manual gestures, and noncommunicative postures. 
Recurrence analysis seems very well suited to investigate interpersonal 
coordination. Therefore, applying these tools to the study of social learning might allow 
new insights to be gained about how learning, here operationalized as improved 
performance in the tests conducted before and after the activity, can be influenced by the 
presence and behaviour of others. However, to my knowledge these tools have not yet 
been used with the explicit goal to study processes of social learning. The current study 
is an initial effort to explore this promising possibility in a naturalistic context.  
6.1.1 The present study 
This study was thoroughly exploratory, guided less by the desire to do hypothesis-testing 
and more by the desire to explore innovative analytical tools to investigate behavioural 
coordination in the context of social learning while being consistent with the theoretical 
perspective developed in the previous chapters. I examined the dynamics of visual 
attention during the task and its association with learning. Children engaged individually 
in a making activity guided by an adult facilitator. I used cross recurrence quantification 
analysis to examine dynamical features of the participants’ eye movements as they 
interacted, and I examined the children’s ability to use a novel tool and to identify the 
crucial steps in the activity. I investigated whether the dyads synchronized their visual 
attention and whether their coupled attention was constrained by the time-evolving task. 
I also investigated whether measures of attentional coordination were associated with 
learning. The facilitator interacted with the potential learners in real time. Therefore, 
measures of behavioural coordination should be interpreted as referring to the dyad as a 
distributed whole rather than to the facilitator or the child as individuals. 
Predictions regarding behavioural coordination 
The different subtasks should impose different constraints on the participants’ 
behavioural flows. Therefore, I expected different subtasks to produce systematically 
different signatures of attentional coordination (Prediction C1) but I do not have more 
detailed predictions. Given the nature of the task and the explicit commitment of the 
 Learning through making together 129 
participants, dyads should not only coordinate indiscriminately but indeed synchronize 
their visual attention during the activity in order for the joint activity to unfold smoothly. 
In other words, participants should tend to be gazing at the same target at the same time 
(Prediction C2). Since the facilitator explicitly agreed to follow the same predefined 
script with all children, I expected different dyads would produce similar temporal 
patterns of coupled attention (Prediction C3). 
Predictions regarding learning. 
Given that the facilitator explicitly intended to bring about learning, I predicted that 
children who engaged in the making activity would improve their ability to use the novel 
tool, compared to children who used the tool unassisted in the control condition 
(Prediction L1), and that they would learn about the steps required to solve the task 
(Prediction L2). I also examined whether coordination during the subtask involving the 
target tool was associated with children’s performance with the tool after the activity. I 
expected that higher values of coordination would be associated with better performance 
(Prediction L3). 
6.2 Method 
6.2.1 Site and participants  
The study took place at Life Science Centre in Newcastle upon Tyne (UK). A total of 42 
children between the ages of 7 and 10 years were recruited from the general public visiting 
the museum. Of these, 17 children (8 females) participated in the making activity and 
were allowed to take the built product with them after. The other 25 children (15 females) 
provided the control condition for the implicit knowledge test. Informed consent was 
obtained from the children’s guardians and also from the adult maker-in-residence who 
acted as the facilitator. The study was approved by the University of St Andrews Teaching 
and Research Ethics Committee. 
6.2.2 Design 
Most of the analyses reported refer to children who engaged in the making activity. They 
were first given the implicit and explicit knowledge tests, then engaged in the task with 
the facilitator, then repeated the tests. Additionally, as a control for the implicit 
knowledge test only, a separate cohort of children were first given the implicit knowledge 
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tests, then returned to the exhibition area and engaged in a distraction task for 10 minutes, 
then returned to repeat the performance tests. During this interval, children might interact 
with their caregivers. Caregivers were instructed to not give any assistance should their 
children ask about the target tool, and no instance of such assistance was observed. 
6.2.3 Experimental setup 
Figure 6-1 shows the setup for the control of the implicit knowledge test. Figure 6-2 
shows the tools and materials for the making activity and Figure 6-3 shows the setup. 
The making activity was conducted in a dedicated room which was visually but not 
acoustically isolated from the rest of the exhibition area. The room included a desk with 
the tools and materials and participants could move around it as required. The facilitator 
and the child stayed on opposite sides of the desk facing each other during most of the 
activity. The sessions were video-recorded using a set of digital cameras. The main 
camera was inside a box hidden from children’s view and captured the activity from the 
side. Participants and the experimenter also wore subjective cameras or subcams. These 
are small cameras attached to lens-free spectacles frames that capture the person’s 
perspective (Lahlou, 2011a), and were used to code eye-gaze and to disambiguate the 
side-view footage when needed. Children were told the subcams would allow the 
experimenter to see things from their perspective, and they showed no signs of discomfort 
using them. The control for the implicit knowledge test involved only the novel tool and 
was conducted in a different space (Figure 6-1) close to an existing activity at the 
museum which provided the distraction task. In this case, the space was only partially 
isolated from the rest of the exhibition area. These sessions were video-recorded using 
two tripod-mounted digital cameras. 
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Figure 6-1. The setup for the control condition. 
 
 
Figure 6-2. Tools and materials used in the making activity. For the vehicle’s body, children chose among 
the piece of foam, milk bottle, and egg carton (left). The tools (centre) included a familiar tool (pair of 
scissors) and a novel tool used in the implicit knowledge tests (hand drill). The black circular plastic lids 
(left) were drilled to become wheels, which were then attached to the vehicle’s main body using the wooden 
axles (left). The other materials were available for decorating: plasticine, stickers, glue, coloured paper, 
glitter pens, and pipe cleaners. 
6.2.4 General procedure 
Children were recruited and taken individually to the dedicated space. First, the 
experimenter (myself, MP) asked a set of questions (Have you seen one of these before? 
Can you tell me what this is? What do people use this for?) to assess familiarity with the 
pair of scissors (expected to be familiar) and the hand drill (expected to be novel) in 
counterbalanced order. The experimenter then conducted the set of pre-activity 
performance tests (Test-1). Table 6-1 summarizes the prompts used and the responses 
coded. The implicit knowledge tests assessed children’s ability to use the target tool. I 
asked them to have a go with the hand drill on a prepared target identical to what they 
would use during the activity. I coded whether they succeeded to drill a hole and measured 
the time interval from when they started operating the tool (i.e. turning the wheel handle) 
until success or test termination. The test was interrupted after about 30 sec of tool use 
without success or earlier to ensure children’s safety and engagement. The explicit 
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knowledge tests assessed children’s understanding of the steps required in the task. I 
showed them a finished model vehicle (shown in Figure 6-3) and the materials available 
on the table and prompted them to describe the steps they might take to make a similar 
product. Responses were coded from the recorded videos into categories that 
corresponded to the subtasks defined in the script: ‘pick a body’, ‘making the wheels’, 
‘assembling’, ‘decorating’, and an additional category ‘other’ for any other response. This 
resulted in an ordered categorical score ranging from zero (no subtask identified) to four 
(all four subtasks identified). 
After the initial performance tests (Test-1), children in the experimental condition 
participated in the making activity, described below, which lasted for an average of 12 
min (range: [9 min, 15 min]). Alternatively, children providing the control for the implicit 
knowledge test returned to the main exhibition area and participated in a distraction task 
for about 10 min. After the making activity or the distraction task, the experimenter 
conducted the post-activity performance tests (Test-2). 
  
 Learning through making together 133 
 
Table 6-1. Tests performed with the children participants before and after the activity or distraction task 
(control). 
Test Prompt Responses coded 
Implicit 
knowledge test 
Can you have a go and show me 
how it works? 
(1) Binary: success or no success. 
(2) Continuous: time to success (in sec). 
Explicit 
knowledge test 
If you would make a vehicle like 
this one [Experimenter shows 
model], what would you have to 
do first? And next? And next?  
Ordered categorical: number of subtasks 
identified ranging from zero to four. 
 
6.2.5 The making activity 
The activity began when the experimenter finished Test-1 and the facilitator took over. 
The overall goal of the task consisted in making a toy vehicle under the assistance of the 
adult facilitator using simple everyday materials, a common tool (a pair of scissors) and 
a novel tool (hand drill). The task was divided into five subtasks, summarized in Table 
6-2 and illustrated in Figure 6-3. Note that the script is not a rigid set of rules, but the 
general storyline within which participants can, indeed must, improvise creatively 
according to the unique situation they encounter and the unique set of abilities and 
intentions they bring. The script represents the activity for communication purposes 
without being a mental representation. The script ‘controls’ the activity insofar as the 
facilitator, but not the children, committed to following it. In the first subtask 
(PICK_BODY), the subgoal was for the children to have chosen the material that would 
become the vehicle’s body. The facilitator’s role was to engage the children by asking 
them what sort of vehicle they want to make. The facilitator offered three possible 
materials (an egg box, a milk bottle, and a piece of foam) and prompted the children to 
choose one. The children’s role was to communicate with the facilitator and commit to 
the task. This subtask ended when the child indicated his or her choice. In the second 
subtask (TOOL_DEMO), the facilitator demonstrated how to use the hand drill by drilling 
a hole in the centre of a circular plastic lid similar to what children would use to make the 
wheels for the toy vehicle. She also gave verbal instructions describing her actions. The 
134  Chapter 6 
children’s expected role was to attend to the demonstration. The subgoal in the third step 
(TOOL_USE) was to have four wheels ready to use. The children’s role was to use the 
hand drill four times to make four wheels. The facilitator’s role was to attend to the 
children and instruct and assist them as required for a safe and appropriate use of the tool. 
The subgoal in the fourth step (ASSEMBLE) was to have the basic vehicle ready. The 
facilitator’s role was to instruct the children how to put the parts together (body + wheels 
+ axles) and assist them if and as necessary. The children’s role was to follow the 
instructions and assemble the parts into a basic toy vehicle. The subgoal in the fifth step 
(DECORATE) was the same as the overall goal of the task, namely to have the final toy 
vehicle ready. The facilitator’s role was to show the available materials for decorating 
and to assist the children as needed. It was also her responsibility to keep track of time 
and bring the activity to an end within 5 minutes after the children started decorating. The 
children’s expected role was to use the materials to decorate their vehicle however they 
wanted. 
 
Figure 6-3. Snapshots illustrating each of the steps that compose the task. The model vehicle is on the desk. 
The tool used in the implicit learning test is the hand drill, shown in steps 2 and 3. 
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Table 6-2. The script of the making activity. Note that the final situation of one subtask becomes the initial 
situation of the next (shown with the same colours). 
 Subtasks of the making activity 
1. PICK 
BODY 
MAKE WHEELS 
4. ASSEMBLE 5. DECORATE 2. TOOL 
DEMO 
3. TOOL USE 
Initial 
situation 
Child is 
recruited and 
ready to engage 
the task. 
Child chooses 
(by gesture or 
verbally) one of 
the materials. 
Demonstration 
lid has a hole 
and drill is 
detached from 
it. 
Four wheels are 
ready, and the 
hand drill is 
detached from 
the fourth lid. 
The basic 
vehicle is 
ready. 
Changes 
made to the 
materials 
Material is 
chosen for the 
body, but no 
changes are 
made to the 
materials. 
The 
demonstration 
lid is drilled but 
no changes are 
made to the 
materials for 
the child’s 
vehicle. 
Four plastic lids 
are drilled and 
now become 
wheels. 
Materials are 
put together 
and now have 
the form of a 
vehicle. 
Other materials 
are added to the 
vehicle, 
depending on 
the children’s 
abilities and 
creativity. 
Final 
situation 
(subgoal) 
Child chooses 
(by gesture or 
verbally) one of 
the materials. 
Demonstration 
lid has a hole 
and drill is 
detached from 
it. 
Four wheels are 
ready, and the 
hand drill is 
detached from 
the fourth lid. 
The basic 
vehicle is 
ready. 
The vehicle is 
decorated and 
finished. 
Facilitator’s 
expected 
role 
Engage child. 
Present choice 
of materials for 
the vehicle’s 
body. 
Ask child to 
choose one. 
Demonstrate 
how to use the 
hand drill. 
Prompt child to 
use the hand 
drill. 
Assist as 
required. 
Prompt child to 
assemble the 
basic vehicle. 
Assist as 
required. 
Offer materials 
and prompt 
child to 
decorate. 
Assist as 
required. 
Terminate 
activity after 
ca. five minutes 
Examples of 
prompts 
directed to 
the children 
Which one of 
these materials 
do you want to 
use for the body 
bit? 
I’m going to 
show you how 
to do it and 
then you’re 
going to have a 
go, ok? 
Do you want to 
have a go at 
making your 
wheels? 
Can you put it 
together now? 
You have five 
minutes to 
decorate your 
vehicle 
however you 
want. 
Children’s 
expected 
role 
Choose one of 
the materials. 
Attend to the 
demonstration. 
Use the hand 
drill four times 
to make four 
wheels. 
Assemble the 
vehicle. 
Decorate the 
vehicle. 
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6.2.6 Data processing 
Coding and inter-observer reliability 
Participants’ behavioural flows were coded from the video recordings into categorical 
time series at a sample rate of one observation per second using the free software Solomon 
version beta 16.06.26 (Péter, 2016). For each session, three time series were produced for 
the facilitator and three time series were produced for the child. In each case, the first 
time series referred to their manipulative behaviour, the second to their vocalizations, and 
the third to the direction of their gaze. The behavioural categories are defined in Table 
6-3. Given the nature of the making activity, manipulation was mainly visually guided. 
Because of the way in which gaze direction was coded, the categories indicate not only 
visual attention (what they are looking at) but can also be used as an index of the overall 
and behavioural states of the participants. An independent coder blind to the hypotheses 
scored 20% of the videos, and inter-observer reliability was high: Cohen’s kappa = .82, 
95% CI [.81, .83]. 
Table 6-3. Behavioural categories used in the study. F: facilitator; L: learner. 
Modality Participant Label Category definition 
Manipulation Facilitator F_manip F manipulates materials alone 
F_joint_manip F manipulates materials jointly with L 
F_no_manip F does not manipulate materials 
Learner L_manip L manipulates materials alone 
L_joint_manip L manipulates materials jointly with F 
L_no_manip L does not manipulate materials 
Vocalization Facilitator F_voc F vocalizes 
F_no_voc F does not vocalize 
Learner L_voc L vocalizes 
L_no_voc L does not vocalize 
Gaze direction Facilitator F_look_F F gazes at her own manipulations 
F_look_L F gazes at L’s manipulations 
F_look_joint_manip F gazes at their joint manipulation 
F_look_Leyes F gazes at L’s eyes 
F_look_other F gazes somewhere else or NA 
Learner L_look_F L gazes at her own manipulations 
L_look_L L gazes at F’s manipulations 
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L_look_joint_manip L gazes at their joint manipulation 
L_look_Feyes L gazes at the F’s eyes 
L_look_other L gazes somewhere else or NA 
 
6.2.7 Analysis 
I examined the performance of the potential learners before and after the making activity 
(or distraction task) and the time series representing the participants’ manipulation, 
vocalization, and direction of gaze. With regard to manipulation and vocalization, I 
simply computed the proportion of time spent in each behavioural category. The time 
series of gaze direction was used to examine behavioural coordination in detail as 
described below. 
Cross Recurrence Quantification Analysis 
To examine the coordinative dynamics of the dyads’ joint visual attention in more detail 
I used a family of nonlinear techniques from recurrence analysis based on cross 
recurrence plots (CRPs). These analyses were conducted using the crqa package in R 
(Coco & Dale, 2014). In general terms, the steps to produce a CRP from a pair of 
categorical time series are the following. First the cross recurrence matrix is computed, 
allowing only a set of chosen pairs of behavioural states to count towards cross 
recurrence. In this matrix, columns represent the time indices of the facilitator’s time 
series, and rows those of the child’s. The states of the two systems are compared for each 
combination of time indices. For one-dimensional categorical data such as behavioural 
states, this comparison is straightforward: if the two participants exhibit ‘the same’ 
behavioural category, a value of one is included in the corresponding entry in the matrix, 
thus indicating cross recurrence; otherwise a value of zero indicates the states are 
different, i.e. no cross recurrence. Table 6-4 shows the pairs of behavioural categories 
considered as being ‘the same behavioural state’ and which were thus allowed to count 
towards cross recurrence. 
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Table 6-4. The pairs of behavioural categories considered to be ‘the same behavioural state’ for the purpose 
of cross recurrence quantification analysis. 
 
The cross recurrence matrix can then be used for cross recurrence quantification analysis 
(CRQA) and can also be plotted as a cross recurrence plot (CRP) for visualization. In the 
CRP the horizontal axis represents the time indexes of the facilitator’s time series and the 
vertical axis those of the child’s, and different colours such as black and white are used 
to contrast the values of one (i.e. cross recurrence) and zero (no cross recurrence) at each 
entry in the matrix. As an illustrative example, Figure 6-4 shows the time series obtained 
for dyad 7 and Figure 6-5 shows the corresponding CRP produced for their gaze direction 
data in the entire activity. In the CRP, the main diagonal or Line of Synchrony (slope = 1 
and passing through the origin) compares the states exhibited by the systems under 
analysis – here, the two participants – at exactly the same time. Diagonals with slope = 1 
and parallel to (above or below) the main compares the states of the participants at 
different time lags.  
Behavioural categories 
Justification 
Facilitator Learner 
F_look_F L_look_F Both are looking at the facilitator’s actions 
F_look_L L_look_L Both are looking at the learner’s actions 
F_look_joint_manip L_look_joint_manip Both are looking at their joint actions 
F_look_Leyes L_look_Feyes Both are looking at each other’s eyes 
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Figure 6-4. Time series coded for dyad 7. The behavioural categories are described in Table 6-3. 
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Figure 6-5. Cross recurrence plot (CRP) computed for the gaze direction data from dyad 7. The time series 
representing the gaze direction of the facilitator (horizontal) and the learner (vertical) are the same as shown 
in Figure 6-4. The CRP has been colour-coded for didactic purpose. Entries in the cross recurrence matrix 
with a value of zero (no cross recurrence) are in black. Entries with a value of 1 (cross recurrence) are 
represented with the colour which indicates the corresponding behavioural states. 
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Cross recurrence points that form continuous lines are of especial interest for 
quantification analysis (Marwan et al., 2007). Vertical (or horizontal) lines indicate that 
one (or the other) system is stationary, i.e. that the behavioural state of one (or the other) 
participant does not change for some time. Diagonal lines with slope = 1 indicate that the 
trajectories of both systems in their corresponding state spaces are running in parallel at 
the corresponding time lag. In the context of this study diagonal lines indicate that both 
participants were visually tracking the same situation or sequence of situations at the 
corresponding time lag.  
Different textures that obtain in the CRP – i.e. how cross recurrence points are 
distributed – indicate features of the underlying dynamics that can be quantified by 
computing CRQA variables. Here I focus on four variables: cross recurrence rate (RR), 
determinism (DET), mean line length (L), and maximum line length (MAXL). The 
variable RR measures the proportion or density of cross recurrence points in the CRP. It 
is a general and indiscriminate measure of the degree of shared activity or coordination 
between the signals, corresponding to the more widely known cross correlation sum 
(Kantz, 1994). The variable DET is defined as the percentage of cross recurrence points 
that have a common trajectory in the phase space. In the CRP this corresponds to points 
that form diagonal lines larger than some defined threshold value and is therefore an index 
of synchronization. L is defined as the average length of diagonals above the threshold 
and is an index of the proportion of time in which both systems stay synchronized. MAXL 
is defined as the longest diagonal line present in the CRP; it quantifies the dynamic’s 
robustness to perturbation and is therefore an index of the stability of coupling. The 
variables DET, L, and MAXL depend on the threshold value which was here set to the 
minimum of 2. This corresponds to 2 seconds in the original data, thus these variables 
consider the cases in which participants are in the same behavioural state for 2 seconds 
or longer. CRQA variables are descriptive in nature and therefore comparisons among 
conditions, participants, or appropriate baselines are required to draw inferences and 
examine specific predictions (Marwan et al., 2007; Shockley et al., 2002). 
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1) Comparing subtasks (Prediction C1) 
To investigate if coupled attention is constrained by the emerging task I examined 
whether different subtasks produced systematically different quantifications of 
coordination (Prediction 1.2). To this end, coordination variables were computed for each 
subtask separately. Participants rarely touched any materials during the first subtask 
(PICK_BODY) so it was ignored. In addition, the two subtasks involving the novel tool 
(TOOL_DEMO and TOOL_USE) were considered together (as MAKE_WHEELS). 
Thus, I compared the subtasks MAKE-WHEELS, ASSEMBLE, and DECORATE. It is 
possible to extract coordination variables from the entire CRPs corresponding to each 
subtask, as described above. However, doing this would include many lags which are far 
away from the main diagonal and thus do not seem relevant in this case. For example, for 
the purpose of examining the on-going coordination between participants, it does not 
seem relevant to include lags which tells us that the facilitator looked where the child was 
looking five or ten minutes before. Therefore, it makes sense to focus on a narrow window 
of a few seconds around the main diagonal. This can be done by conducting a windowed 
analysis. A windowed analysis consists in building CRPs and computing CRQA 
measures, not once for the entire time series but multiple times for a sequence of 
overlapping windows of a determined size, thus effectively tracking how CRQA values 
evolve over the entire time course. In the CRP shown in Figure 6-5, this would 
correspond to computing CRQA variables, not for the entire CRP but for a set of 
overlapping windows around the main diagonal. I used the wincrqa function and set the 
parameter windowsize to 11 and parameter windowstep to 1. This corresponds to using 
a window including the main diagonal ± 5 seconds lag in each side, computing the 
coordination variable, moving the window one second, computing the variables again, 
and so on, for the entire time series. This produces high-resolution data. Thus, I simply 
computed the average values for each subtask. The values of RR computed for the subtask 
MAKE_WHEELS (RRMW) were additionally used as a predictor in the analyses of the 
association between coordination and implicit learning (see below). Finally, I also 
computed RR for the entire activity (RRactivity) and this was used as a predictor in the 
analysis of the association between coordination and explicit learning (see below). 
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2) Quantifying synchronization (Prediction C2) 
To examine the degree of synchronization in coupled attention (Prediction C2), 
diagonal-wise cross recurrence profiles (DCRP) were produced for each dyad (Marwan 
et al., 2007). One example is shown with the filled circles in Figure 6-6. The DCRP is 
produced by plotting the proportion of cross recurrence points that obtain at each lag 
within a range of interest, here defined to include the main diagonal (lag 0) and 10s on 
either side. The patterns that obtain in the DCRP indicate aspects of synchronization. If 
one participant tends to lead the other’s attention, this will produce a peak on either side 
depending on who is leading. In contrast, if both participants take turns leading and 
following, or if they tend to track the same situation at the same time, then this will 
produce a peak near lag zero. If there is no clear leader/follower pattern, this will produce 
a relatively flat curve. 
3) Comparing temporal patterns of coupled attention (Prediction C3) 
To examine if coupled attention follows a similar temporal organization across 
dyads (Prediction C3), I conducted windowed analyses separately for each relevant pair 
of behavioural states: 
(1) looking at facilitator’s actions (categories F_look_F and L_look_F) 
(2) looking at children’s actions (categories F_look_L and L_look_L) 
(3) looking at joint manipulation (categories F_look_joint_manip and L_look_joint_manip) 
(4) mutual gaze (categories F_look_Leyes and L_look_Feyes) 
As above, the window included the main diagonal ± 5 seconds lag in each side and 
it moved only one second in each iteration. I report only the variable RR as a general 
quantification of coupled attention. For this analysis I used the complete, high-resolution 
data (rather than computing the average, as above) to examine how the dyad’s attention 
changed in real time throughout the entire task. Since dyads varied in the amount of time 
spent in each subtask, the time series were normalized to be of the same length prior to 
this analysis. This was accomplished by making the length of each subtask equal to the 
minimum length observed in the sample, producing time series with a normalized total 
length of 464 seconds or 7 min: 44 sec. The subtask PICK_BODY corresponded to only 
9 secs after normalizing and therefore it is not captured properly in this analysis. These 
data were not modelled formally but used for qualitative interpretation. 
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Statistical analysis 
All analyses were carried out in R version 3.1.3 (R Core Team, 2016). Regression models 
were fit in STAN (Carpenter et al., in press) using the stan function from the rstan 
package (Stan Development Team, 2016) or the convenient map2stan function from the 
rethinking package (McElreath, 2016). STAN is a tool for implementing Bayesian 
multilevel models using Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) simulation, which 
approximates the posterior distribution for unknown parameters (Gelman et al., 2014; an 
accessible introduction is McElreath, 2016). Fitted Bayesian models provide samples 
from the posterior distribution of the parameters for which summary statistics are 
computed and reported (such as mean and standard deviation). In all models, I used 
weakly informative priors to avoid unreasonable parameter values while still allowing the 
model to estimate a wide range of sensible values (Gelman et al., 2014), and I report 
posterior distributions estimated from 3,000 samples after warmup. 
1) Analysis of coordination across subtasks (Prediction C1) 
To investigate if coupled attention is constrained by the emerging task, I modelled 
the coordination variables computed for each subtask using multilevel linear models. Four 
models were produced, one for each variable. In each model the outcome was the 
respective variable and the predictors were an indicator for subtask (MAKE-WHEELS, 
ASSEMBLE, DECORATE) and included varying intercepts (also called random effects) 
for dyad. 
2) Analysis of synchronization (Prediction C2) 
To examine synchronization quantitatively, I summarized the data from all dyads 
(N=17) with a single test statistic and used a simulation-based approach: I simulated data 
under two opposing assumptions, summarized each simulation with the same test statistic, 
and replicated this procedure 10,000 times. I then compared the two resulting 
distributions of the test statistic computed for the simulations with the test statistic 
computed from the observed data. The test statistic used to formalize this check was 
defined as the difference between the maximum RR and the average RR in the profile: 
diffRR𝑖 = max(RR𝑖) − mean(RR𝑖) 
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I used this variable (diffRR) as a proxy for how peaked each profile was and thus 
as a measure of the amount of synchronization between participants. Figure 6-6 
illustrates this procedure with an example from a single dyad for didactic purposes. 
However, for the actual test I used the average obtained across all dyads. The two 
opposing assumptions tested were that (1) the attentional flow of the participants is 
independent from each other; and (2) the attentional flow of the participants is perfectly 
synchronized with each other. By simulating data under the two opposing assumptions, 
it is possible to examine where the observed data lie between the theoretical extremes. 
For this analysis I allowed only the following pairs of categories to contribute towards 
cross recurrence: F_look_F and L_look_F; F_look_L and L_look_L. By excluding the 
categories F_look_joint_manip and L_look_joint_manip I am choosing for a conservative 
approach, since including them would inevitably increase the amount of synchronization 
detected because of how they were defined (described in Table 6-3). 
 
Figure 6-6. Diagonal-wise cross recurrence profile computed for dyad 7, showing the original data (filled 
circles) as well as two sets of 10,000 simulated data corresponding to the randomized (triangles) and 
perfectly synchronized (squares) baselines. Lag zero correspond to the main diagonal in Figure 6-5, and 
the ± 10 sec lags correspond to diagonals above/below it. To avoid overplotting and improve readability, 
the original data were shifted slightly to the left and the synchronized data to the right. 
3) Analysis of learning (Predictions L1 and L2) 
To examine if children’s performance with the tool improved as a result of engaging 
in the activity (Prediction L1) I modelled the data from the implicit knowledge tests using 
multilevel logistic regression with logit link. The outcome was the probability to succeed 
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with the tool (i.e. to produce a hole) and the predictors were an indicator for treatment 
(control = 0, making = 1), an indicator for test (Test-1 = 0, Test-2 = 1) and the interaction 
between them. 
To examine whether children’s ability to identify the steps in the task (explicit 
knowledge) improved from Test-1 to Test-2, I modelled the data from the explicit 
knowledge tests using multilevel ordered categorical regression with latent variable and 
cutpoints (following Gelman & Hill, 2007; and implemented according to McElreath, 
2016). The outcome was the cumulative probability to obtain each possible score in the 
explicit knowledge tests (i.e. the number of correct subtasks spontaneously identified by 
the children, either 0, 1, 2, 3, or 4). The predictors were an indicator for test (Test-1 = 0, 
Test-2 = 1) and an error term for children to account for individual variability. Dyads 8, 
10, and 11 were excluded due to experimenter error during the tests, therefore this 
analysis included N=14 sessions. To specifically test whether children scored higher in 
the post-activity test compared to the pre-activity test, I computed the posterior difference 
between the corresponding coefficients for Test-2 and Test-1. 
4) The association between coordination and learning (Prediction L3) 
To examine if higher values of attentional coordination were associated with an 
increase in the ability to use the novel tool, I focused on the subset of children who 
engaged in the making activity and used the novel tool successfully in Test-2 (N = 14). 
The variable used as an index of coordination was RRMW, the average cross recurrence 
rate computed during MAKE-WHEELS, as explained above. This variable seems 
appropriate as it captures the attentional coordination between children and the facilitator 
during the only subtask which involved the hand drill. Three generalized linear models 
with gamma error structure and logarithmic link were fitted to the data and compared in 
terms of their prediction accuracy using WAIC scores (Widely Applicable Information 
Criterion; see McElreath, 2016). Lower values of WAIC indicate better accuracy. In all 
models the outcome was the time children required to produce a hole in Test-2 (timeT2). 
The first model had only one predictor, RRMW, which was centred (i.e., subtracted from 
the mean) to facilitate interpretation. The second model included as a second predictor 
the children’s centred score in the explicit knowledge Test-1 (EKTest-1). This 
corresponds to statistically controlling for the children’s existing motor abilities prior to 
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the activity. A better control would have been the time children required to produce a hole 
in Test-1, but no child succeeded in the initial test. The third model included the second-
order interaction between RRMW and EKTest-1. 
To examine whether higher values of coordination during the activity were 
associated with more steps being explicitly identified in Test-2 than Test-1, I modelled 
the data from the explicit knowledge tests using multilevel ordered categorical regression 
with latent variable and cutpoints (Gelman & Hill, 2007). Three models were produced 
and compared using WAIC. In all models the outcome was the cumulative probability to 
obtain each possible score in the explicit knowledge Test-2. The first model had only one 
predictor, the cross recurrence rate computed for the whole activity (RRactivity), which was 
centred prior to including in the model. The second model included the centred score 
obtained in Test-1 as a covariate (EKTest-1) to adjust for each participant’s baseline 
score. The third model included the second-order interaction between RRactivity and 
EKTest-1. As with Prediction 2.3 above, this analysis included N=14 sessions. 
Evaluating evidence of effects 
All STAN models converged, and mixing was good. Unless otherwise indicated, I report 
the mean and 95% credible interval of the estimated parameters from the fitted models. 
In this section, strong evidence for an effect corresponds to a central credible interval of 
at least 95% which excludes 0, and weak evidence corresponds to cases where the 95% 
central credible interval includes 0, but the 90% central credible interval does not. I 
sometimes report the probability that the model estimates a positive parameter value to 
provide evidence of an effect. 
6.3 Results 
6.3.1 General characterization of the activity 
With regard to the manipulative actions, on average participants manipulated materials 
alone half of the time (facilitator: 47%, range [31%, 61%], children: 53%, range [37%, 
75%]) and there was no evidence of a systematic difference between facilitator and 
children (Welch’s t test: 95 % CI of the difference in seconds [-15, 103]). In addition, on 
average, dyads jointly manipulated the same materials during 17% of the time (range [8%, 
26%]). The facilitator vocalized on average during 52% of the time (range [38%, 69%]) 
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and children much less, during only 9% of the time (range [2%, 16%]) and there was 
strong evidence that this difference was systematic (Welch’s t test: 95 % CI of the 
difference in seconds [263, 349]) and corresponded to a large effect size (r = .95). 
Qualitative assessment of the recordings suggest that the facilitator used speech in a 
variety of contexts, including to engage children’s imagination (“What sort of vehicle do 
you want to make?”); to indicate how she anticipated the situation would unfold and thus 
possibly influencing the children’s expectation (“I’m going to show you how we’re going 
to use the drill, and then you’re going to have a go, ok?”); to narrate her actions during 
the hand drill demonstration and thus possibly facilitate learning by directing children’s 
attention to specific aspects of the unfolding task (“You’re going to hold the top of this 
[handle] in your left hand…”); to provide feedback and instruction (“That’s it!”, “Keep 
turning!”), to direct children’s attention to specific materials (“There’s tissue paper, stars, 
plasticine…”), and to finish the activity and praise the children’s work (“Right, are we 
done? That is a brilliant ice cream van!”). Children, on the other hand, mainly used 
vocalization to provide backchannel responses (“Aham”, “Yeah”), and to express 
emotions such as surprise (“Wow”) and frustration (“Oh”). 
Visual attention will be investigated in more depth below, but as a first step I 
operationalized synchronized coupled attention simply as the proportion of time in which 
both participants were visually tracking the same target situation during the same second 
interval – which target could be either the child’s hands, the facilitator’s hands, or their 
joint manipulation. With this preliminary definition, dyads engaged in synchronized 
attention on average for 74% of the time (range [68%, 81%]). These general patterns are 
overall consistent with the task being a joint making activity in which participants played 
different and complementary roles, sometimes doing things together and sometimes 
alone, and in which the facilitator used her actions and vocalizations to influence the 
behavioural flow of the children with the intention to follow the pre-defined script. 
6.3.2 Analysis of coordination across subtasks (Prediction C1) 
I predicted different subtasks would produce systematically different signatures of 
attentional coordination. Figure 6-7 shows the model estimates for each of the four 
coordination variables (CRR, DET, L, MAXL). Overall, estimated CRQA values were 
similar across subtasks, indicated by their broadly overlapping ranges. However, there 
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was evidence of systematic differences across subtasks, indicated by the peaked pattern 
in all plots. Table 6-5 shows the probability that the models estimated the highest and 
lowest values for each subtask. With regard to the subtask ASSEMBLE, there was strong 
evidence that the dyads showed the highest values of overall coordination compared to 
the other subtasks (RR: p = .96), that they synchronized more (DET: p = .99), and that 
they stayed synchronized for longer (L: p = .97). In addition, with regard to the subtask 
DECORATE, there was strong evidence that they were less synchronized (DET: p = .94) 
and that the behavioural coupling was less stable (MAXL: p = 1). 
 
Figure 6-7. Estimated values of the coordination variables RR, DET, L, and MAXL, in subtasks 
MAKE_WHEELS (MW), ASSEMBLE (A), and DECORATE (D). Reported values are the mean estimates 
(thick, red) and 100 simulations from the fitted models (thin, black). Even though the values overlap across 
subtasks, it is possible to see that the models systematically estimated the highest values for the subtask 
ASSEMBLE. 
These results are consistent with the prediction that the different constraints 
imposed by each subtask should produce systematic differences across conditions. On the 
one hand, during ASSEMBLE, the subgoal was to have the basic vehicle ready by 
bringing the set of materials available at that stage – the body, four wheels, and four axles 
– into a specific spatial arrangement. The manipulative behaviours required to transform 
their current situation were constrained by the properties of the materials and the imagined 
design. They were also constrained by the children’s existing manual dexterity, which is 
a function of their prior history in similar making activities. The facilitator must be aware 
of all these elements and intervene appropriately, sometimes even taking full control of 
the flow of manipulations (i.e., going from manipulating jointly to manipulating alone) 
without fully disengaging the children from the activity altogether. The results indicate 
that these challenges were particularly demanding in terms of behavioural coordination. 
Qualitative assessment of the videos was consistent with this: children struggled to 
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complete the subtask without assistance and the facilitator attended closely to the 
unfolding of events and intervened multiple times. 
On the other hand, during DECORATE, instead of the rigid normative rules 
imposed by the script, children were relatively free to choose among a set of familiar 
materials Figure 6-2 and were invited to decorate the vehicle ‘however they wanted’. 
These constraints produced less behavioural coordination between the facilitator and the 
children. Qualitative assessment of the videos corroborated this: the facilitator frequently 
moved away and looked away from the children’s hands more often, as children explored 
the different materials. However, the facilitator still supervised, suggested alternatives, 
assisted, encouraged, and praised them until she eventually started bringing the activity 
to an end. 
Table 6-5. Probability that the models estimated the highest or the lowest value of coordination for each of 
the subtasks. For example, the model of RR estimated that the subtask MAKE-WHEELS will have the 
highest value with probability .06 and the lowest value with probability .24. Probabilities lower than .1 or 
higher than .9 are in bold. The cases reported in the main text are highlighted in grey. 
Variable 
Subtask 
MAKE-WHEELS ASSEMBLE DECORATE 
p(highest) p(lowest) p(highest) p(lowest) p(highest) p(lowest) 
RR .04 .21 .96 0 0 .79 
DET .01 .06 .99 0 0 .94 
L .02 .28 .97 0 0 .72 
MAXL .15 0 .85 0 0 1 
 
6.3.3 Analysis of synchronization (Prediction C2) 
I predicted participants’ visual attention should be synchronized in addition to being 
coordinated. This was examined with the diagonal-wise cross recurrence profiles. In all 
dyads the maximum RR was observed at lag zero, supporting the prediction, i.e. 
participants tended to be looking at the same situation at the same time. Furthermore, 
there was no clear leader/follower pattern, indicating that the facilitator was not only 
guiding the children but also being guided by the children. This is constrained by the 
resolution available (1 observation per second) and it should be noted that a finer 
resolution might produce a richer result. 
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The test statistic diffRR, defined above, was interpreted as an index of 
synchronization. I compared the mean value of diffRR computed for the observed data 
(diffRRobserved) with the distribution of values computed for randomized simulated 
baseline (diffRRrandom) and the perfectly synchronized simulated baseline (diffRRsynced). 
Figure 6-8 shows the distribution of diffRR values computed for the simulated baselines 
and the value computed for the observed data. There was strong evidence that the 
observed data were indeed synchronized (probability that diffRRrandom is equal to or higher 
than the value of diffRRobserved, p = 0). This is consistent with the suggestion that, in this 
case, behavioural coupling is direct (participants influence each other in real time) and 
the influence is bidirectional (the facilitator influences the children and the children also 
influence the facilitator). In addition, there was strong evidence that this synchronization 
was not perfect (probability that diffRRsynced is equal to or higher than the value of 
diffRRobserved, p = 1). This is consistent with participants influencing each other’s 
behaviour in the joint making activity while maintaining their individual autonomy. 
 
Figure 6-8. Distribution of the test statistic diffRR computed for the two simulated baselines, randomized 
and perfectly synchronized. The solid vertical line shows the value of diffRR computed for the observed 
data. 
6.3.4 Temporal patterns of coupled attention (Prediction C3) 
I expected different dyads would produce similar temporal patterns of coupled attention 
because the facilitator was explicitly committed to follow the same script every time. 
Figure 6-9 shows the median results from the windowed analysis, and Figure 6-10 
supplements it by representing variability across dyads. In these plots the horizontal axes 
represent time as the sequence of overlapping windows produced in the windowed 
analysis, and the vertical axes represent the RR values computed in each window for each 
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target of interest (both looking at the facilitator’s actions, both looking at the children’s 
actions, both looking at their joint manipulation, mutual gaze). Relatively higher values 
of RR indicate that the corresponding target dominates the dyad’s coupled attention. 
Therefore, these results capture the dynamical constitution of coupled attention and 
provide evidence to support a narrative about how coupled attention is established, 
maintained, and eventually dissolved as the task unfolds. 
The proportion of time participants spent looked at each other’s eyes was overall very 
small, but the facilitator gazed at the children relatively much more (mean: 6%, range 
[4%, 8%]) than children gazed at the facilitator (mean: 3%, range [1%, 4%]). This is 
reflected in extremely low RR values for the cross recurrence of the categories 
[F_look_Leyes and L_look_Feyes] throughout the task, with the notable exception of the 
initial moments, where most of the mutual gaze occurred. During the subtask MAKE-
WHEELS, the dyads’ coupled attention was first directed to the facilitator’s hands and 
then to the children’s or to their joint manipulation. This is consistent with the facilitator 
first demonstrating the tool (TOOL_DEMO) and then the children using it four times to 
make the wheels (TOOL_USE). Note there are four waves of ‘both looking at their joint 
manipulation’, corresponding to the children using the hand drill four times to produce 
four wheels. These curves have decreasing peaks, suggesting children overall were faster 
and/or received less assistance from the facilitator as they accumulated practical 
experience with the tool. During ASSEMBLE, the dyads’ coupled attention was again 
first directed to the facilitator’s hands and then to the children’s or to their joint action. 
This is consistent with the facilitator first prompting the children and then assisting them 
put the parts together. Finally, during DECORATE, the dyads’ coupled attention was first 
directed to the facilitator’s hands and then shifted mostly to the children’s. This is 
consistent with the facilitator first prompting the children and then the children working 
creatively with the common materials to decorate their vehicle, thus receiving less 
guidance. Figure 6-10 tells the same general story but indicates the variability across 
dyads. 
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Figure 6-9. Temporal evolution of the targets of coupled attention as the task unfolded. Windowed analyses 
were conducted separately for each target of attention after normalizing the length of the time series as 
explained in the main text. The coloured lines show median values of cross recurrence rate (across all 
dyads) at each window, for each of the possible targets of attention. The dashed vertical lines indicate the 
transitions between subtasks. The time intervals P have been added to indicate when prompts were being 
given by the facilitator. 
 
154  Chapter 6 
 
Figure 6-10. Temporal evolution of the targets of coupled attention as the task unfolded. Windowed 
analyses were conducted separately for each target of attention after normalizing the time series. The thick 
coloured lines are the same as in Figure 6-9 and show median values of cross recurrence rate (across all 
dyads) at each window, for each of the possible targets of attention. The black lines show the data for each 
of the N=17 dyads to indicate the variability in the complete dataset. The dashed vertical lines indicate the 
transitions between subtasks. The time intervals P have been added to indicate when prompts were being 
given by the facilitator. 
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6.3.5 Analysis of learning (Predictions L1 and L2) 
All children responded that they had seen a pair of scissors before, knew scissors are for 
cutting, and had used them before, thus suggesting they understood this set of questions 
about familiarity. In contrast, only two children in the control group and two in the 
experimental group reported having seen a hand drill before, and all children reported that 
they had never used a hand drill before. I therefore considered the hand drill to be a novel 
tool for all participants.  
Implicit learning 
I predicted that children who engaged in the making activity would improve their ability 
to use the novel tool more, compared to children who used the tool the same number of 
times but unassisted. Figure 6-11 reports the fitted logistic model. The estimated mean 
probability to succeed before the activity (Test-1) was similar for children in both 
conditions and there was no evidence of a difference between conditions (estimated 
difference in the probability to succeed: .10, 97% CI [-.01, .27). This suggests that 
children started with a roughly similar ability in both conditions. In contrast, children 
were much more likely to succeed after (Test-2) the joint making activity than after the 
distraction activity and there was strong evidence of a positive difference between 
conditions (estimated difference in the probability to succeed: .62, 97% CI [.32, .83]). 
The results indicate that engaging in the making activity with the adult maker indeed 
facilitated learning, as intended. 
Explicit learning 
Figure 6-12 reports the model of explicit knowledge predicted by test. The uncertainty 
around the parameters is very broad. However, as predicted, there was strong evidence 
that children explicitly identified more steps after the activity compared to before 
(difference between bTest-2 and bTest-1: 1.58, 95% C.I. [0.01, 3.36]). This indicates that 
participating in the making activity hands-on changed, indeed improved, children’s 
ability to imagine and explicitly identify the steps involved in making a toy vehicle. 
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Figure 6-11. Evidence of implicit learning. Estimated probability to succeed using the novel tool before 
(Test-1) and after (Test-2) participating in the distraction activity or the joint making activity. 
 
 
Figure 6-12. Evidence of explicit learning. A) Mean estimated cutpoints indicating the cumulative 
probability to identify 0, 1, 2, 3, or 4 steps in the explicit knowledge tests, before (Test-1) and after (Test-
2) participating in the joint making activity. For example, the third cutpoint from the bottom indicates that 
the mean estimated probability to identify 3 or 4 steps was about .5 in Test-1 and about .75 in Test-2. B) 
The mean (black solid lines, same as in A) and 95% credible intervals (grey dotted lines) of the estimated 
cutpoints are here shown separately to indicate model uncertainty. 
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6.3.6 The association between coordination and learning (Prediction L3) 
Implicit learning 
I predicted that higher values of coordination during the subtasks involving the novel tool 
(MAKE-WHEELS) would be associated with more time-efficient tool use in Test-2. The 
results from model comparison are shown in Table 6-6. The interaction model obtained 
the lowest WAIC score and an Akaike weight of .74, suggesting this the best model given 
the data and model assumptions. Thus, the decision to include the children’s score in the 
explicit knowledge Test-1 (EKTest-1) seemed to have been appropriate as an index of the 
children’s existing motor abilities prior to the activity. 
Table 6-6. Model comparison using information criteria of the three models examining the association 
between implicit learning and coordination. WAIC: Widely Applicable Information Criterion; dWAIC: 
difference between each WAIC and the lowest WAIC; weight: Akaike weight (rescaled WAIC); SE: 
standard error of WAIC estimates; dSE: standard error of the difference in WAIC between each model and 
the top-ranked model. 
Predictors in each model WAIC dWAIC weight SE dSE 
RRMW + EKTest1 + RRMW X EKTest-1 108.9 0.0 .74 8.9 NA 
RRMW  111.7 2.8 .19 11.33 11.96 
RRMW + EKTest-1 113.5 4.5 .08 10.86 10.64 
 
Table 6-7 reports the estimated coefficients of the interaction model. For 
interpretation, Figure 6-13 shows model predictions as a tryptic, with the scores for the 
centred predictor EKTest-1 fixed at lowest (-2), mean (0), and high (2) values. For 
children who indicated having more prior experience in similar activities (higher EKTest-
1 scores), coordination during MAKE-WHEELS was not associated with performance 
with the tool in Test-2. This is indicated by the flat predictive curve of the right plot in 
Figure 6-13. On the other hand, for children who indicated having less prior experience 
in similar activities (lower EKTest-1 scores), there was strong evidence that coordination 
during MAKE-WHEELS was associated with performance with the tool in Test-2 but in 
the opposite direction than predicted. Higher values of RRMW were associated with higher 
(less efficient) values of time to succeed in Test-2. Table 6-7 indicates this in the positive 
effect of RRMW and Figure 6-13 illustrates this in the ascending curve of the leftmost and 
middle plots. In a post-hoc analysis, including age as a covariate did not improve model 
prediction accuracy. 
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Table 6-7. Summary of the estimated coefficients in the final model examining the association between 
implicit learning and coordination. N_eff: estimate of the number of independent samples from the posterior 
distribution, Rhat: a measure of convergence/mixing of independent MCMC simulations. N_eff and Rhat 
are used as general diagnostics for MCMC models. 
Coefficient Mean SE 95% C.I. N_eff Rhat 
Intercept 2.42 0.16 [2.11, 2.75] 728 1 
RRMW 0.13 0.04 [0.06, 0.20] 592 1 
EKTest-1 0.14 0.14 [-0.13, 0.40] 597 1 
RRMW X EKTest-1 -0.06 0.02 [-0.11, -0.02] 607 1 
scale 2.92 0.71 [1.57, 4.21] 1409 1 
 
 
Figure 6-13. Time to succeed with the novel tool after the making activity (Test-2) as a function of 
coordination during the subtask MAKE-WHEELS (centred RRMW), estimated separately for the lowest 
(left), average (middle), and highest (right) scores in the explicit knowledge test before the activity. 
Explicit learning 
I predicted that higher values of coordination during the activity would be associated with 
children identifying more steps in Test-2 The results from model comparison are shown 
in Table 6-8. The simplest model, including only the measure of coordination in the 
whole activity (RR) as a predictor, obtained the lowest WAIC score and an Akaike weight 
of .69, suggesting this is the best model given the data and model assumptions. I therefore 
report this model. 
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Table 6-8. Model comparison using information criteria of the three models examining the association 
between explicit learning and coordination. WAIC: Widely Applicable Information Criterion; dWAIC: 
difference between each WAIC and the lowest WAIC; weight: Akaike weight (rescaled WAIC); SE: 
standard error of WAIC estimates; dSE: standard error of the difference in WAIC between each model and 
the top-ranked model. 
Predictors in each model WAIC dWAIC weight SE dSE 
RR 37.7 0 0.69 12.56 NA 
RR + EKTest-1 39.8 2 0.25 12.14 6.08 
RR + EKTest-1 + RR * EKTest-1 42.8 5.1 0.05 11.87 7.55 
 
Figure 6-14 reports the chosen model. There was strong evidence that coordination 
during the activity was associated with explicit learning but in the opposite direction than 
predicted (bRR = -0.45, [-0.83, -0.12]). Dyads with lower values of coordination during 
the activity identified more steps after the activity. In contrast, dyads with higher values 
of coordination during the activity identified fewer steps after the activity. In a post-hoc 
analysis, I added age as a covariate, but this did not improve model accuracy. 
 
Figure 6-14. Estimated cutpoints indicating the cumulative probability to identify 0, 1, 2, 3, or 4 steps in 
the explicit knowledge test after the activity (Test-2) as a function of coordination during the whole activity 
(RR). A) Mean estimates. Shaded areas indicate the 25% lowest (left) and highest (right) values of 
coordination. B) The mean (black solid lines, same as in A) and 95% credible intervals (grey dotted lines) 
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of the estimated cutpoints are here shown separately to indicate model uncertainty. For example, children 
with the lowest 25% values of RR during the whole activity (left shaded region in A) had a mean probability 
of about .98 to score 3 or 4 in the explicit knowledge Test-2, and a mean probability of only .02 to score 0, 
1 or 2. On the other hand, dyads with the highest 25% values of RR (right shaded region in A) had a mean 
probability of about .55 to score 3 or 4, and a mean probability of .45 to score 0, 1, or 2. 
6.4 Discussion 
Making and learning together as a relational process 
Children were invited to participate in a making activity together with an adult facilitator. 
This study was used as an opportunity to explore, in more concrete terms, what it means 
to view social learning as a form-generating process occurring within histories of mutual 
engagement, rather than in terms of the transmission of information (sensu represented 
knowledge) about the target task. To this end, I focused on the behavioural coordination 
between the facilitator during the joint making task and the children and its association 
with learning. Figure 6-15 represents making and learning together, conceived of as a 
relational developmental process, schematically. 
 
Figure 6-15. Schematic representation of the activity of making and learning together viewed as a relational 
developmental process. 
As the activity unfolded, the tools and materials persisted under transformation and 
the form of the constructed vehicles appeared as a result of the forces produced through 
manipulation. Other materials persisted untouched or became rubbish and were discarded. 
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Similarly, the children’s bodies also persisted under transformation, with some aspects 
remaining the same and others changing. Here I focused on two aspects of what children 
might learn in the activity. I used the implicit knowledge tests to examine changes in their 
ability to use the target tool (the hand drill), and I used the explicit knowledge test to 
examine changes in their ability to imagine and verbally report the steps required to ‘solve 
the task’ (i.e., to produce a toy vehicle under the given constraints). In this discussion, I 
will first focus on behavioural coordination throughout the making activity, then on 
learning, and finally on the association between coordination and learning. 
Making together involves coordinating behaviour in real time 
In each session, the child and the facilitator contributed to the making activity by 
manipulating tools and materials, sometimes alone, sometimes in parallel, and sometimes 
jointly. However, their roles were not symmetric. The facilitator committed to following 
the predefined script and her role was to guide the children’s behaviour, assist as required, 
and ensure they reached the goal safely and within the given time frame. In contrast, the 
children did not know about the script but accepted the invitation to ‘make a vehicle’ with 
the facilitator. The children’s role was to follow the instructions given by the facilitator 
and manipulate the tools and materials according to their existing abilities.  
Children were not physically forced to do anything. In fact, they were told they 
could leave at any point without providing a reason (no one did). Thus, to successfully 
complete the task, the facilitator and the children must coordinate their behaviour 
according to the contingencies of the unfolding situation and constrained by the task 
requirements. The fact that all dyads did end up doing similar things, as shown by them 
producing toy vehicles and enacting similar temporal patterns of coupled attention in each 
session, is not trivial but noteworthy. This is likely to not have been the case with pre-
verbal children, children with atypical neurodevelopmental trajectories and, of course, 
even less likely if the facilitator were interacting with another species. 
It is fair to ask, then, what accounts for the children being able to engage in the 
activity in similar ways? Part of the answer has to do with the fact that these children have 
had a similar previous developmental history thus far. For example, their bodies have 
developed a similar anatomy with similar biomechanical properties (Thelen & Smith, 
1994), perceptual systems (J. J. Gibson, 1966), and neuromuscular coordinative structures 
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(Kelso, 1995). They speak and understand spoken English with the local accent. They all 
go to schools with similar activities where they pay attention to teachers and follow their 
instructions. They are familiar with using the tools and materials provided (excepting the 
hand drill); they have seen vehicles and toy vehicles before and thus have preferences and 
expectations about what to do. 
The similarities in the children’s developmental trajectories, in turn, partly depend 
on the genealogical relations that exist among them as a result of the evolutionary history 
in which their individual ontogenies are nested. Because of their close genealogical 
relations and the similarities in their ontogenies, their bodies ended up having a similar 
organization and supporting similar abilities. It is this material similarity and the mutual 
sensitivity it enables that underlie the way in which the behaviour of the participants 
might affect each other. One of the main contributions of this study is that it explored a 
new methodology to capture aspects of the dynamics of this mutual influence. 
The dynamical constitution of coupled visual attention. 
During the short time they lived together, the behaviour of the participants may become 
coupled by informational constraints (by means of perceiving each other or when they 
consistently look at the same targets at the same time) as well as mechanical constraints 
(e.g., when the facilitator holds the hand drill in place by pushing it down from the top as 
the child attempts to operate it). This behavioural coupling involved coordinating visual 
attention with each other and in relation to the tools and materials included in the 
unfolding situation. Participants established, sustained, and eventually dissolved coupled 
visual attention constrained by what they were doing, by what the other was doing, and, 
more generally, by the changing situations in which they found themselves. In other 
words, coupled attention is not a static, homogeneous state but a historical achievement 
involving nonlinear causal relations. Cross recurrence quantification analysis captures 
some dynamical aspects of this process and can therefore be a valuable analytical tool in 
behavioural studies to complement aggregate measures such as duration and proportion 
of behavioural categories. 
While living – and making – together, the behavioural flows of the participants not 
only influenced each other but became relatively synchronized, as the facilitator and the 
children took turns in leading and following each other’s attention throughout the activity. 
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Such synchronisation – i.e., the observation that participants often attended to the same 
things at the same time, as the activity unfolded – is consistent with the nature of the joint 
task. The observed synchronisation is consistent with previous research on coupled 
attention during live conversation (D. C. Richardson, Dale, & Kirkham, 2007). One 
possible shortcoming of the present study is the relatively coarse resolution in the time 
series data (one observation per second). Future work could attempt to obtain a finer 
spatiotemporal resolution to produce a more refined picture of leader/follower patterns 
than the ones reported here. In the study reported in the next chapter, I used an eye-
tracking system to obtain data with higher resolution. 
The inclusion of a randomized baseline to test whether participants synchronize 
their behaviour above chance is common in studies using CRQA (e.g., D. C. Richardson 
& Dale, 2005; D. C. Richardson et al., 2007). In addition to this, I also simulated a 
perfectly synchronized baseline. I suggest that simulating both the randomized baseline 
and the perfectly synchronized baseline is useful because it provides a range, a kind of 
synchronization scale, within which the observed data could be located. In the present 
study, this provided evidence that, although the behaviour of participants synchronizes, 
this synchronization is not perfect. This result is sensible as it indicates that participants 
maintained their autonomy while at the same time being influenced by the partner’s 
behaviour (De Jaegher & Di Paolo, 2007; De Jaegher & Froese, 2009; Thompson, 2007; 
Varela et al., 1991). This innovation can be seen as a contribution to methodology in the 
study of behavioural coordination more generally and specifically in the study of living 
and learning socially. 
 
Learning socially: not transmission, but development 
Before the activity, the facilitator already knows how to make a toy vehicle and how to 
use the hand drill, whereas the children do not. After the activity, the facilitator still knows 
these things and now the children do, too, at least to some degree. These empirical 
observations suggest that the facilitator ‘passed on’ some form of knowledge to the 
children during the activity. In a loose sense, talking in these terms is unproblematic. One 
way to make sense of the observations regarding tool use, following a representational 
view of cognition and the linear communication model, is by saying the following: 
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1. Successful tool use requires that the person has relevant information (sensu 
represented knowledge) about how to use the tool. 
2. Before the activity, only the facilitator, but not the children, has such information. 
3. During the activity, the facilitator transmits this information to the children. 
4. After the activity, both the facilitator and the children have this information. 
This general picture might be useful for those content with a computational-
representational view of cognition. In addition, for studies focusing, not on dyads but on 
large-scale spatiotemporal patterns spanning across many individuals and across many 
generations, such as those using mathematical or computational models, it makes good 
sense to find economic ways to talk about how knowledge may be ‘passed on’. However, 
for those interested in a processual view of the ‘passing on’ of knowledge in terms of the 
ontogeny of bodies-in-their-environment, rather than in terms of the execution of 
computational algorithms or in terms of the evaluation of mathematical models, the 
‘transmission’ metaphor becomes less appealing. By focusing on abstract computational 
or mathematical events rather than concrete behavioural or physiological ones, the 
transmission metaphor may drive our attention away from the processes we set out to 
investigate. 
Consider, for example, what happens when the facilitator attempts to demonstrate 
the correct use of the novel tool to the children (during subtask TOOL_DEMO), and 
suppose the children are attending to the unfolding demonstration. If we followed a 
representational view of cognition and Shannon’s formal model of a communication 
system, we might say that signals (or representations) carrying some amount of 
information about how to use the hand drill were transmitted from the facilitator (the 
sender or transmitter) to the potential learner (the receiver or destination). Note that this 
is not unlike saying that, in “production imitation” (Table 5-1), the novel action is 
“acquired by the observer directly through observation” (Hoppitt & Laland, p. 73). 
However, if we take the transmission metaphor seriously, we should ask, What exactly 
are these information-carrying signals? How are they transmitted? How does the 
facilitator encode semantic information about the tool in these signals? How does the 
potential learner recover the original meaning encoded in these signals? I find these 
questions, that follow from adopting the transmission metaphor and a representational 
view of the mind, confusing and unhelpful. My intention here is to provide a positive 
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account consistent with my (meta)theoretical commitments. Thus, I suggest the following 
alternative: 
1. Successful tool use requires that the person has the relevant abilities of perception-
action. 
2. Before the activity, only the facilitator, but not the children, has the bodily 
organization underlying these abilities. 
3. During the activity, the facilitator influences the development of these abilities in 
the children. 
4. After the activity, both the facilitator and the children have the bodily organization 
underlying these abilities. 
This way of speaking is consistent with a processual, developmental systems 
perspective, and with radical embodied cognitive science. The ability to use the tool is 
seen as depending, not on mental representations (‘information’ about the task encoded 
in the brain) but on bodily organization, which cannot be transmitted from one person to 
another. Children develop their own tool-using ability, i.e. their own bodily organization, 
as a result of a relational developmental trajectory. The change towards a stronger 
similarity in how the facilitator and the children used the tool after the activity, compared 
to before, may justify us attributing them to the same category (e.g. ‘successful tool use’), 
but the metaphor of learning as linear communication of signals makes no sense here. 
Characterizing social influences on learning 
Making together gave children the opportunity to embody implicit knowledge about using 
a novel tool and explicit knowledge about the steps required to make a toy vehicle. The 
results indicated that engaging in the activity indeed transformed children’s abilities in 
both regards. In Chapter 5, I suggested three criteria to clarify the scope of any study of 
social learning and five criteria to clarify the ‘social influences’ under scrutiny. The 
current study provides an opportunity to clarify how these criteria can be used in concrete 
cases. I first clarify the scope of interest. With regard to the time scale, here I focused on 
learning that might occur within the short time scale of several minutes. With regard to 
the spatial scale, the learning situation unfolded within a science museum, in a room 
enclosed within the exhibition area with no sound insulation, thus providing an 
environment less controlled than lab-based studies. The main components under analysis 
were the facilitator, the learners, and the supporting materials. With regard to learning 
outcome, this study focused on skill or implicit learning (using a novel tool) and explicit 
learning (verbally identifying the steps in the activity). 
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I now turn to characterizing the ‘social influences’ present in this case. With regard 
to the environmental information made available by the facilitator, this included optic 
information specifying the tools and materials as well as her actions, and auditory 
information created by her speech. With regard to the general role played by the 
facilitator, this must be characterized separately for each learning outcome. With regard 
to using a novel tool (implicit learning), on the one hand the facilitator acted as a 
demonstrator and, on the other hand, she provided assistance as the learners attempted to 
use the tool. Thus, the facilitator engaged both in the same and in a different task than the 
one in which the learners’ performance was judged. With regard to identifying the steps 
in the activity (explicit learning), the facilitator did not act as a demonstrator but rather as 
a partner and a guide. Thus, even though the facilitator engaged in the making task 
together with the learners, their roles were not the same but complementary. Throughout 
the activity, the facilitator could influence the learner and the learner could also influence 
the facilitator, thus the influence was bidirectional. The learner interacted with the 
facilitator in real time, thus the influence between them was direct. The behavioural 
coupling between them was informational, i.e. by means of perceiving each other, and 
sometimes also mechanical. With regard to their prior intentions, the facilitator explicitly 
intended her behaviour to promote learning and thus her behaviour falls under the 
definition of teaching I put forward in Chapter 5. The potential learners explicitly 
committed to engage in the activity but there was no commitment to learn something in 
the process. 
Behavioural coordination and learning 
This study not only provided analytical tools to examine signatures of coordination but 
also the association between quantitative measures of coordination and learning. The 
prediction was that a stronger behavioural coordination would provide a better context 
for knowledge to be ‘passed on’. More specifically, I predicted that children who 
composed dyads showing higher measures of coordination, compared to lower measures, 
should improve more. The results contradicted this. To make sense of this result, consider 
that coordination variables such as RR capture the nonlinear relationship between two 
time series and characterize the coupled system as a distributed whole rather than the 
individual systems. In some studies of attentional coordination, participants interacted 
with recordings rather than live people (e.g., D. C. Richardson & Dale, 2005). In this case, 
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variation in coordination measures is produced by variation in the participant’s behaviour 
only because it is the only time series that varies in the analysis. In the current study, 
children interacted with ‘the same’ facilitator. However, the facilitator did not behave 
exactly the same with each child because her role explicitly required that she responded 
to each child differently (Table 6-2). Thus, even though she followed ‘the same script’ 
every time, she never did things exactly the same way. As a result, the time series 
representing the facilitator’s behaviour is different in every session. Thus, the children 
and the facilitator contributed to variation in the coordination variables. Compared to 
dyads with lower values of coordination, a higher value in this case might indicate either 
(1) that the child coordinated his attention to the facilitator more, (2) that the facilitator 
coordinated her attention to the child more, or (3) that both the child and the facilitator 
coordinated more with each other. 
Post hoc informal, qualitative analysis of the recordings suggested that when 
children showed more signs of struggling with the novel tool in the subtask 
MAKE_WHEELS, the facilitator responded by intervening more and providing more 
assistance. This was reflected in higher values of RRMW being computed in these cases. 
Therefore, it might be that the facilitator systematically varied the amount of influence 
she exerted while assisting children in using the novel tool, depending on the general level 
of ability demonstrated by the children on the spot. If this was the case, then children 
whom the facilitator perceived as generally less skilled (as opposed to more skilled) 
received more attention from her, thus producing higher values of RRMW. Later, in Test-
2 these less skilled children took longer to succeed. These considerations suggest that 
real-time, contingent behavioural adjustments are indeed a central aspect of facilitating-
learning relations, at least in some cases. However, studies of social learning and teaching 
commonly neglect this real-time coordination (Caro & Hauser, 1992; Hoppitt et al., 2008; 
Hoppitt & Laland, 2013). Thus, further work using similar methods might indeed help 
elucidate relevant causal processes which are being neglected in the literature. For 
example, we might ask whether different categories of social learning produce 
systematically different signatures of behavioural coordination. We might also ask 
whether signatures of coordination vary across different age groups as they engage in 
similar learning tasks. For example, suppose we study caregiver-infant dyads playing 
with a novel tool and that we compare cases with younger and older children. One 
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hypothesis could be that, in dyads with younger children, the adults play a more 
prominent role in establishing and maintaining coordination as they interact and that, as 
they grow older, children might become increasingly able to influence how these 
situations unfold. These changes might be captured by changes in CRQA variables as 
well as in diagonal-wise cross recurrence profiles. 
Final considerations and link to the following chapter 
This study explored new ways to examine behavioural coordination, coupled attention, 
and social learning within a relatively naturalistic, noisy, environment. One limitation of 
this design was the lack of control for the explicit knowledge test. Another limitation was 
the use of relatively broad categories of gaze direction (Table 6-3). Consider the category 
Learner gazes at Facilitator’s eyes. This category merely indicates that the child is 
looking in the direction of the adult’s eyes with no further qualification, for example, 
regarding the affective character of the gaze in each case. On the one hand, defining the 
different categories in such broad terms allowed me to capture dynamical aspects of 
behavioural coordination and provide evidence of attentional synchronisation throughout 
the activity. On the other hand, thus defined, this category tells us very little about what 
each instance of a gaze might mean. A child might look at the instructor’s eyes because 
he is attentive to what the adult is saying, distracted from the activity, excited to be using 
a hand drill, bored with how the activity is being conducted, and so on. In addition, the 
current design did not allow me to distinguish between the effects of demonstration and 
assisted practice on learning. Finally, because both participants contributed to the 
variation in the coordination variables, this made it difficult to interpret the observed 
association between coordination variables and learning. The next chapter reports a study 
which was designed to deal with these limitations. The conditions to be compared were 
more clearly defined and an eye tracking system was used to produce the gaze direction 
data, thus avoiding hand-coding from the videos. In addition, potential learners received 
the same stimulus, thus variation in the coordination variables can be interpreted as 
indicating variation in the learners and not the facilitator. On the one hand, these changes 
in the methodology allowed for a more controlled study. This, however, came at the price 
of losing the messy richness of live interaction. 
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Chapter 7 Learning through demonstration: a study 
of eye movements during observational 
learning of a manual task 
7.1 Introduction 
In Chapter 6, I focused on learning through making together as a concrete example to 
advocate for a view of social learning as a relational developmental process that changes 
embodied skills, rather than as the acquisition or transmission of mental representations. 
In this chapter, I focus on learning how to solve construction puzzles through observing 
demonstration videos as another concrete example. Similar to producing a toy vehicle, 
solving a construction puzzle can be regarded as a making activity. Here, too, the maker 
manipulates a set of materials, thus producing forces that change the spatial arrangement 
among them and bring about a change in form. And here, too, the bodily organization that 
underlies the abilities that the maker brings to the activity persist under transformations, 
possibly changing in systematic ways that we observers might wish to describe as 
learning. However, solving a construction puzzle is different from making a toy vehicle 
in that the form of the final product is much more constrained. In the previous study, 
participants were invited to produce their own toy vehicle and decorate it however they 
liked (within given constraints). Here, participants were expected to produce the pre-
defined forms shown to them, which would be considered the correct solution to the 
puzzles. 
Watching an expert (henceforth, ‘facilitator’) engage in some task is one among 
many possible ways in which skill learning can be influenced by the presence and activity 
of others around us. Learning by observing others can occur in formal settings such as in 
schooling, more informally such as when we watch instructional videos online showing 
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us how to prepare a recipe, or during our encounters with those around us as we go about 
our daily activities. In the dominant literature on social learning, it is common to read 
that, in such situations, facilitators transmit ‘information’ (sensu represented knowledge) 
about the target task to learners or that learners acquire such representations socially 
rather than asocially (e.g., Csibra & Gergely, 2009; Hoppitt et al., 2008; Hoppitt & 
Laland, 2013). However, from the perspective put forward in this thesis, the knowledge 
that experts ‘have’ is embodied in their physical organization and therefore cannot be 
‘transmitted’ except in a very loose, metaphorical sense. Rather, learners must construct 
their own knowledge themselves as they encounter the world. 
One of the main goals of this chapter is to further clarify why the transmission 
metaphor is inconsistent with an approach committed to developmental systems thinking 
and radical embodied cognitive science, and to offer an alternative, positive account. 
How, then, one might ask, can the facilitators affect the learners if not by ‘transmitting 
information’ to them? The alternative being put forward relies on the notion of ecological 
information (J. J. Gibson, 1979/2015) rather than representations, and views ontogeny as 
a history of causal relations among the components of the organism-environment system 
in which some abilities persist and others change. The basic idea is that, by their presence 
and behaviour, facilitators can structure the ambient arrays of light, sound, chemicals, 
objects, and so on, and therefore create environmental information (sensu meaningful 
patterns, not ‘knowledge’) that is publicly available (J. J. Gibson, 1979/2015). Learners 
may or may not detect these patterns and use them to guide their own actions. Depending 
on how they make sense of what they perceive in the changing situations in which they 
find themselves, learners may exercise their existing abilities in new ways, and even 
possibly develop new ones, thus embodying new knowledge. Learning, then, can be 
viewed as a historical, relational process of “education of attention” (J. J. Gibson, 
1979/2015) rather than a computational process of accumulation of representations. It is 
a category of developmental process, one in which the bodily structures that underlie the 
individual’s abilities (bones, joints, muscles, neuronal networks, and so on) change and 
become attuned to their environment in different, maybe even relatively improved, ways. 
The present study focused on two aspects of the environmental information made 
available by the facilitator that potential learners might pick up and use to guide their own 
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behaviour. The first aspect is the information (sensu meaningful patterns in the light) 
made available in the optic flow specifying the facilitator’s face. The second aspect is the 
information (sensu meaningful patterns in the air waves) made available in the sounds 
produced by the facilitator’s verbalizations. These aspects are related to the mechanisms 
underlying joint attention, a term denoting those cases in which the individuals are aware 
that they are attending to the same unfolding situation. Joint attention is widely 
recognized as fundamental to social relations, including early language acquisition (M. 
Carpenter, Nagell, & Tomasello, 1998; Tomasello, 2003), verbal communication (Clark 
& Krych, 2004; Dale, Kirkham, & Richardson, 2011; D. C. Richardson & Dale, 2005), 
and joint action (Kraut, Fussell, & Siegel, 2003; Sebanz & Knoblich, 2009). Gaze 
following is considered central to establishing and sustaining joint attention (M. 
Carpenter et al., 1998; Tomasello et al., 2005). This is the case because, by looking at 
other people’s face and eyes, one might detect the invariants specifying where they are 
looking and thus be informed about what they are looking at. Depending on one’s 
intentions, one can use this ecological information to adjust one’s own behaviour and 
attention accordingly. 
However, in goal-directed actions, such as reaching and object manipulation, eye 
movements and hand movements are tightly correlated in space and time. People tend to 
look at what they are manipulating (Johansson, Westling, Backstrom, & Flanagan, 2001; 
Land & Hayhoe, 2001). Additionally, people tend to shift their visual attention to the 
target object or location just before initiating reaching, and they tend to continue looking 
at it until the movement is completed (Horstmann & Hoffmann, 2005; Land & Hayhoe, 
2001). In contexts such as these, both the eye movements and the hand movements are 
linked to the actor’s current target of attention by constraints and can therefore inform 
about it. Thus, when we look at people manipulating objects, we may not need to examine 
their eyes to learn about where they are looking – we can just follow their hands instead. 
This mechanism leading to joint attention is not restricted to, say, adults with 
extensive experience in observing manipulative actions. Yu and Smith (2013) provided 
evidence for this route to joint attention in the case of one-year-old children and their 
parents as they played with toys while both were being eye tracked. In this context, the 
participants rarely looked at each other’s faces and, nevertheless, were able to establish 
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and sustain joint attention by simply looking at their own hands (when manipulating 
objects) or at the partner’s hands (when the partner manipulated objects). Thus, this 
process is possibly much more widespread than previously acknowledged. 
Another aspect of how individuals may coordinate their attention and behaviour is 
related to the role of speech. One of the primary roles of speech is to influence the 
attentional, and therefore also the intentional, state of the listeners (Briggs, 2002; 
Tomasello, 2003). During a conversation, speakers and listeners monitor their own 
actions (which include their vocalizations) as well as the actions (including the 
vocalizations) of the conversational partner, adjusting their behavioural flow as they go 
along (Clark & Krych, 2004; Fogel, 1993). Evidence shows that speakers tend to look at 
those objects that correspond with the words being spoken (Griffin & Bock, 2000; Meyer, 
Sleiderink, & Levelt, 1998), and that listeners also tend to look at those objects that 
correspond with the words being heard (Allopenna, Magnuson, & Tanenhaus, 1998; D. 
C. Richardson & Dale, 2005). As a result of this mutual co-regulation of behaviour, the 
attention of speakers and listeners can become more synchronized over time (D. C. 
Richardson et al., 2007). Thus, both the possibility to see the partner’s face, and the 
possibility to listen to the partner’s vocalizations, may impact how people detect and use 
the information (sensu meaningful patterns) available in their environment to guide their 
own behaviour, therefore possibly influencing how they learn about the target task. 
Previous work on coordination of attention and task performance 
A few studies have used eye tracking explicitly to address the relation between 
coordination of visual and/or auditory attention, and performance in some task. A study 
by van Gog, Jarodzka, Scheiter, Gerjets, and Paas (2009) used a computer-based problem-
solving task known as ‘Frog Leap’ and examined whether attempting to direct the 
learner’s attention during a learning phase improved performance in a subsequent test 
phase. To direct the learners’ attention, the authors first asked a skilled demonstrator to 
solve the problem didactically while using an eye tracker, and simultaneously captured 
(1) the computer screen showing the task being solved, (2) the audio of the demonstrator’s 
verbal explanation of his actions, and (3) the eye movements (i.e. fixations on the screen) 
of the demonstrator. Following a 2 x 2 factorial design, the authors then produced four 
types of example videos to be used as stimuli: (1) screen capture only; (2) screen and 
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audio capture; (3) screen capture and demonstrator’s eye movements; and (4) screen and 
audio capture and demonstrator’s eye movements. The eye movements of the 
demonstrator were shown as a coloured dot moving on the screen, and the authors 
assumed that this would guide the learners’ attention. Participants were exposed to one 
of the four conditions. First, they went through a learning phase where they received the 
stimulus twice. They were then asked to solve the problem twice in the test phase. 
The authors predicted that showing the facilitator’s eye movements would 
contribute to learning, and that this effect would be larger in the group receiving visual 
and auditory stimulus compared to visual stimulus only. Neither of these predictions were 
observed. Results suggested that showing the demonstrator’s eye movements 
superimposed on the screen required higher investment of mental effort by the learners 
and, contrary to expected, was either neutral or detrimental to learning. In addition, 
regardless of attention guidance, no difference in performance was seen between 
participants receiving visual stimulus only and participants receiving both visual and 
auditory stimulus. However, the authors did not provide further interpretation of this 
finding. 
D. C. Richardson and Dale (2005) reported two studies examining the coupling of 
visual attention between speakers and listeners. In the first study they recorded the speech 
and eye movements of four participants while they looked at a set of pictures of famous 
cast members of a TV sitcom (either ‘‘Friends’’ or ‘‘The Simpsons’’) and spoke 
spontaneously about them. They then played one-minute segments of the recorded speech 
to a separate set of participants who were looking at the same pictures and also recorded 
their eye movements. Results from cross-recurrence quantification analysis showed that 
speakers and listeners synchronized the direction of their gaze above chance with a peak 
at a 2-sec lag, consistent with the speaker leading the listener’s attention. In addition, a 
stronger coupling was associated with higher scores in a comprehension test subsequently 
applied to the listeners. In the second study reported, the authors attempted to direct the 
listener’s attention by flashing (i.e. changing from dimmed to full colour) the pictures of 
the characters, either at the time that the speaker had looked at them or, in the control 
condition, following a randomized order. Although no difference was seen in the overall 
accuracy of listeners’ comprehension between conditions, listeners in the synchronized 
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condition were quicker in answering the comprehension questions. The results from this 
systematic manipulation provide some evidence that the attentional coordination between 
speakers and listeners is not only correlated with, but plays a causal role in, discourse 
comprehension. In other words, listeners tend to comprehend better what a speaker says 
when they look at the same objects at the same time.  
Grant and Spivey (2003) used an insight problem known as Duncker’s radiation 
problem to investigate whether directing the attention of participants in a systematic way 
can facilitate learning. The solution to insight problems cannot be logically induced and 
is often arrived at suddenly by the learners, who often describe an accompanying ‘Aha!’ 
sensation. In the first study reported, the authors recorded the eye movements of 
participants as they attempted to solve the problem. Results showed that, compared to 
unsuccessful participants, successful problem solvers spent more time looking at the same 
particular area of the task diagram in the 30 s before arriving at the solution. In the second 
study the authors attempted to direct the attention of participants by subtly blinking and 
therefore increasing the perceptual salience of the critical area of the task diagram. As 
predicted, compared to highlighting a non-critical area and to presenting a static stimulus, 
highlighting the critical area facilitated insight and led to increased success rates. 
Recently, Coco, Dale, and Keller (2018) investigated the association of gaze 
coordination in dyads and performance in a spot-the-difference task. Participants viewed 
a set of scenes on their individual monitor and, on each trial, had to decide whether they 
were viewing the same or different scenes. In one condition they could talk freely to reach 
a consensus. In another condition, only one partner could speak while the other could give 
no feedback and had to remain silent. In a third condition, the listener was allowed to give 
only minimal feedback in the form of backchannel to signal understanding. The eye 
movements of participants were recorded and their coordination examined using cross 
recurrence quantification analysis. The authors provide evidence of an association 
between coordination of eye movements and performance, but only in the condition in 
which the listener could not talk to the speaker. Specifically, two of the measures of 
coordination they examined were negatively associated with performance. The authors 
interpreted this negative association by arguing that, as the nature of the task was akin to 
a visual search task, if the eye movements of the participants are too much aligned this 
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suggests that the listener is following the speaker’s verbalisation too closely and not 
exploring parts of the images that are potentially relevant. 
In sum, the evidence of an association between attentional coordination and task 
performance is scarce and mixed. D. C. Richardson and Dale (2005) provided some 
evidence that attentional coordination was positively associated with discourse 
comprehension. In contrast, Coco et al. (2018) provided evidence of a negative effect that 
nevertheless seemed consistent with the context of their task. Similarly, studies 
attempting to direct the learners’ attention by means of the stimuli also showed mixed 
results. By highlighting the critical part of the stimulus, Grant and Spivey (2003) managed 
to increase success rate. In contrast, in the study by van Gog et al. (2009), showing a 
coloured dot on the screen to indicate where the facilitator was looking at was, if anything, 
detrimental to learning. However, in this study the authors did not analyse the eye 
movements of the learners and therefore presented no evidence to support the premise 
behind the methodology, namely that the attention of the learners was indeed guided by 
the coloured dot on the screen. It is possible, as the authors admit, that the extra visual 
stimulus superimposed on the demonstration video might have distracted the learners 
rather than guided their attention. 
There is no reason to expect a simple and uniform picture of how attentional 
coordination affects learning because both attentional coordination and learning can refer 
to many related processes. This class of phenomena is likely to be influence by many 
factors including the nature of the task being examined, the abilities of learners and 
facilitators, the affordances available in each situation and specified by the patterns in the 
ambient arrays, how the individuals might affect each other in each case, what counts as 
coordination, and so on. The present study aims to contribute to this literature and, more 
broadly, to the growing field of radical embodied cognitive science (Chemero, 2009; J. J. 
Gibson, 1979/2015; Thompson & Varela, 2001; Varela et al., 1991). 
7.1.1 The present study 
Here I examine the dynamics of eye movements during observation of demonstrations of 
the solution to a novel manual task in adult humans, and its association with learning. 
Participants watched demonstration videos and then attempted to solve a target task. This 
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procedure was repeated five times with each task, and this iterative procedure was 
repeated with three different tasks. I used eye tracking and cross recurrence quantification 
analysis to examine dynamical features of the learners’ eye movements as they watched 
the demonstration videos, and I examined their subsequent performance at the task in 
each trial iteration. I investigated whether seeing the facilitator’s face and listening to his 
vocalizations affected (1) how learners coordinated their attention to the actions being 
demonstrated and to the facilitator’s face, and (2) how they performed at the task. I also 
investigated whether measures of attentional coordination were associated with learning, 
here operationalised as improved performance with practice. 
Predictions 
I have indicated two, non-mutually exclusive, mechanisms associated with joint attention 
above: gaze following (e.g., M. Carpenter et al., 1998) and hand-eye coordination (Yu & 
Smith, 2013). To test which might be important here, I examined whether being able to 
see the facilitator’s face, compared to not (face blurred), affected how learners 
coordinated their visual attention with the actions being demonstrated. If gaze following 
was important for establishing and sustaining attentional coordination, I expected higher 
values of coordination in the conditions where the facilitator’s face was visible compared 
to blurred. However, if gaze following was not important for attentional coordination in 
this task, I expected no evidence of differences in coordination measures between these 
conditions. 
I also examined whether listening to the facilitator, compared to not, affected how 
learners coordinated their visual attention with the actions he was demonstrating. The 
explicit communicative intention of the facilitator in this case was to describe the actions 
required to solve the task as they were performed (see Appendix). I therefore predicted 
that learners who could listen to the facilitator, compared to not, would show higher 
values of coordination. 
Finally, I examined the association between coordination of attention and learning. 
Given the nature of the task, looking at precisely those pieces being manipulated should 
allow learners to detect relevant aspects of the demonstration, and this should be 
beneficial to learning. I therefore predicted that, overall, higher values of coordination 
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between the pieces being manipulated by the facilitator and the pieces being looked at by 
the learner would be beneficial to learning. 
The facilitator’s behaviour during the recording of the demonstration videos was 
certainly influenced by his own prior experience in similar situations, including his 
interaction with schoolchildren with whom he has previously engaged as a teacher. 
However, he did not interact with the potential learners in this study directly. Therefore, 
there is an important asymmetry in this design: while the behaviour of the facilitator might 
influence the behaviour of the learners, the opposite cannot occur. Thus, the design does 
not examine bidirectional behavioural coupling but unidirectional coupling in which the 
direction of influence is from facilitator to learners. It is in this sense that coordination 
and social influence should be understood. The benefit of this design is that, because all 
participants receive the same stimuli, the observed variation is restricted to differences 
among the learners. The weakness that comes with it is that the constrained, lab-based 
learning situation thus created might evoke behaviours different from a more naturalistic 
situation. Therefore, as in any empirical study, generalizations should be made with care. 
7.2 Method 
7.2.1 Site and participants  
The study took place at the Joint Eye-tracking lab at the University of Edinburgh (UK). 
An experienced school teacher in Edinburgh (33 years of age, male) was recruited to 
perform the role of the facilitator in the video recordings used as the stimuli and received 
£20 for his time. A further 53 adult participants were recruited to perform the role of 
learners using the Experimenter Volunteer Panel of the University of Edinburgh and by 
emails sent to students and staff in different departments. Ages ranged from 18 to 29 with 
two outliers of ages 42 and 50 (median: 21; s.d. = 5.4), and 32 (60%) were female. All 
participants gave informed consent, had normal or corrected-to-normal vision, indicated 
no known learning disability, and were paid £7 as compensation for their time. Each 
experimental session lasted for 45-60 minutes. The study was approved by the University 
of St Andrews Teaching and Research Ethics Committee and by the Psychology Research 
Ethics Committee of the University of Edinburgh, in accordance with the British 
Psychological Society guidelines on ethics. 
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7.2.2 Stimuli 
The task consisted of construction puzzles, which are solved by assembling a set of pieces 
to form specific structures. Three different commercially available wooden puzzles were 
used, which differed in the number of pieces (star puzzle: six pieces; egg puzzle: eight 
pieces; barrel puzzle: twelve pieces) and in the sequence of steps required to solve them. 
The stimuli used to potentially facilitate learning were demonstration videos and, in the 
case of the control conditions, neutral still images extracted from the initial frames of 
these videos (i.e., prior to beginning the demonstration; see Figure 7-1). The participant 
acting as the facilitator was shown how to solve each puzzle by the experimenter and was 
given time to practice. To produce the demonstration videos, the facilitator performed 
explicit demonstrations of each of the solutions, accompanied by verbal instructions of 
the movements being performed. The script of each demonstration was specified 
beforehand by the experimenter and the facilitator together in order to achieve a 
naturalistic sequence and to ensure the demonstrations were similar in structure and 
vocabulary across the three tasks (transcriptions of the verbal instructions are available in 
the Appendix. 
A tripod-mounted camera was positioned at eye level in front of the facilitator, 
where an imaginary learner would stand. The facilitator was instructed to act naturally 
and to look at the camera from time to time, as if he were teaching an imaginary learner 
in front of him. The videos were captured in the portrait orientation and a lapel 
microphone was used to capture the facilitator’s speech. Several shots were recorded for 
each puzzle and the most natural and fluent one was chosen to be further processed. 
Because the puzzles differed in the number of pieces, the final videos differed in duration 
(star: 40s; egg: 54s; barrel: 78s). 
To produce the stimuli for the four experimental conditions, the initial 
demonstration videos were edited in the Wondershare Filmora software. For each puzzle, 
four different videos were produced. In two of them, the face of the facilitator was blurred 
while no image editing was performed in the other two. Furthermore, in two of them the 
sound was completely muted while no sound editing was performed in the other two. This 
yielded four versions of the demonstration video for each task, corresponding to the four 
experimental conditions described below. Furthermore, to produce the stimuli for the two 
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control conditions, another two videos were produced for each task consisting of a single 
still image extracted from the initial frames showing the facilitator in the neutral starting 
position (with his hands on the desk without touching the puzzle pieces) and which either 
included or did not include the corresponding sound track. 
 
Figure 7-1. The three tasks (A: star, B: egg, C: barrel) and samples from the stimuli (demonstration videos) 
used in the study. The still images were extracted from the initial frames of the demonstration videos and 
show the facilitator in the neutral starting position, i.e. with his hands on the desk without touching the 
puzzle pieces in front of him. The insets show the corresponding solved puzzles. 
7.2.3 Design 
The experimental conditions varied in a 2 (facilitator’s face visible, face blurred) by 2 
(with audio, no audio) design. This produced four conditions: face blurred and no audio 
(noFACE_noAUDIO); face visible and no audio (FACE_noAUDIO); face blurred and 
with audio (noFACE_AUDIO); and face visible and with audio (FACE_AUDIO). In 
addition, I ran two extra conditions in which participants were shown a neutral still image 
of the facilitator and the puzzle pieces rather than a video (similar to the snapshot shown 
bottom left in Figure 7-3).These conditions varied in terms of the audio that accompanied 
it, thus producing the conditions no video and no audio (noVIDEO_noAUDIO); and no 
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video and with audio (noVIDEO_AUDIO). Participants were randomly allocated to one 
of the six conditions. 
All participants faced the three versions of the task (star, egg, and barrel puzzles) 
and the order of presentation was counterbalanced across participants. Participants 
engaged in each task in five consecutive iterations (after an initial baseline test), each 
comprising presentation of the demonstration video followed by the opportunity to try 
solving the task. This iterative procedure is interesting for the study of learning because 
it produces repeated measures forming a learning curve rather than just a one-off 
success/failure outcome. 
7.2.4 Experimental setup 
Participants manipulated the puzzles on one desk and were exposed to the stimuli at 
another desk, as shown in Figure 7-2. Participants could easily move between the two 
desks by simply rotating their chair 90 degrees and adjusting for comfort, ensuring that 
they could alternate between engaging in the tasks and watching the demonstration videos 
with little disturbance. Videos were displayed on a 21’’ monitor in portrait orientation at 
a resolution of 1680 x 1050 pixels at a refresh rate of 100 Hz and a frame rate of 25 Hz, 
and the audio media were played on standard desktop speakers.  
One eye tracker (SR Research EyeLink 1000 with Desktop Mount) was used with 
a sampling rate of 1000Hz. A chin and headrest were used to limit head movement. The 
monitor covered 35 degrees of visual angle vertically and 22 degrees horizontally, and 
the distance between the headrest and the top of the monitor was 74 cm. The experiment 
was implemented in the SR Research Experiment Builder software. All sessions were 
also video recorded using two tripod-mounted cameras, but these images were used only 
to double check measures of success initially coded in real time during the sessions. 
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Figure 7-2. The workspace. The learner is at the observation desk watching the demonstration video while 
being eye tracked. To her left is the task desk with a solved barrel puzzle (model) and the corresponding 
pieces. The other two puzzles (star and egg) are currently hidden from the participant’s view. 
7.2.5 Procedure 
Participants were informed that they would alternate five times between trying to solve a 
puzzle and attending to the visual and/or auditory stimuli while their eye movements were 
recorded, and that this procedure would be repeated for three different puzzles. The 
experimenter placed the pieces of the first puzzle in front of the participant, as well as an 
assembled model, and asked if the participant had seen and/solved it before. The 
participant was then given the instruction to attempt to solve the puzzle as quickly as 
possible, i.e. to manipulate the pieces such as to produce a copy of the assembled model. 
They could inspect the assembled model visually but were not allowed to touch it. 
Learners were given a fixed time interval to solve the task (star: 90s, egg: 90s, barrel: 
120s), corresponding roughly to twice the time required by the facilitator to solve them. 
The first attempt was performed before any stimulus was presented and was 
therefore used as the baseline score. After this, the participant turned to the observation 
desk, positioned him or herself on the head and chin rest and the appropriate stimulus 
(video or still image, with or without face, with or without sound) was then presented. 
During this period, the experimenter disassembled the partially or completely solved 
puzzle and arranged the pieces randomly on the desk for the next attempt. The participant 
then turned back to the task desk with the same instruction to attempt to solve the puzzle 
again as quickly as possible. This procedure of alternating between attending to the 
stimulus and attempting to solve the task was iterated five times in total before the same 
procedure was performed for the second (and then third) puzzle. 
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At the beginning of the session a parallax test was conducted and only the data for 
the dominant eye were used in the analysis. Nine-point calibration routines were 
performed before the first attempt at each puzzle, and a drift correction was performed 
before each iteration. The experimenter coded the participant’s performance at the end of 
each attempt as either a success (i.e. puzzle was assembled correctly within the time 
given) or no success (i.e. task was not solved).  
7.2.6 Data processing 
Facilitator’s manipulation and gaze data 
I coded the facilitator’s behavioural flow from the demonstration videos into categorical 
time series at a sample rate of one observation every 25 ms using the free software 
Solomon version beta 17.03.22 (Péter, 2016). For each puzzle solving demonstration, I 
produced two time series. The first included labels for the individual puzzle pieces and 
for the aggregates (partially solved puzzle) that appear as the pieces are being assembled. 
It also included a label to indicate no manipulation. An example is shown in Figure 7-4, 
in which different colours indicate the different labels. Often the facilitator held the puzzle 
in one hand while reaching for the next piece to be incorporated. In these cases, the label 
for the new piece was used. This time series was used together with the corresponding 
time series indicating the pieces or aggregates being fixated by the learners. 
The second time series produced for each demonstration video included one label 
for when the demonstrator looked directly at the camera (thus simulating the situation of 
looking at the learner) and one label for ‘other’. This was used together with the 
corresponding time series indicating when the learners looked at the facilitator’s face (see 
Figure 7-6 for an example). The length of these time series was normalized according to 
the length of each of the videos (star: 1500 bins, egg: 2000 bins, barrel: 3000 bins). 
Learner’s performance data 
I coded the binary performance data (1 for ‘success’ or 0 for ‘no success’) during the trials 
and later confirmed these data with the video recordings of the sessions. 
Learner’s gaze data 
Only the gaze data of participants in conditions noFACE_noAUDIO, FACE_noAUDIO, 
noFACE_AUDIO, and FACE_AUDIO (i.e. the 2 x 2 = 4 experimental conditions under 
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scrutiny) were used in the analyses reported below. Fixation events were extracted with 
the SR Research parsing algorithm using the Data Viewer software at its default 
parameter settings. For each video I defined regions-of-interest, including a margin of 
one degree, around each puzzle piece, the emerging aggregates (partially solved pieces), 
and the facilitator’s face. The raw gaze recording yields one observation every 
millisecond. To reduce this unnecessarily high resolution, I produced scan patterns with 
one observation every 25ms and then normalized them to a fixed length to avoid small 
differences that occur across trials. Scan patterns are categorical time series representing 
the sequence of fixated targets. Because the demonstration videos for each puzzle varied 
in length, so did the final time series. Their lengths were: star: 1500 bins; egg: 2000 bins; 
barrel: 3000 bins. Each bin contributes one value in the final time series, which is a label 
of the target being fixated by the learner most of the time in that brief interval of about 
25ms.  
Similar to the facilitator’s data, I also produced two time series to represent the 
learner’s gaze in each iteration. The first included labels for the individual puzzle pieces 
and for the aggregates (partially solved puzzle) that appear as the pieces are being 
assembled. It also included a label for ‘other’. This time series was used to examine how 
participants coordinated their visual attention to the facilitator’s actions. The second time 
series included a label for when the learner looked directly at the facilitator’s face, and 
one label for ‘other’. This time series was used to examine how participants looked at the 
facilitator’s face. I also computed the proportion of fixation time that learners spent 
looking at the facilitator’s face and at the puzzle pieces. Figure 7-3 illustrates the data 
from which the time series were produced. 
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Figure 7-3. Snapshots from the demonstration of the star puzzle in two conditions (noFACE_noAUDIO 
and FACE_AUDIO). The coloured dots represent the eye tracking data from all participants in each 
condition. The cloud of dots indicate that participants tended to be looking at the pieces being manipulated 
by the facilitator. It also indicates, especially in the first and last frames, that participants looked more at 
the facilitator’s face when it was clearly visible. 
7.2.7 Analysis 
I examined, from each trial, the performance of the potential learners (success or no 
success); the proportion of fixation time directed at the facilitator’s face and at the puzzle 
pieces; the time series representing the sequence in which the facilitator manipulated the 
puzzle pieces in the demonstration videos; the time series representing when the 
facilitator looked at the camera; the time series representing the sequence in which the 
learners looked at the puzzle pieces while watching the demonstration videos; and the 
time series representing when learners looked at the facilitator’s face in the videos. 
The analysis of difference in performance across all six conditions did not involve 
eye tracking data. In this case, from the initial 795 trials (53 participants x 3 puzzles x 5 
iterations), only 5 trials of a single participant were excluded because she was familiar 
with the star puzzle. 
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For the remaining analyses involving eye tracking data, however, we focus only on 
four experimental conditions and therefore start with an initial dataset of 600 trials (40 
participants x 3 puzzles x 5 iterations). From these, 3 trials were excluded due to early 
termination (the participant moved away from the eye tracker), 5 due to the participant 
knowing the puzzle (same case as reported above), 124 due to the eye tracking data not 
being acquired properly, as indicated by more than 20% of out-of-range fixations (103 
cases) or by artefacts appearing in the time series (21 cases). A further two cases were 
excluded due to the participant inadvertently moving the desk during data collection. The 
final dataset included in the results reported below included 466 trials. The number of 
participants was well balanced across conditions: noVIDEO_noAUDIO = 6; 
noVIDEO_AUDIO = 7; noFACE_noAUDIO = 10; FACE_noAUDIO = 8; 
noFACE_AUDIO = 8; and FACE_AUDIO = 10. 
Recurrence Quantification Analysis 
4) Cross recurrence plots and joint recurrence plots 
To examine the coordination dynamics between the learners’ direction of gaze and 
the facilitator’s behaviour (manipulating the pieces and looking at the camera), I used a 
family of nonlinear techniques from recurrence analysis based on cross recurrence plots 
(CRPs) and joint recurrence plots (JRPs), already introduced in Chapter 6 (Marwan & 
Kurths, 2002; Marwan et al., 2007; Shockley et al., 2002; Webber & Zbilut, 2005; Zbilut 
et al., 1998). These analyses were conducted in R with the crqa package (Coco & Dale, 
2014). I have examined coordination in two cases. The first case is the coordination 
between the sequence of puzzle pieces manipulated by the facilitator and the sequence of 
pieces fixated by the learner as they watch the demonstration videos. The second case is 
the coordination between the facilitator looking at the camera and the learner looking at 
the facilitator’s face.  
I first focus on the coordination between the facilitator manipulating the pieces and 
the learners looking at the pieces. For each trial I produced a cross recurrence plot from 
the two corresponding time series (facilitator manipulating pieces and learners gazing at 
them) and I extracted quantification variables (similar to chapter 6). Here only the labels 
indicating the different puzzle pieces, but not the labels for ‘other’ or missing data, were 
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allowed to contribute towards cross recurrence. It might be helpful to consult Figure 7-4, 
Figure 7-5, Figure 7-6, and Figure 7-7 while reading the next section. 
In this study, each cross recurrence point (i.e., each coloured point in the CRP) 
corresponds to approximately 25ms of the behavioural flows being compared. I examined 
three coordination variables: recurrence rate (RR), determinism (DET), and mean line 
length (L). RR is the proportion of cross recurrences that obtain in the cross recurrence 
matrix represented in the CRP. In Figure 7-5, the RR corresponds to the number of 
coloured points divided by the total number of points (i.e., coloured or white) in each plot. 
This is a general and indiscriminate measure of the degree of shared activity or 
coordination between the two time series being compared, corresponding to the more 
widely known cross correlation sum (Kantz, 1994). 
DET is defined as the proportion of cross recurrence points that form continuous 
diagonal lines (sequence of points with slope = 1) longer than some threshold. These 
diagonal lines are important because they indicate when the systems exhibit a common 
trajectory in the phase space, i.e., when they visit (roughly) the same state. If the two 
systems visit the same state at the same time, this is indicated by cross recurrence points 
forming the main diagonal passing through the origin. Alternatively, if the two systems 
visit the same state at different times (i.e. with some time lag), this is indicated by cross 
recurrence points forming diagonals parallel to the main (not passing through the origin). 
DET is therefore an index of synchronization between the systems. Here, DET quantifies 
the synchronization between the learner’s direction of gaze and the specific piece being 
manipulated by the facilitator during the demonstration. In Figure 7-5, the DET 
corresponds to the number of coloured points that form continuous diagonal lines divided 
by the total number of coloured points is each plot. In the present case, higher values of 
DET indicate that learners consistently gaze more often at the specific piece being 
manipulated by the facilitator, with or without some lag. 
L is defined as the average length of the diagonal lines (longer than the threshold) 
formed by cross recurrence points. This is an index of the proportion of time in which 
both systems stay synchronized. In Figure 7-5, the L corresponds to the average length 
of the diagonal lines that obtain in each plot. Higher values of L indicate that, when the 
learner synchronizes her or his gaze with the behaviour of the facilitator, she or he stays 
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synchronized for a relatively longer time. Here, each unit of L corresponds to 
approximately 25ms of synchronized attention. 
The values of variables DET and L depend on the threshold parameter 
mindiagline. The appropriate value for this parameter was defined empirically by (1) 
running the crqa function with a range of possible mindiagline values, (2) plotting the 
resulting DET values as a function of the different mindiagline values, (3) visually 
inspecting these plots and (4) choosing the parameter value that reduces the ceiling effect 
in the DET variable. Following this procedure suggested a threshold value of 30 points 
was appropriate, which corresponds to about 750 ms in the raw data. In other words, only 
synchronized attention sustained for longer than 750 ms counted towards values of DET 
and L. CRQA variables are descriptive in nature and therefore comparisons among 
conditions, participants, or against appropriate baselines are required to draw inferences 
and examine specific predictions (Marwan et al., 2007; Shockley et al., 2002). 
To capture the iterative character of the experimental design and examine how 
coordination dynamics evolved across trials, in addition to the cross recurrence plots I 
also examined joint recurrence plots (JRPs) for every participant and for every task. JRPs 
were produced, only for iterations 2 to 5, by multiplying the cross recurrence matrices 
computed for each iteration and all previous iterations with the same task. For the first 
iteration I simply used the cross recurrence plot (since there is no previous CRP to 
multiply it with). For iteration 2 I multiplied the two cross recurrence matrices obtained 
for iterations 1 and 2. For iteration 3 I multiplied the three cross recurrence matrices 
obtained for iterations 1, 2, and 3; and so on. 
Cross recurrence matrices only have values of one and zero. Therefore, multiplying 
them produces a matrix which also only has values of one and zero. Specifically, if all 
cross recurrence matrices being multiplied have a value of one in some entry [xi, yi], then 
the resulting joint recurrence matrix will also have a value of one in the corresponding 
entry. If, on the other hand, there is at least one cross recurrence matrix in which there is 
a value of zero in that position, then the resulting joint recurrence matrix will have a value 
of zero in the corresponding entry. Thus, the resulting JRPs indicate the patterns of 
coordination dynamics that consistently appear across trials with each task. I computed 
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the quantification variables RR, DET, and L, from these JRPs and interpreted them as 
measures of repeated or consistent attentional coordination across trials. 
I used the same procedure just described to examine the coordination between the 
facilitator looking at the camera and the learners looking at the facilitator’s face. For each 
trial I produced a cross recurrence plot from the two corresponding time series and I 
extracted the same quantification variables: RR, DET and L. Here only the labels for 
facilitator looking at the camera and learner looking at the facilitator’s face, but not the 
labels for ‘other’ or missing data, were allowed to contribute towards cross recurrence. I 
also produced the joint recurrence plots as described. 
As an illustrative example, I show data from one participant in the condition 
FACE_AUDIO. Figure 7-4 shows the time series of the pieces of the star puzzle being 
manipulated by the facilitator and the time series of the learner looking at the pieces while 
watching the demonstration video in each trial. Figure 7-5 shows the corresponding 
CRPs produced from pairing the time series of the facilitator with each of the time series 
of the learner, and the corresponding JRPs produced by multiplying the CRPs as 
described above. In addition, Figure 7-6 shows the time series of the facilitator looking 
at the camera as he manipulated the pieces of the puzzle, and five time series of the learner 
looking at the facilitator’s face while watching the demonstration videos in each trial. 
Figure 7-7 shows the corresponding CRPs and the JRP produced by multiplying them.  
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Figure 7-4. Time series of the facilitator manipulating the pieces of the star puzzle and five time series of 
a learner looking at the pieces while watching the demonstration videos. The colours indicate either a single 
piece or the partially assembled puzzle being manipulated (or looked at). The grey periods in the facilitator’s 
time series indicate moments in which he was not manipulating any piece. Note that the learner tended to 
be looking at exactly the piece (or composite) being manipulated by the facilitator at any moment. 
 
Figure 7-5. A: Cross recurrence plots (CRP) produced from the time series of the facilitator manipulating 
the puzzle pieces (horizontal axis) paired with the time series of learner_3 looking at the pieces while 
watching the demonstration videos (vertical axis). The line of synchrony, in which the time stamp of the 
two time series coincide, is shown in black, and cross recurrences are shown in blue. These are the same 
cases shown in Figure 7-4. B: Joint recurrence plots (JRP) produced from the CRPs shown in A. For each 
iteration, the JRP is produced by multiplying the CRP from that iteration with all previous ones, thus leaving 
only those recurrences that occur in all of them. For iteration 1, the CRP is used.  
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Figure 7-6. Time series of the facilitator looking at the camera as he manipulated the pieces of the star 
puzzle, and five time series of learner_3 looking at the facilitator’s face while watching the demonstration 
videos. The colour red indicates the relevant states. These are the same trials shown in Figure 7-4. 
 
Figure 7-7. A: Cross recurrence plots (CRP) produced from the time series of the facilitator looking at the 
camera (horizontal axis) paired with the time series of learner_3 looking at the facilitator’s face while 
watching the demonstration videos (vertical axis). The line of synchrony, in which the time stamp of the 
two time series coincide, is shown in black, and cross recurrences are shown in red. These are the same 
cases shown in Figure 7-4. The learner was in the condition FACE_AUDIO. B: Joint recurrence plots 
(JRP) produced from the CRPs are shown in A. For each iteration, the JRP is produced by multiplying the 
CRP from that iteration with all previous ones, thus leaving only those recurrences that occur in all of them. 
For iteration 1, the CRP is used. The number of recurrences drops dramatically and, from iteration 3, the 
JRPs are blank. 
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5) Diagonal-wise cross recurrence profiles 
In the cross recurrence plots, the main diagonal or line of synchrony (slope = 1 and 
passing through the origin) compares the states exhibited by the facilitator and the learner 
at exactly the same time, while diagonals parallel to it (above or below the line of 
synchrony) compare the states of both participants at increasingly diverging time lags. 
Therefore, one way to visualize the degree of synchronization between two time series is 
by plotting the proportion of cross recurrence points that obtain at the line of synchrony 
and at each lag within a range of interest, here defined as from -3s to +3s. The shape of 
the resulting curve indicates the degree of synchrony between the facilitator and the 
learner. Specifically, a curve that peaks at around lag = 0 indicates that both time series 
tended to have the same labels at the same time, i.e. both participants tended to exhibit 
corresponding behavioural states at the same time. A curve that peaks at some other lag 
other than zero indicates that one time series tended to follow the other after some delay, 
with the delay indicated by that lag. A flat curve indicates that the sequence of states of 
the systems were not synchronized.  
The resulting plots are called diagonal-wise cross recurrence profiles (Marwan et 
al., 2007). Two sets of such profiles were produced (Figure 7-11). One set examines 
synchronization between the facilitator manipulating the puzzle pieces and the learners 
looking at those pieces. The other set examines synchronization between the facilitator 
looking at the camera and learners looking at the facilitator’s face on the screen. I report 
them to illustrate and provide qualitative evidence of synchronization. In addition, I report 
statistical models of RR and DET extracted from the respective cross recurrence plots, 
predicted by success, as described below. 
Statistical analysis 
To account for the hierarchical data structure that results from the mixed design, in the 
models reported below condition was modelled as a between-participant parameter with 
fixed effect, iteration was modelled as a within-participant parameter with fixed effect 
(repeated measures), and both the indicator of puzzle and the indicator of participant were 
modelled with varying intercepts (also called random effects). All analyses were carried 
out in R version 3.1.3 (R Core Team, 2016). Regression models were fit in STAN (B. 
Carpenter et al., 2017) using the convenient map2stan function from the rethinking 
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package (McElreath, 2016). STAN is a tool for implementing Bayesian multilevel models 
using Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) simulation, which approximates the posterior 
distribution for unknown parameters (Gelman et al., 2014; McElreath, 2016). Fitted 
Bayesian models provide samples from the posterior distribution of the parameters for 
which summary statistics are computed and reported (such as mean, credible intervals, 
differences, or the proportion of positive values). In all models, I used weakly informative 
priors to avoid unreasonable parameter values while still allowing the model to estimate 
a wide range of sensible values (Gelman et al., 2014), and I report posterior distributions 
estimated from at least 3,000 samples after warmup.  
I first investigated if the situations created by the experimental manipulation might 
indeed be generally characterized as learning that is facilitated by the facilitator’s 
behaviour (i.e. ‘social learning’). To this end I fitted hierarchical logistic models with 
logit link to the performance data from participants in all six conditions. The outcome 
was the probability of success in each trial and the predictors were condition (coded as 
dummy variables), iteration, and the interaction between them. The model also included 
indicators of task and participant as varying intercepts (fully crossed random effects). No 
participant solved any of the tasks during the baseline test, and therefore there was no 
need to include the baseline score as a covariate, as was initially intended. 
To examine whether the proportion of time learners spent looking at the puzzle 
pieces and at the facilitator’s face varied across conditions, I fitted a hierarchical 
generalised linear model to the data. Because proportions are bounded between 0 and 1, 
I modelled these data using a Beta likelihood and logit link. The predictor was condition 
(coded as dummy variables) and I used indicators of label (‘face’ and ‘pieces’) such that 
the model would estimate the parameters for each separately. The model also included 
varying intercepts of task and participant. I also fitted a variation of this model adding 
iteration and its interaction with condition as predictors and compared them using the 
Widely Applicable Information Criterion or WAIC (Gelman et al., 2014; McElreath, 
2016). There was no effect of iteration and WAIC indicated that adding iteration did not 
improve prediction accuracy. I therefore report the simpler model. 
To further investigate if the way in which learners coordinated their eye movements 
with respect to the facilitator’s manipulation varied across conditions, I fitted hierarchical 
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linear models to the data indicating coordination between the time series of facilitator 
manipulating the puzzle pieces paired with each time series of learner looking at the 
pieces. In each model, the outcome was one of the measures of coordination (RR, DET, 
or L, computed from either the cross recurrence plots or the joint recurrence plots) and 
the predictors were condition, iteration, and their interaction. The models also included 
varying intercepts for task and participant. 
The observed values of RR extracted from the cross and joint recurrence plots 
computed from the times series of facilitator manipulating the puzzle pieces and learner 
looking at the pieces were close to zero (range: 1.79% - 10.90%), which reflected in some 
negative values being predicted by the fitted linear models. The posterior validation 
checks in these cases were good but since RR is a proportion and negative values do not 
make sense, I re-fitted the models which had RR (from CRP and from JRP) as the 
outcome using Beta distribution and logit link. These models converged, and mixing was 
good, but the posterior validation checks were less satisfactory than the linear models. 
Therefore, I opted to report the linear models, which make sense overall except for the 
caveat that RR is a proportion and therefore bounded within the unit interval. 
The qualitative assessment of the diagonal-wise cross recurrence plots, which will 
be reported below, suggested a possible association between how learners looked at the 
facilitator’s face and success at solving the task. I therefore also modelled the values of 
RR and DET extracted from the cross recurrence plots produced for the time series of 
facilitator looking at the camera paired with each time series of learner looking at the 
facilitator’s face using hierarchical generalized linear models with Beta likelihood and 
logit link. In these models the outcome was either RR or DET and the only predictor was 
success in the trial. The models used indicators of condition to estimate effects for each 
separately. These models included varying intercepts for participants but not of trials 
since these could not be well estimated (as indicated by poor mixing of independent 
chains and low number of effective samples in the posterior distribution, in the models 
which included them). 
Finally, to examine the association between coordination and learning, I used the 
framework of model comparison with WAIC and fitted hierarchical logistic models with 
logit link to the performance and coordination data. The guiding question in this analysis 
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is whether each of the six variables that quantify the coordination between the time series 
of facilitator manipulating the puzzle pieces and each time series of learner looking at 
the pieces were predictive of performance. 
To conduct this analysis, I first modelled the probability of success predicted by 
condition, iteration, and the interaction condition X iteration. This ‘base model’ also 
included varying intercepts for task and participant but did not include any coordination 
variable. Then, for each of the six coordination variables, I produced two models with a 
structure that builds upon the base model. The first included the additive effect of the 
coordination variable and therefore asks if there is a statistic association between 
performance and coordination, after we take into account the effects of condition and 
iteration. The second model also included the interaction condition X coordination and 
therefore allow the effect of coordination (if there is any) to vary across conditions. 
Relatively lower values of WAIC are indicative of better predictive accuracy. Akaike 
weights are rescaled values of WAIC in which a total weight of 1 is partitioned among 
the models under consideration, thus indicating relative predictive accuracy among the 
models being compared (McElreath 2016). Comparing the WAIC and Akaike weight 
scores indicates whether adding each of the coordination variables (and the interaction 
with condition) improves prediction accuracy relative to the base model. The values of 
the coordination variables were standardised or z-scored (i.e. subtracted from the mean 
and divided by the standard deviation) to be included in the models. 
Evaluating evidence of effects 
All STAN models converged, and mixing was good. Unless otherwise indicated, I report 
the mean and 95% credible interval of the estimated parameters from the fitted models. 
In this section, strong evidence for an effect corresponds to a 95% central credible interval 
which excludes 0, and weak evidence corresponds to cases where the 95% central credible 
interval includes 0, but the 90% central credible interval does not. I sometimes report the 
probability that the model estimates a positive parameter value to provide further 
evidence of an effect. When evidence of an effect comes only from such a probability but 
not from the credible intervals (because even the 90% CI includes zero), I consider this 
to be very weak evidence. Unless noted, I report posterior estimates computed marginal 
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of task and participant, i.e. averaging across the variation introduced by their varying 
intercepts. 
7.3 Results 
7.3.1 Was learning influenced by the facilitator? 
No participant solved any of the tasks during the baseline test. Table 7-1, Table 7-2 and 
Figure 7-8 report the model of the probability of success predicted by condition, iteration, 
and their interaction. In all conditions, the probability of success in the first trial after the 
baseline test was very low, suggesting that participants started from a similar level of skill 
and that the puzzles were relatively challenging. There was strong evidence that learning 
(improved performance with practice) was influenced by condition. This is indicated 
visually by how the curves showing simulated probabilities vary in steepness across 
conditions (Figure 7-8) and, formally, by the estimated effects of iteration (which 
indicate learning rate) and probabilities of success reported in Table 7-1, as well as by 
the differences in the effect of iteration across conditions reported in Table 7-2. 
Table 7-1. Estimated mean and 95% credible intervals of the effect of iteration on the probability of success 
across conditions. Also reported are the estimated mean and 95% credible interval of the probability of 
success in the first and in the last trial. 
Condition 
Effect of iteration 
(mean and 95% CI) probability of 
success at 
trial 1 
probability of 
success at 
trial 5 Estimate Odds ratio 
noVIDEO 
noAUDIO  
0.82  
[0.08, 1.68] 
2.27 
[1.09, 5.39] 
.03 
[0, .30] 
.14 
[0, .89] 
noVIDEO 
AUDIO  
0.84 
[0.30, 1.44] 
2.32 
[1.35, 4.23] 
.05 
[0, .53] 
.28 
[0, .97] 
noFACE 
noAUDIO  
0.91 
[0.52, 1.35] 
2.50 
[1.69, 3.84] 
.07 
[0, .66] 
.42 
[.01, .99] 
FACE 
noAUDIO  
0.58 
[0.19, 0.98] 
1.79 
[1.21, 2.67] 
.12 
[0, .85] 
.36 
[.01, 0.98] 
noFACE 
AUDIO  
1.81 
[1.29, 2.38] 
6.10  
3.65, 10.76] 
.06 
[0, .68] 
.88 
[.30, 1] 
FACE 
AUDIO  
1.49 
[1.01, 2.05] 
4.44 
[2.75, 7.74] 
.06 
[0, .59] 
.74 
[.08, 1] 
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To examine how learning varied across conditions in more detail, I first averaged 
the effects estimated for the relevant sets of conditions in each posterior simulation (thus 
producing a vector of average estimates) and then computed the difference between the 
sets (Table 7-2). Compared to engaging with the puzzles individually (with no influence 
from the facilitator), listening to the facilitator’s speech alone without watching the 
corresponding videos did not lead to a faster learning rate (comparison 1) and neither did 
watching the demonstration videos without listening to the corresponding audio 
(comparison 2). In contrast, participants who watched the videos and listened to the 
facilitator’s speech learned faster compared to those who did not watch the videos 
(comparisons 3 and 4), and also compared to those who watched the videos without the 
audio (comparisons 5 and 6). There was no evidence of a difference in learning rate 
between those watching the video with the facilitator’s face visible, compared to blurred 
(comparisons 7 and 8). In fact, there is a weak trend in the opposite direction. The 
probability that the model estimates a greater effect of iteration in condition 
noFACE_AUDIO than FACE_AUDIO is .81, and that it estimates a greater effect in 
condition noFACE_noAUDIO than FACE_noAUDIO is .88. Thus, there is some 
suggestion that allowing participants to see the facilitator’s face in the demonstration 
videos proved detrimental to learning in this case. 
Table 7-2. Estimated difference in the effect of iteration on the probability of success across sets of 
conditions. Unless indicated, reported values are mean and 95% credible intervals. 
comparison 
Conditions being compared Difference in the effect of 
iteration (set 2 – set 1) set 1 set 2 
1 noVIDEO_noAUDIO noVIDEO_AUDIO 0.02 [-0.97, 0.93] 
2 noVIDEO_noAUDIO 
noFACE_noAUDIO,  
FACE_noAUDIO 
-0.07 [-0.91, 0.79] 
3 noVIDEO_noAUDIO 
noFACE_AUDIO, 
FACE_AUDIO 
0.83, 90% CI [0.10, 1.57] 
4 noVIDEO_AUDIO 
noFACE_AUDIO, 
FACE_AUDIO 
0.81 [0.16, 1.49] 
5 noFACE_noAUDIO noFACE_AUDIO 0.89 [0.25, 1.55] 
6 FACE_noAUDIO FACE_AUDIO 0.91 [0.28, 1.54] 
7 noFACE_noAUDIO FACE_noAUDIO -0.34 [-0.91, 0.21] 
8 noFACE_AUDIO FACE_AUDIO -0.32 [-1.07, 0.34] 
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In sum, neither listening to the facilitator’s speech alone (without watching the 
demonstration) or watching the demonstration alone (without listening to the facilitator’s 
speech) improved learning rate, compared to engaging in the task individually. In 
contrast, listening to the facilitator’s speech while watching the corresponding 
demonstration greatly facilitated learning. In addition, there was some evidence 
suggesting that seeing the facilitator’s face, compared to face blurred, was relatively 
detrimental to learning. 
 
Figure 7-8. Plots show 100 simulations (black) and the mean predictions (red) from the fitted model of 
performance as a function of condition, iteration, and their interaction across all conditions. A: simulations 
marginal of task and participant, i.e. considering the variation introduced by their varying intercepts. B: 
simulations for an average task and average participant, i.e. without considering the variation introduced 
by the varying intercepts of task and participant. The observed performance data are shown in blue (0: no 
success, 1: success), with their position jittered to avoid overlap. C1_nVnA: no video and no audio. 
C2_nVA: no video, with audio. C3_nFnA: video with noFACE_noAUDIO. C4_FnA: video with 
FACE_noAUDIO. C5_nFA: video with noFACE_AUDIO. C6_FA: video with FACE_AUDIO. 
7.3.2 Did condition affect relative allocation of visual attention?  
Figure 7-9 reports the model of the proportion of fixation time participants directed at 
the facilitator’s face and at the puzzle pieces, predicted from condition. Overall, 
participants looked for much longer at the puzzle pieces compared to the facilitator’s face 
(difference in the mean estimates averaged across conditions: 74.1% [40.3%, 90.1%]). 
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There was no effect of condition on the time spent looking at the pieces. In contrast, there 
was strong evidence that participants looked more at the facilitator’s face when it was 
visible compared to blurred (difference in the mean estimates between FACE_noAUDIO 
and noFACE_noAUDIO: 3.14% [0.5%, 10.3%]), between FACE_AUDIO and 
noFACE_AUDIO: 5.6% [0.8%, 17.9%]). There was no evidence of a difference in the 
mean estimates between the two conditions in which the face was blurred. Comparing the 
two conditions in which the face was visible, there was weak evidence that participants 
spent more time looking at his face when the audio was played (difference between 
FACE_AUDIO and FACE_noAUDIO: 2.9%, 90% CI [0.2%, 8.0%]]). In sum, learners 
looked more at the facilitator’s face when it was visible compared to blurred, and even 
more when they could also listen to what he was saying. 
 
Figure 7-9. Estimates and 95% credible interval of the proportion of fixation time participants spent looking 
at the facilitator’s face and at the puzzle pieces, across the four experimental conditions under scrutiny. 
C3_nFnA: noFACE_noAUDIO. C4_FnA: FACE_noAUDIO. C5_nFA: noFACE_AUDIO. C6_FA: 
FACE_AUDIO. 
7.3.3 Did condition affect the coordination between the learners’ visual 
attention and the facilitator’s behaviour?  
I first focus on the analyses of the time series representing how the facilitator manipulated 
the puzzle pieces paired with each time series representing how learners looked at the 
pieces. Table 7-3 and Figure 7-10 report the models of the six different coordination 
variables, in which the predictors were condition, iteration, and their interaction. The 
estimates of the coordination variables overlap considerably across conditions and across 
iterations, and there was no evidence of an effect of condition on the mean estimates, 
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averaged across iterations, of any of the coordination variables. With regard to the 
variables computed from the cross recurrence plots, there was strong evidence that DET 
and L increased across iterations in the condition noFACE_AUDIO.  
With respect to the joint recurrence plots (JRPs), there was no evidence of an effect 
of condition on the mean estimates of RR and DET, averaged across iterations. There was 
evidence of an effect of condition on values of L. Comparing the two conditions with the 
facilitator’s face blurred, there was weak evidence that the mean estimates of L (from 
JRPs), averaged across iterations, were lower when the audio was played (difference 
between the estimates of conditions noFACE_AUDIO and noFACE_noAUDIO: -5, 90% 
CI [-11, -0.1]). This suggests that listening to the audio might have led learners to look at 
different pieces in different trials. In addition, comparing the two conditions in which the 
audio was played, there was strong evidence that the mean estimates of L were higher 
when the facilitator’s face was visible compared to blurred (difference between the mean 
estimates of conditions FACE_AUDIO and noFACE_AUDIO: 8 [1, 13]). This suggests 
that seeing the facilitator’s face, compared to face blurred, motivated learners to stay 
synchronized with the facilitator’s actions more similarly across trials. Each cross 
recurrence point corresponds to approximately 25ms, thus, for example, the estimated 
difference of 5 corresponds to about 125ms. 
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Table 7-3. Estimated values for the effect of iteration on the different coordination variables: RR, DET, 
and L, computed from the cross recurrence plots (CRP) and the joint recurrence plots (JRP). Reported 
values are means and 95% credible intervals. Values indicating strong evidence of an effect are in bold and 
shaded to facilitate reading. 
RP Variable 
 Conditions 
noFACE 
noAUDIO 
FACE 
noAUDIO 
noFACE 
AUDIO 
FACE 
AUDIO 
    
CRP 
RR 
0.04 
[-0.04, 0.11] 
0.02 
[-0.06, 0.11] 
0 
[-0.08, 0.09] 
-0.01 
[-0.09, 0.07] 
DET 
0.36  
[-0.56, 1.28] 
0.79 
[-0.24, 1.75] 
1.37 
[0.25, 2.51] 
0.64 
[-0.28, 1.58] 
L 
0.48 
[-0.65, 1.56] 
0.4 
[-0.79, 1.62] 
1.58 
[0.34, 2.86] 
0.53 
[-0.57, 1.62]  
JRP 
RR 
-0.60 
[-0.70, -0.50] 
-0.64      
[-0.74, -0.53] 
-0.60 
[-0.72, 0.49] 
-0.68 
[-0.79, -0.58] 
DET 
-6.71 
[-8.00, -5.46] 
-6.66 
[-8.03, -5.34] 
-6.5 
[-7.98, -4.99] 
-5.73 
[-6.96, -4.49]  
L 
-4.16 
[-5.1 -3.18 
-4.52 
[-5.54, -3.44] 
-3.45 
[-4.57, -2.27] 
-3.74 
[-4.71, -2.75] 
 
Because of the way they are computed, described above, JRPs produced by 
multiplying more (compared to fewer) CRPs will tend to have lower values of RR. JRPs 
for later (compared to earlier) trials are produced by multiplying more CRPs. For 
example, the JRP for trial 2 is produced by multiplying the CRPs for trials 1 and 2, 
whereas the JRP for trial 5 is produced by multiplying the CRPs for trials 1, 2, 3, 4, and 
5. It is therefore expected that JRPs from later trials will have lower values of RR (see 
Figure 7-5 and Figure 7-7 for examples). Consistent with this, there was strong evidence 
that RR, DET, and L were negatively associated with iteration in all four conditions, but 
there was no evidence of a difference in the magnitude of this effect across conditions in 
any of these cases. 
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Figure 7-10. Estimated mean and 95% credible intervals of RR, DET, and L, for iterations 1 (light grey) 
to 5 (black), marginal of task and participant, across the experimental conditions under scrutiny. The labels 
b<0 (or b>0) indicate cases where there is strong evidence of a negative (or positive) effect of iteration on 
the coordination variable. C3_nFnA: noFACE_noAUDIO. C4_FnA: FACE_noAUDIO. C5_nFA: 
noFACE_AUDIO. C6_FA: FACE_AUDIO. 
Finally, Figure 7-11 shows the two sets of diagonal-wise cross recurrence profiles 
computed to illustrate and examine synchronization between learner and facilitator 
qualitatively. I start with set A, which examines synchronization between the time series 
of facilitator manipulating the puzzle pieces paired with each time series of learner 
looking at the pieces. The peak around lag = 0 means that most recurrence points in the 
resulting cross recurrence plots fall on or close to the line of synchrony, as evident in the 
examples in Figure 7-5. In other words, in all trials, participants showed a strong 
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tendency to be looking at precisely those puzzle pieces being manipulated by the 
facilitator at any moment. The apparent similarity across conditions, and also between 
successful and unsuccessful trials, suggests there were no qualitative differences in how 
synchronized participants’ eye movements were relative to the pieces being manipulated 
by the facilitator. This is consistent with the lack of evidence of an effect of condition on 
the coordination variables extracted from cross recurrence plots. 
I now focus on the analyses of the time series representing how the facilitator looked 
at the camera paired with each time series representing how learners looked at the 
facilitator’s face. Set B in Figure 7-11 examines synchronization in this case. The overall 
low values of RR (compared to set A) indicate that the combination of the states examined 
here was substantially less recurrent over time in each trial than the states examined in set 
A. There are only very few curves with values above zero in conditions 
noFACE_noAUDIO and noFACE_AUDIO, indicating that learners never (or only 
rarely) looked at the facilitator’s face when it was blurred. This is consistent with the 
evidence from the proportion of fixation time and fixation count, reported above. The fact 
that these curves do not show a clear peak indicates that, in those cases when learners did 
look at the facilitator’s blurred face, they did so irrespective of the facilitator looking at 
the camera. This is evidence that the amount of blurring applied to the videos did indeed 
disrupt the optical structure which specified the facilitator looking at the camera, as 
intended. 
In contrast, there are many more curves with values of cross recurrence above zero 
in condition FACE_noAUDIO, and even more in FACE_AUDIO. This indicates that 
some learners did, at least in some trials, look at the facilitator’s face when it was clearly 
visible, and they did so more when the audio was played. The fact that the curves in the 
conditions with face visible show a peak close to lag = 0 indicate that, in those cases when 
learners did look at the facilitator’s face, they did so at about those moments when the 
facilitator looked at the camera. Moreover, the fact that these curves tend to peak at 
slightly positive lags indicates that the facilitator was leading this behaviour, i.e. the state 
facilitator looking at the camera tended to occur first, closely followed by the state 
learner looking at the facilitator’s face. This suggests learners were responding to the 
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facilitator looking ‘at them’ or, more precisely, to the sudden appearance, in their field of 
view, of optical structure specifying a pair of eyes looking in their direction.  
Visual inspection of the profiles suggests that, on average, the values of RR were 
higher, and the profile peaks were also higher, in successful compared to unsuccessful 
trials. This is particularly suggestive in condition FACE_AUDIO. This qualitative 
suggestion was confirmed formally by the model of RR predicted by success, which 
provided strong evidence of a positive association in condition FACE_AUDIO (b = 0.26 
[0.01, 0.54]). There was also a weak trend of a positive association in condition 
FACE_noAUDIO, suggested by the probability that the model estimates a positive effect 
(p = .77). The models of DET predicted by success provided only weak evidence of a 
trend in both conditions in which the face was visible, supported by the probability that 
the model estimates a positive effect (FACE_noAUDIO: p = .86; FACE_AUDIO: p = 
.83).  
When reporting the relative effect of iteration on performance across conditions 
above, I provided some (relatively weak) evidence suggesting that seeing the facilitator’s 
face in the demonstration videos was detrimental to learning. Here I provide evidence that 
looking back at the facilitator’s face was associated with success. This might sound 
contradictory and therefore it is sensible to clarify. Consider that the effects of iteration 
on success are smaller in condition FACE_noAUDIO compared to noFACE_noAUDIO, 
and also smaller in condition FACE_AUDIO compared to noFACE_AUDIO 
(respectively, comparisons 7 and 8 in Table 7-2). This difference is also illustrated by the 
learning curves depicted in Figure 7-8. This comparison is among participants that find 
themselves in different learning conditions. Here the comparison is among participants 
that find themselves within the same learning conditions (either FACE_noAUDIO or 
FACE_AUDIO). 
Thus, on the one hand, I provided evidence that the presence of the optic structure 
specifying the facilitator’s face (compared to a pixelized blob) in the visual array was 
somewhat detrimental to learning. This is possibly because the face momentarily distracts 
the learners’ attention from the actions being performed on the pieces. On the other hand, 
given that the face is visible, successful participants tended to be those responsive to the 
facilitator’s glancing at them (more precisely, glancing at the camera during video 
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recording). Since the structure of the facilitator’s face is unrelated to the solution of the 
tasks, I suggest that the behaviour of ‘being looked at’ by the facilitator influences the 
motivational state of the learners, and that this effect is even stronger when they can also 
hear the facilitator speaking ‘to them’. Assuming that the tasks were not so difficult such 
that all participants could eventually learn how to solve them, this motivational influence 
might give these learners an advantage. This effect is possibly triggered by the 
participants’ prior experience in similar situations. On the other hand, it is possible that 
these participants were more motivated regardless and that their behaviour of ‘looking 
back’ is capturing their intrinsic motivation. 
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Figure 7-11. Diagonal-wise cross recurrence profiles computed for the observed data (black), where each 
curve represents one trial, and the mean across trials (red). The values of each curve indicate the proportion 
of recurrence points (cross recurrence rate) that fall within a range of lags (from -3s to 3s) around the main 
diagonal or line of synchrony (lag = 0) in the corresponding cross recurrence plot. A: This set examines 
synchronization between the time series of the facilitator manipulating the puzzle pieces and the time series 
of the learners looking at those pieces as they watch the demonstration videos. B: This set examines 
synchronization between the time series of the facilitator looking at the camera and the time series of the 
learners looking at the facilitator’s face. Conditions are C3_nFnA: noFACE_noAUDIO; C4_FnA: 
FACE_noAUDIO; C5_nFA: noFACE_AUDIO; C6_FA: FACE_AUDIO. 
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7.3.4 Was learning associated with measures of coordination? 
Table 7-4 reports the model comparison conducted for the models of performance to 
begin examining the association between coordination and learning. According to the 
WAIC and Akaike weight values, including the coordination variables extracted from 
cross recurrence plots did not improve the prediction accuracy relative to the base model 
with predictors condition, iteration, and their interaction, and these models will therefore 
not be further analysed. On the other hand, including coordination variables extracted 
from joint recurrence plots did improve prediction accuracy relative to the base model. 
More specifically, including RR improved model accuracy but including the interaction 
between condition and RR did not improve it any further. With respect to DET and L, 
including both the coordination variable and its interaction with condition improved 
model accuracy. I therefore focus on these three models below. 
Table 7-5 reports the estimated effects of iteration on the probability of success in 
these models. As expected, these effects are similar to those reported in Table 7-1. Table 
7-6 reports the estimated effects of coordination on the probability of success. To aid 
interpretation of what the estimates imply, I present a set of three figures corresponding 
to each model: The model with RR as a covariate is shown in Figure 7-12, the model 
with DET in Figure 7-13, and the model with L in Figure 7-14. These figures show 
model predictions of the probability of success as a function of condition and iteration, 
computed for three different values of the respective coordination variable: -2, 0, and 2. 
Recall that these variables were standardised to be included as covariates. Therefore, 0 
corresponds to the observed mean value, -2 corresponds to the value 2 standard deviations 
below the mean (i.e. a low value), and 2 corresponds to the value 2 standard deviations 
above the mean (i.e. a high value). Note that these figures are similar to the model of 
performance shown above in Figure 7-8, which included only condition, iteration, and 
their interaction, as predictors. At the same time, they present their individual 
assumptions, predictions, and uncertainties. 
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Table 7-4. Model comparison for the models of performance (including, or not including, coordination 
variables as predictors) using information criteria. WAIC: Widely Applicable Information Criterion; 
dWAIC: difference between each WAIC and the lowest WAIC; weight: Akaike weight (rescaled WAIC); 
SE: standard error of WAIC estimates; dSE: standard error of the difference in WAIC between each model 
and the top-ranked model. The final models, chosen for interpretation and reporting, are shown in grey. 
Recurrence 
plot 
Model WAIC dWAIC weight SE dSE 
CRP 
Base model 323.9  0.42 25.27  
+ RR 323.9 0 0.41 25.27 1.17 
+ RR + condition X RR 325.7 1.9 0.17 26.06 5.28 
Base model 323.9  0.54 25.27  
+ DET 324.3 0.5 0.43 25.34 0.63 
+ DET + condition X DET 329.6 5.8 0.03 26.23 4.4 
Base model 323.9  0.58 25.27  
+ L 324.6 0.7 0.4 25.37 0.67 
+ L + condition X L 331.2 7.4 0.01 26.29 4.33 
JRP 
+ RR 319.5  0.6 25.32  
+ RR + condition X RR 320.7 1.2 0.33 26.29 5.49 
Base model 323.9 4.4 0.07 25.27 4.27 
+ DET + condition X DET 307.3  1 25.16  
Base model 323.9 16.6 0 25.27 9.24 
+ DET 325.5 18.2 0 25.55 9.33 
+ L + condition X L 309.4  1 26.16  
Base model 323.9 14.4 0 25.27 9.22 
+ L 324.6 15.2 0 25.2 9.09 
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Table 7-5. Estimated values for the effect of iteration on the probability of success from the fitted models 
of success predicted by condition, iteration, their interaction, and one of the coordination variables extracted 
from joint recurrence plots. Values indicating strong evidence of an effect are in bold and shaded in dark 
grey to facilitate reading. 
Coordination 
variable  
(from JRPs) 
Condition 
Effect of iteration on the probability of 
success (mean and 95% CI) 
Estimate Odds ratio 
RR 
noFACE 
noAUDIO  
1.11 
[0.55, 1.63] 
3.17 
[1.72, 5.08] 
FACE 
noAUDIO  
0.81 
[0.26, 1.37] 
2.34 
[1.18, 3.74] 
noFACE 
AUDIO  
2.00 
[1.34, 2.67] 
7.83 
[3.37, 13.62] 
FACE 
AUDIO  
1.95 
[1.26, 2.65] 
7.56 
[3.09, 13.47] 
DET 
noFACE 
noAUDIO  
1.39 
[0.70, 2.12] 
4.33 
[1.74, 7.79] 
FACE 
noAUDIO  
0.15 
[-0.66, 0.91] 
1.27 
[0.43, 2.30] 
noFACE 
AUDIO  
2.70 
[1.76, 3.68] 
17.04 
[4.71, 36.47] 
FACE 
AUDIO  
1.44 
[0.78, 2.15] 
4.51 
[1.82, 7.95] 
L 
noFACE 
noAUDIO  
1.73 
[0.98, 2.55] 
6.18 
[2.30, 11.84] 
FACE 
noAUDIO  
0.01 
[-0.77, 0.77] 
1.10 
[0.39, 2.02] 
noFACE 
AUDIO  
2.20 
[1.37, 3.07] 
10.05 
[3.15, 19.90] 
FACE 
AUDIO  
1.58 
[0.97, 2.28] 
5.17 
[2.20, 8.96] 
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Table 7-6. Estimated values for the effect of coordination variables computed from joint recurrence plots 
(JRP) on the probability of success across conditions, computed for the models chosen following the model 
comparison. The probability that the models estimate a positive effect given the data is also reported. Values 
indicating strong (or weak) evidence of an effect are in bold and shaded in dark (or light) grey to facilitate 
reading. 
Coordination 
variable 
(from JRPs) 
Condition 
Effect of coordination on the probability of 
success (mean and 95% CI) 
Estimate Odds ratio 
RR 
noFACE_noAUDIO, 
FACE_noAUDIO, 
noFACE_AUDIO, 
and FACE_AUDIO 
0.91 
[0.02, 1.78] 
2.48 
[1.02, 5.93] 
DET 
noFACE 
noAUDIO  
1.14 
[0.01, 2.29] 
3.13 
[1.01, 9.91] 
FACE 
noAUDIO  
-1.32 
[-3.03, 0.45] 
0.27 
[0.05, 1.57] 
noFACE 
AUDIO  
2.14 
[0.81, 3.68] 
8.50 
[2.25, 39.49] 
FACE 
AUDIO  
-1.11 
[-2.12, -0.17] 
0.33 
[0.12, 0.85] 
L 
noFACE 
noAUDIO  
2.05 
[0.82, 3.28] 
7.76 
[2.28, 26.45] 
FACE 
noAUDIO  
-1.82 
90% CI [-3.42, -0.24] 
0.16 
90% CI [0.03, 0.79] 
noFACE 
AUDIO  
1.39 
90% CI [0.02, 2.71] 
4.00 
90% CI [1.02, 14.96] 
FACE 
AUDIO  
-0.41 
[-1.11, 0.30] 
0.66 
[0.33, 1.35] 
 
There was strong evidence that RR was positively associated with probability of 
success, although the effect size is relatively small. This is indicated by the model 
predicting slightly higher probabilities of success for high (2) compared to low (-2) values 
of RR. Because this model does not include the interaction between condition and RR, 
the additive effect of RR is the same across all conditions. This model tells a very coherent 
story, for three reasons. First, the comparison between the conditions 
[noFACE_noAUDIO and FACE_noAUDIO] with conditions [noFACE_AUDIO and 
FACE_AUDIO] shows that learning was facilitated by listening to the audio instructions 
compared to not. Second, the comparison, within each condition, among different values 
of RR shows that learning was also facilitated by coordinating eye movements with 
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respect to the manipulations being demonstrated. Finally, comparing between conditions 
noFACE_noAUDIO and FACE_noAUDIO, as well as between noFACE_AUDIO and 
FACE_AUDIO, show that learning was slower when the facilitator’s face was clearly 
visible compared to blurred. 
The variables DET and L show a more complicated pattern. In the conditions where 
the facilitator’s face was blurred, both DET and L were positively associated with 
probability of success. This suggests that, in these cases, learners who synchronized their 
eye movements more and for longer with the facilitator’s actions learned faster. 
Regarding DET, the evidence of this effect is strong in conditions noFACE_noAUDIO 
and noFACE_AUDIO. Regarding L, the evidence of this effect is strong in condition 
noFACE_noAUDIO and weak in condition noFACE_AUDIO. So far this is consistent 
with the model of RR and with the general prediction that coordinating visual attention 
to the actions being demonstrated should be beneficial for learning. However, in the 
conditions where the facilitator’s face was visible, DET and L were negatively associated 
with probability of success, as shown by the negative estimates reported in Table 7-6. 
With respect to DET, the evidence of this effect is strong in condition FACE_AUDIO but 
there is also a trend in condition FACE_noAUDIO, since here the model estimated a 
negative effect with probability p = .93, but the 90% credible interval included zero. 
Regarding L, the evidence of this effect is weak in condition FACE_noAUDIO but there 
is also a trend in condition FACE_AUDIO, since here the probability that the model 
estimated a negative effect was p = .88. I find this pattern surprising, and it is unclear how 
best to explain this result. 
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Figure 7-12. Estimated probability of success across conditions C3-C6 and across iterations, computed for 
low (-2), mean (0) and high (2) values of RR computed from joint recurrence plots. To see the effect of the 
coordination variable in each condition, the reader should compare the three plots in the same column. To 
see the effect of a given value of the coordination variable across conditions, the reader should compare the 
plots in the same row. Here the joint recurrence plots were computed from the time series indicating the 
pieces being manipulated by the facilitator and the time series indicating the pieces being foveated by the 
learner. To indicate uncertainty, reported values are 100 simulations from the fitted models. Conditions are 
C3_nFnA: noFACE_noAUDIO; C4_FnA: FACE_noAUDIO; C5_nFA: noFACE_AUDIO; C6_FA: 
FACE_AUDIO. 
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Figure 7-13. Estimated probability of success across conditions C3-C6 and across iterations, computed for 
low (-2), mean (0) and high (2) values of DET. computed from joint recurrence plots. To see the effect of 
the coordination variable in each condition, the reader should compare the three plots in the same column. 
To see the effect of a given value of the coordination variable across conditions, the reader should compare 
the plots in the same row. Here the joint recurrence plots were computed from the time series indicating the 
pieces being manipulated by the facilitator and the time series indicating the pieces being foveated by the 
learner. To indicate uncertainty, reported values are 100 simulations from the fitted models. Conditions are 
C3_nFnA: noFACE_noAUDIO; C4_FnA: FACE_noAUDIO; C5_nFA: noFACE_AUDIO; C6_FA: 
FACE_AUDIO. 
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Figure 7-14. Estimated probability of success across conditions C3-C6 and across iterations, computed for 
low (-2), mean (0) and high (2) values of L. computed from joint recurrence plots. To see the effect of the 
coordination variable in each condition, the reader should compare the three plots in the same column. To 
see the effect of a given value of the coordination variable across conditions, the reader should compare the 
plots in the same row. Here the joint recurrence plots were computed from the time series indicating the 
pieces being manipulated by the facilitator and the time series indicating the pieces being foveated by the 
learner. To indicate uncertainty, reported values are 100 simulations from the fitted models. Conditions are 
C3_nFnA: noFACE_noAUDIO; C4_FnA: FACE_noAUDIO; C5_nFA: noFACE_AUDIO; C6_FA: 
FACE_AUDIO. 
In an attempt to understand how this pattern arises from the data, I ran a post-hoc 
model with the same structure as above. The outcome was success and the predictors were 
condition, iteration, the interaction condition x iteration, coordination, and the interaction 
coordination x condition. As always, it also included varying intercepts for task and 
participant. However, this time I included the coordination variables RR, DET, and L, 
extracted from the CRPs produced by pairing the time series of the facilitator looking at 
the camera paired with each time series of the learners looking at his face. Thus, these 
models examine the association between ‘mutual gaze’ (or its equivalent in this situation) 
and learning. I used WAIC to compare each of the three models with the base model 
(which does not include the coordination variable). In the next paragraph, I use the 
subscripts (e.g. RRface) for clarity. 
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According to this comparison, adding the coordination variable did not improve 
prediction accuracy and, examining the estimates, there was no evidence of an effect of 
RRface on the probability of success in any condition. There was, however, some weak 
evidence of effects of DETface, and Lface on success which varied across conditions, 
suggested by the probability that the model estimates a positive or negative effect. The 
posterior distribution of these effects is shown in Figure 7-15. The trend was the 
following. The effect of DETface on success was positive in the two conditions in which 
learners could see the facilitator’ face (FACE_noAUDIO and FACE_AUDIO), which are 
precisely the conditions for which the model above estimated a negative effect of 
DETpieces on success. Moreover, the magnitude of the effect was higher in FACE_AUDIO 
than in FACE_noAUDIO with p = .90. Similarly, the effect of Lface was also positive in 
one of the conditions in which learners could see the facilitator’s face 
(FACE_noAUDIO), for which the model above estimated a negative effect of Lpieces. This 
suggests that the presence of the facilitator’s face affected how learners engaged in the 
task, even if the face in itself cannot inform the learners about the solution to the task. 
 
Figure 7-15. Posterior distribution of the estimated effect of DET (A) or L (B) on success, in each condition. 
In this model, DET and L were extracted from the CRPs produced by pairing the time series of the facilitator 
looking at the camera paired with each time series of the learners looking at his face. The vertical line 
indicates zero. The model tended to estimate a negative effect for condition noFACE_AUDIO, and a 
positive effect for the other conditions. The range of estimated values indicates the uncertainty of the model 
given the data and model assumptions. Conditions are C3_nFnA: noFACE_noAUDIO; C4_FnA: 
FACE_noAUDIO; C5_nFA: noFACE_AUDIO; C6_FA: FACE_AUDIO. 
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7.4 Discussion 
Solving puzzles and watching videos as relational processes 
Participants were invited to solve a set of construction puzzles. After a baseline test, 
participants watched videos in which the facilitator demonstrated the solution to the target 
task, and subsequently attempted to solve it themselves again. This procedure – watching 
a video and having a go at the task – was repeated five times for each of three different 
puzzles. Note that the potential learners did not interact with the facilitator directly. 
Participants received different video stimuli depending on condition. The facilitator’s 
face was either visible or not, and the corresponding audio tracks were either played or 
not. I examined how the different stimuli affected learning and variables which capture 
the real-time behavioural coordination between potential learners and the information 
(sensu meaningful patterns of light and sound) made available by the videos. I also 
examined the association between coordination variables and learning. Following up on 
the previous chapter, this study was used as an opportunity to further explore what it 
means to view social learning from the perspective of developmental systems thinking 
and radical embodied cognitive science. Figure 7-16 represents the learning situation 
produced by the study design, conceived from this perspective, schematically. 
 
Figure 7-16. The learning situation conceived of as a relational developmental process. In each iteration, 
learners have the opportunity to sample and make sense of the environmental information produced by the 
216  Chapter 7 
video showing the facilitator demonstrating how to solve the task. This is followed by an attempt at solving 
the task. 
Watching videos involves coordinating behaviour in real time. 
The video recordings showed the facilitator engaging with the same puzzle which the 
potential learners had just attempted to solve and that they would subsequently 
manipulate once again. When watching the videos, and as a function of their existing 
abilities of perception-action, learners might detect the optical patterns specifying the 
different puzzle pieces and the facilitator’s hands, as well as the optical patterns 
specifying the changes brought about by the manipulations. This may change aspects of 
their task-related abilities and have consequences for their behaviour when they attempt 
the task again. Thus, watching the demonstration videos is here seen, not as a matter of 
acquiring information (sensu represented knowledge) from the facilitator, but rather as a 
matter of sampling and detecting the information (sensu meaningful patterns of light and 
sound) made available by the facilitator, with possible long-lasting (developmental) 
effects in task-related abilities (see Figure 7-16). 
In order to explore environmental information, potential learners must coordinate 
their flow of behaviour and attention to what is happening on the monitor. Here I focused 
on two aspects of this coordination. On the one hand, I examined the coordination 
between the time series of the pieces being manipulated by the facilitator (as shown in 
the videos) and the time series of the pieces being looked at by the potential learners (as 
captured by the eye tracker). On the other hand, I examined the coordination between the 
time series of the facilitator looking at the potential learners’ eyes (more precisely, at the 
camera) and the time series of the learners looking at the facilitator’s eyes (shown in the 
monitor). The assumption here is that these periods of behavioural coordination might 
have persisting effects on the bodily organization of the potential learners, especially in 
the neuronal networks involved in detecting the patterns which specify task-relevant 
features of their situation. These effects might become evident later on when participants 
have another go at the task. For example, learners might perceive relevant aspects which 
they would otherwise have failed to detect, or they might remember which piece they 
should pick up given the current configuration of the partially-solved puzzle. Thus, during 
the observation phase, the facilitator might influence the behavioural flow of the learner 
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indirectly, i.e. by means of a product of his behaviour (the digital media files). The 
learner, however, could not affect the behaviour of the facilitator. 
Learners in all conditions tended to look at precisely those pieces being manipulated 
by the facilitator. The study design attempted to influence this attentional coordination by 
allowing learners to see either the facilitator’s face or face blurred, and by allowing 
learners to either listen to the facilitator’s speech or not. Overall, learners looked more at 
the facilitator’s face when it was visible compared to blurred, and even more if the audio 
was also played. Moreover, this behaviour tended to be triggered in response to the 
facilitator looking ‘at them’ (i.e., at the camera) and seemed to play a motivational role 
since the face is not relevant to solving the task. However, there was no evidence that 
seeing the facilitator’s face, compared to face blurred, affected how leaners coordinated 
their eye movements with respect to the pieces being manipulated by the facilitator. 
Together with the overall high proportion of time spent looking at the pieces, this is 
consistent with the hand-eye coordination route to joint attention suggested by Yu and 
Smith (2013), rather than the more widely studied gaze following route. 
Given that the verbalization produced by a speaker can influence the listener’s 
attention, and given that the facilitator explicitly intended to instruct about the 
manipulations being performed, I predicted that listening to the facilitator’s speech, 
compared to not, should have a positive overall effect on how leaners coordinated their 
eye movements with respect to the pieces being manipulated by the facilitator. There was 
no evidence supporting this. The values of the coordination variables, which indicate how 
learners moved their eyes while watching the demonstration videos, were very similar 
across all trials and across conditions. 
On the other hand, there was some evidence that listening to the facilitator’s speech 
affected eye movements in one condition. When the facilitator’s face was blurred and the 
audio was played, learners synchronized their eye movements with the facilitator’s 
actions progressively more across iterations, but they stayed synchronized for relatively 
shorter periods compared to participants in two other conditions (noFACE_noAUDIO 
and FACE_AUDIO). This suggests that listening to the audio might have prompted 
learners to explore other parts of the screen (thus reducing the similarity in the cross-
recurrences across trials), especially in the initial trials. Thus, it is possible that listening 
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to the facilitator’s speech might influence how learners explore their environments 
visually even if this was not prominent here. In this case, the dynamics of eye movements 
was primarily influenced by the optic information created by the manipulation being 
shown to them, rather than by seeing the facilitator’s face or listening to him speak. 
Solving puzzles involves coordinating behaviour in real time. 
During the test phase, potential learners engaged the task hands-on according to their 
(changing) abilities to perceive-act and in relation to the (changing) spatial configuration 
of the puzzle pieces. As a consequence of the forces thus applied on the pieces, their initial 
spatial arrangement might be transformed in ways we observers may consider the correct 
or incorrect solution. Thus, attempting to solve the puzzles is here seen, not as a matter 
of expressing previously acquired information (sensu represented knowledge) in overt 
behaviour, but rather as a matter of sampling and detecting the information (sensu 
meaningful patterns of light) made available by the pieces and using it to guide task-
relevant manipulative actions in real time, with possible long-lasting (developmental) 
effects in task-related abilities (see Figure 7-16).  
In order to explore environmental information and solve the puzzles, participants 
must coordinate their flow of behaviour and attention in relation to what is happening 
with their bodies and the pieces. However, here I did not examine behavioural 
coordination during the test phase. Rather, I coded participants’ performance in these tests 
and interpreted them as an index of their task-related abilities. The baseline test indicated 
their abilities at the beginning of the learning period. The subsequent tests, following the 
iterative procedure of the study design, were used to capture possible changes in relevant 
body parts (especially neuronal networks) as the activity unfolded. I interpreted 
improvement in performance across trials as indicating, not the acquisition of 
representations, but systematic changes in task-related body parts in the expected 
direction – in other words, learning.  
Behavioural coordination during demonstration affects subsequent task performance 
Participants learned faster when they could not only see the facilitator demonstrate the 
solutions to the tasks but also listen to him talk about it. In addition, participants learned 
relatively slower when they could see the facilitator’s face compared to face blurred 
(although the evidence for this negative effect was weak). By manipulating the puzzles 
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and talking about what he was doing, the facilitator structured the ambient arrays of light 
and sound, thus creating optic and auditory information that was publicly available (see 
Figure 7-16). The learners might detect and make sense of this information according to 
their own existing skills, and possibly use it to guide their own actions when they later 
engage the tasks.  
Looking at precisely the pieces being manipulated by the facilitator should help 
learners perceive the relevant sequence of events that compose the solution to the tasks. 
Therefore, I predicted that learning should be positively associated with variables 
measuring the coordination between the pieces being manipulated by the facilitator and 
the pieces being looked at by the learners. The association between coordination variables 
and performance provided an intriguing set of results, most of it supporting the prediction. 
In general, participants who coordinated their eye movements more, compared to less, 
with the manipulations had a higher probability of success, after we accounted 
(statistically) for the effects of condition and iteration. Similarly, participants who 
synchronized their eye movements more and for longer bouts with the facilitator’s 
actions, compared to less and for shorter bouts, also had a higher probability of success. 
However, this last point was the case only if the facilitator’s face was blurred. When his 
face was clearly visible, on the other hand, the statistical association was reversed: more 
synchronization hampered learning. It remains unclear how to make sense of this pattern. 
I provide one alternative below. 
When the facilitator’s face is blurred, learners can focus on sampling the optic 
information made available by his actions with the puzzle pieces. In the current context, 
it seems sensible to suggest that looking at precisely those pieces being manipulated 
should allow learners to detect relevant aspects of the situation as it evolves in time, and 
this should be beneficial to learning. When the face is visible, this general reasoning still 
applies. However, the presence of the face and, especially, the facilitator’s behaviour of 
‘looking at’ the learner, changes the context. Consider the evidence. On the one hand, 
performance tended to be lower when the face was visible compared to blurred. Thus, the 
presence of the face in the field of view might have distracted the learners somewhat from 
the demonstration. On the other hand, in those conditions where the facilitator’s face was 
visible, learners who responded by ‘looking back’ tended to have a higher probability of 
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success compared to those who did not. I speculated that this behaviour might indicate 
motivation and commitment to the task. 
Thus, it seems that, in the cases where the face is visible, attending too much at the 
pieces – thus synchronizing more (DET) and for longer (L) – indicates the participants 
were less engaged. It might be that their eyes are just moving towards the movement 
specified in the optic array, which is known to capture the attention of the eyes (Mital, 
Smith, Hill, & Henderson, 2011). Note that this explanation does not make sense in the 
conditions in which the face was blurred, since in these cases participants only very rarely 
looked at the blurred blob and this did not correlate with performance. The trend of a 
positive effect of DETface on success, precisely in the conditions where the face was 
visible, seem to be consistent with this suggestion. 
Learning socially: not transmission, but development 
The learning situation produced by the study design involved unidirectional influence 
from the facilitator to the potential learners. This unidirectional influence, however, 
should not be confused as indicating a linear transmission of information (sensu 
represented knowledge) from facilitator to learners. Rather, it indicates an asymmetry. 
On the one hand, the facilitator makes information (sensu meaningful patterns of light 
and sound) available for the potential learners who, in turn, must detect and make sense 
of it on their own, possibly changing (i.e. developing) their task-solving ability as a result. 
In contrast, the environmental information made available by the learners’ presence and 
behaviour during this period cannot possibly influence the facilitator. 
Although listening to the verbal instructions did facilitate learning, in this case it 
did not affect how leaners coordinated their eye movements with respect to the pieces 
being manipulated by the facilitator. Authors working within the currently dominant 
approach might be tempted to interpret these results as supporting the view of social 
learning as transmission of information (sensu represented knowledge). They might do 
so by arguing that one of the main roles of speech is to transmit ‘knowledge’ (e.g., Csibra 
& Gergely, 2009) and that the behavioural coordination involving mutual responsiveness 
(one aspect of communication that I have been emphasizing in this thesis) is only 
marginally important to social learning. I agree that speech may be used to ‘communicate 
knowledge’ in the sense that listeners might interpret what they hear in ways consistent 
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with what the speaker intended to convey. However, this need not imply a commitment 
to the view of social learning as transmission of information (sensu represented 
knowledge). Although this study was not designed to investigate this in detail, anecdotal 
evidence suggests a possible explanation for speech having a positive effect on learning 
and virtually no effect on coordination, in line with the current view. During debriefing, 
one participant spontaneously suggested that she tried to memorize what the facilitator 
said and later, when she was engaging with the task, she would follow the instructions as 
she remembered them. This suggests a plausible hypothesis for the role of memory in 
cases of social learning involving speech worth examining in further studies. Consider 
that the narrative structure of the verbal instructions correlates in real time with the 
narrative structure of the demonstration itself (see Appendix). Both imply the same 
history of transformations in which the initial situation (puzzle pieces scattered on the 
desk) becomes, through a flow of manipulative behaviours, the final situation (puzzle 
pieces forming the desired structure). The verbal instructions provide learners with a 
description of which pieces are relevant at some period and which actions they are 
involved in at each step. The suggestion is that participants might later re-enact this 
sequence of instructions as they remember it and use it to guide their own attention and 
behaviour in real time. Remembering is here understood, not in terms of retrieving data 
structures stored in a computer-like memory, but in terms of how (auditory) experience 
can have lasting (developmental) effects in the individual’s ability to simulate similar 
(auditory) experience in the future. The suggestion is that this simulating auditory 
experience involves enacting dynamical patterns of neurophysiological activity that may 
constrain (reduce the degrees of freedom of) other components of the ongoing global 
neurophysiological activity and, therefore, the individual’s behavioural flow. 
Remembering (simulating auditory perception of) the verbal instructions might explain 
the positive effect of audio on learning in this case without systematic differences in eye 
movements across conditions. Future work should investigate the roles remembering, 
planning, and imagining, play across different cases of learning socially in ways 
consistent with a radical embodiment perspective. 
Characterizing social influences on learning in the current case 
Watching video recordings of the facilitator performing demonstrations gave participants 
the opportunity to embody implicit knowledge about solving a set of puzzles. In Chapter 
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5, I suggested three criteria to clarify the scope of any study of social learning. With 
regard to the time scale, here I focused on learning that might occur within the short time 
scale of several minutes. With regard to the spatial scale, the learning situation unfolded 
within a lab-based, controlled environment. The main components under analysis were 
the learners, the task and supporting materials, and the stimuli playing the role of ‘social 
influence’. With regard to the learning outcome, this study focused on skill learning by 
using a set of construction puzzles as the target task. 
I also suggested five criteria to clarify the ‘social influence’ under scrutiny. With 
regard to the general role played by the facilitator in the learning process, here the 
facilitator engaged in the same task in which the learner was judged, thus acting as a 
demonstrator. Only the facilitator could influence the learner, thus the influence was 
unidirectional (from facilitator to learner). The learner did not interact with the facilitator 
in real time but rather with recorded videos, thus the influence was indirect. However, 
given the use of recorded videos, the stimuli created flowing optic arrays similar to what 
would be available if the learners watched the demonstrations live. With regard to their 
prior intentions, the facilitator explicitly intended his behaviour to promote learning, and 
the learners explicitly committed to attempt learning the task. In conclusion, this study 
focused on one example of how learning can be influenced by the presence and behaviour 
of others around us. From the perspective of radical embodiment, this process is 
understood in terms of the facilitator influencing how learners engage with the task at 
hand and, in so doing, how learners might transform their existing skills. This is an 
alternative to saying that the facilitator transmits knowledge or representations to them. 
Focusing on coordination explicitly and quantitatively might improve our understanding 
of this broad class of phenomena. This study provided some conceptual, methodological 
and analytical tools in this direction.
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Chapter 8 General Discussion 
This thesis set out to outline a novel way of thinking about social learning that was 
motivated by a set of critical developments across relevant disciplines. The previous 
chapters explored ideas from developmental systems theory, radical embodied cognitive 
science, as well as process and relational thinking, and also reported empirical studies 
examining behavioural/attentional coordination and its relation to social learning. In this 
final chapter, I will first provide a summary of findings. I will then discuss why the 
metaphor of transmission of information fails to capture important aspects of the 
phenomena of interest, and provide an alternative. I will then suggest areas for future 
work before concluding. 
8.1 Summary of findings 
References to ‘information’ are ubiquitous in the literature on social learning, usually in 
three variations: genetic information, asocial information, and social or cultural 
information. Therefore, I attempted to clarify the different meanings that the term might 
acquire, especially in the context of development and behaviour (Chapters 2 to 5). 
Crucially, the statement that ‘situation A might carry information about situation B’ was 
understood in terms of lawful or normative constraints that hold between A and B 
(Barwise & Perry, 1981; Devlin, 2006; Dretske, 1981; Israel & Perry, 1990). However, 
in this sense, there was no ground to justify the view that genetic information corresponds 
to “a set of instructions” or “a recipe” for how to make the organism (Maynard Smith, 
2000, p. 187). On the other hand, reference to ‘information’ in the context of behaviour 
and social learning commonly indicates a representational-computational view of 
cognition. Here, the term is used colloquially in the sense of mental representations, 
considered to be analogous to computer data structures (Thagard, 2014). 
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To avoid the nature-culture distinction, along with the associated distinctions 
nature-nurture, biology-culture, body-mind, individual-society, I attempted an original 
integration of developmental systems theory, radical embodied cognitive science, and 
relational thinking. The overall strategy consisted in conceiving of biological and 
behavioural form as being continually produced within a developmental system, 
considered as a network of causal relations among processes unfolding in time. 
Depending on the focus of interest, this network of causal influences might be 
provisionally dissected in different ways, giving prominence to some components or 
processes while leaving others in the background. In Chapters 6 and 7, for example, I 
focused on the learner, the facilitator, and the materials and objects involved in the 
respective activity, as composing the developmental system under scrutiny. 
Chapters 3 focused on ontogeny – the entire lifespan of an organism – conceived of 
as a historical (dynamical), relational, constructive and contingent process in which a 
zygote or a corresponding initial configuration persists under transformation until it 
eventually dies. Chapter 4 focused on behaviour as one aspect of the flow of ontogeny. 
Behaviour was understood, not in terms of computation with representations, but in terms 
of the dynamic pattern produced by the entire animal-environment system. The related 
notions of ‘environmental information’, ‘affordance’, and ‘ability’ were used to make 
sense of how animals can perceive and act upon their environment. Environmental 
information refers to meaningful patterns that appear in the ambient arrays of light, sound, 
chemicals, etc. (J. J. Gibson, 1979/2015). These patterns are meaningful in the sense that 
they are linked to other aspects of the world by lawful or normative constraints and can 
therefore inform the skilful animal about them. 
Some of the information available in the environmental situation is especially 
relevant for behaviour because it specifies opportunities for action or affordances. 
Affordances refer to what abilities animals might exercise, given the situation in which 
they find themselves. Abilities refer to what animals might perceive and do, given their 
bodily organization and the affordances currently present. I accepted the suggestion by 
Chemero (2009) to view abilities and affordances dynamically rather than as properties 
of the environment (Turvey et al., 1981), and I argued for the need to include intentions 
in the picture. Instead of saying that behaviour is the expression of information (sensu 
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represented knowledge) stored and processed in the nervous system, I suggested that the 
flow of behaviour, i.e. the lived sequence of perception-action events, results from the 
dynamic, real-time interplay of (1) the current (changing) affordances of the environment; 
(2) the current (changing) abilities of the animal; (3) the (more or less specific) intentions 
of the animal (or, alternatively, differences in the valence associated with aspects of the 
environment); and (4) random or unpredictable fluctuations. Learning was then defined 
in terms of developmental changes in the body parts involved in abilities, especially, but 
not restricted to, relevant neuromuscular networks and the coordination dynamics they 
may produce.  
Chapter 5 focused on living and learning socially. Animals commonly live within 
multispecies communities. Therefore, the environmental information created by the 
presence and behaviour of one animal is publicly available and might be detected by 
other, skilful animals. Thus, animals may influence each other’s behaviour as they go 
about living within a common environment. Moreover, because animals might be 
mutually sensitive to each other’s presence and behaviour, they might become 
mechanically or informationally coupled for some period of time. If the behaviour of one 
animal is systematically influenced by another animal, this might have developmental 
consequences for that animal’s abilities. These cases are captured by the broad notion of 
social learning as “learning that is facilitated by observation of, or interaction with, 
another individual (or its products)” (Hoppitt & Laland, 2013, p. 4). Thus, consistent with 
a view of ontogeny as a historical (dynamical), relational, constructive and contingent 
process, I argued that learning is not about acquiring ‘information’ or representations 
relevant to the target task, and social learning is not about acquiring ‘cultural 
information.’ Instead, learning, and learning socially, are here seen as possible material 
consequences of relational developmental processes. More specifically, learning denotes 
a change in relevant body parts (e.g. bones, joints, muscles, neuronal networks) 
underlying some ability of interest. We observers might infer that such changes have 
occurred by comparing the individual’s performance in some test before and after the 
‘learning’ period under consideration. I suggest this (meta)theoretical orientation allows 
us to investigate how living together may influence the flow of behaviour and the 
development of abilities without committing to distinguishing ‘culture’ as a source of 
representations or as a domain fundamentally distinct from ‘biology’. 
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Chapters 6 and 7 corresponded to the empirical part of this project, which provided 
case studies used to apply the way of thinking about social learning developed in the 
previous chapters. In Chapter 6, I examined a joint making activity and explored 
analytical tools to capture the dynamical constitution of coupled attention and its 
association with learning. In Chapter 7, the task was defined in such a way as to allow for 
better control and a finer spatiotemporal resolution, however at the cost of losing the 
bidirectional influence that depends on the real-time interaction between individuals. I 
used these studies as opportunities to practice an alternative way of thinking and writing 
about social learning consistent with the (meta)theoretical framework put forward in the 
previous chapters. The phenomena of interest were described and explained, not in terms 
of genetic or cultural information but in terms of ecological information and the 
transformation of abilities consequent on experience. The influence observed from 
facilitator to learner was described, not in terms of the transmission of information (sensu 
represented knowledge) but in terms of the creation of environmental information (sensu 
meaningful patterns of light and sound), the coordination of the learner’s behaviour in 
relation to this information, and the association between this coordination and learning. 
Both studies provided quantitative evidence that behavioural coordination is associated 
with learning. 
8.2 Social learning: not transmission, but development 
The metaphor of ‘transmission of information’ is ubiquitous in the dominant literature on 
social learning and using it might indeed simplify the verbal description of what is going 
on in a given case. Some authors might find this strategy especially useful when 
examining larger spatiotemporal scales such as the ‘passing on’ of knowledge across 
several generations rather than between two individuals. Transmission talk might also 
sound reasonable in studies of large-scale populational processes using computational 
algorithms in which the target behaviour is modelled by variables involved in iterative 
‘copy-paste’ procedures. However, I have been arguing against the transmission 
metaphor throughout this thesis. Figure 8-1 shows two schematic representations of 
social learning conceived of as a process of transmission and as a process of relational 
development. In addition, Figure 8-2 shows additional aspects of the common 
environment in which the facilitator and the learner live together. This is intended to 
highlight the broader material context in which social learning may occur. 
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Figure 8-1. Schematic representation of social learning conceived of as a process of transmission of 
‘information’ (A) and as a relational developmental process (B). 
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Figure 8-2. Schematic representation of social learning conceived of as a relational developmental process, 
with additional aspects of the facilitator’s and learner’s common environment explicitly indicated. 
I want to highlight four major problems with the transmission metaphor. The first 
problem is that transmission talk is commonly associated with a representational view of 
the mind, which is rejected here. From the perspective being put forward, knowledge is 
not conceived of as being contained in mental representations. Rather, knowledge is 
conceived in relational and dynamical terms, as being supported by the material 
components of the individual’s body (e.g., bones, joints, neuromuscular networks) and 
the temporally extended relations they may enter with task-relevant aspects of their 
environment as a function of their biomechanical and coordinative properties. The bodily 
components associated with knowledge cannot be ‘transmitted’ from one individual to 
another, since each individual must develop their own body parts. Thus, I find it difficult 
to make sense of theoretical statements such as that novel actions can, in some cases of 
social learning, be “acquired by the observer directly through observation” (Hoppitt & 
Laland, 2013, p. 73). 
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The transmission metaphor stems from the mathematical theory of communication, 
which involves a notion of information as reduction of uncertainty (Shannon, 1948a, 
1948b). I suggest it is possible to use the term information consistently, in the context of 
social learning, even when avoiding the transmission metaphor. This can be done by using 
the notion of ecological information (J. J. Gibson, 1979/2015). Thus, rather than saying 
that the facilitator transmits information (sensu represented knowledge) to the learner, we 
might say (1) that the presence and behaviour of the facilitator creates environmental 
information (sensu meaningful patterns in the environment) that becomes publicly 
available and (2) that the learner, constrained by his or her current abilities, might pick 
up and use this environmental information to guide the flow of behaviour. As a 
consequence of this relational process, some aspects of the organization of the learner’s 
body persist while other aspects might change systematically affecting his or her abilities 
as we observers detect them. The transmission metaphor does not capture this non-
representational notion of knowledge and how it can be ‘passed on’ as a consequence of 
a relational history.  
A similar argument involves communication. I agree that humans may use speech, 
and other inscriptive practices such as written text, diagrams, and artefacts, to 
communicate what they know about the world. However, in communication (verbal, 
written, pictorial, and so on), the facilitator is not ‘transmitting’ knowledge in any 
material sense, but rather creating environmental information in the sense of patterns of 
light, sound, surfaces, chemicals, and so on. Potential learners may detect some of these 
patterns. When detecting these patterns, rather than having knowledge transmitted to 
them, ready to use, potential learners must make sense of what they see, hear, touch, etc., 
according to their own abilities to perceive, act, imagine, remember, plan, and so on, that 
they developed thus far. 
The second major problem with the transmission metaphor is that it neglects mutual 
sensitivity in facilitating-learning relations. In cases involving bidirectional influence, the 
target learner may detect and respond to the behaviour of the facilitator, and the facilitator 
may detect and respond to the behaviour of the learner, as they keep on living together. 
As a result of their historical interaction, their bodies might change systematically. This 
mutual sensitivity brings about a history of nonlinear causal influences not captured by 
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the idea of linear transmission. In their influential work on teaching in nonhuman animals, 
Caro and Hauser (1992) acknowledge that facilitators might behave differently in the 
presence or absence of the learners. However, they explicitly chose to neglect the issue 
of sensitivity because they believe that, “from an evolutionary perspective that focuses 
on the effects of teaching, there is no a priori reason why one should necessarily expect 
more or less sensitive mechanisms to have a greater or lesser effect on the reproduction 
and survival of the pupil” (Caro & Hauser, 1992, p. 155). Here I chose not to neglect the 
importance of sensitivity and examined it in terms of bidirectional coordination 
established and sustained throughout the activity. The empirical study reported in chapter 
6 explored ways to capture bidirectional coordination for quantitative analysis and 
provided evidence of statistical association between coordination measures and learning 
outcome. 
The third major problem with this metaphor is that it supports an artificial 
distinction between teaching-related behaviour (‘sending the information’) and learning-
related behaviour (‘receiving the information’) as logically independent or “orthogonal 
to each other” (Hoppitt et al., 2008). Here I offered an alternative account of the relation 
between teaching and social learning. More specifically, teaching-related behaviour and 
learning-related behaviour are seen as complementary aspects of a single history of co-
regulation of behaviour involving the facilitator and the learner. On the one hand, the 
facilitator is sensitive to what the learner is doing and behaves with the (more or less 
specific) intention to teach. On the other hand, the learner is influenced by what the 
facilitator is doing and might change as a result. Thus, teaching-learning relations form a 
subset of the broader class of facilitating-learning relations. 
The fourth major problem with the transmission metaphor is that it fails to capture 
the causal roles played by tools and materials, such as in learning through making 
together. Through their behaviour, animals are able to alter their environment by making 
things and may indeed be able to imagine the desired form and plan their course of action 
more or less precisely, according to their previous experience. Imagining and planning 
are here understood in dynamical terms, as simulated experience of perception-action that 
may constrain the ongoing activity of neuromuscular networks, including those more 
directly associated with the occurring overt behaviour. On the one hand, imagining, 
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planning, perceiving, and acting, play causal roles in the transformation of materials-
becoming-artefact. On the other hand, in a making activity, the tools and materials 
effectively become part of the maker’s developmental system, thus influencing the 
unfolding history of causal relations according to their physicochemical properties. 
Therefore, making can be conceived of as unfolding within a relational, developmental 
process in which the makers, the tools, and the materials, affect each other in a seamless 
history of material, causal relations. As a result of these causal relations, the materials 
might change in their composition, physicochemical properties, and spatial arrangement, 
and become new things. The bodies of the makers might also change in their composition, 
biomechanical and coordinative properties, and spatial arrangement, and support new 
abilities. Making, therefore, is a form-generating process, and this applies to the artefact 
as well as to the makers. Learning through making, as a history of transformation 
involving both persistence and change in materials and in body parts, can thus be seen as 
nested within the individual’s ontogeny.  
In sum, what links the facilitator and the learner is not a communication channel 
transmitting signals carrying some amount of information. Rather, the unskilled 
individual becomes the skilled individual in a history of persistence and change of the 
individual’s entire developmental system. This developmental process might involve uni- 
or bidirectional influences relative to the facilitator as well as the (changing) material 
surroundings. 
8.2.1 Categories of social learning as genres of developmental histories 
Social learning refers to a historical achievement of a set of mutually constraining 
processes, including the facilitator, the learner, and relevant aspects of their common 
environment. Therefore, similar to how sets of literary or film works can be categorized 
within different literary or film genres, I suggest categories of social learning might be 
best understood as denoting genres of developmental narratives rather than mechanisms 
of transmission of ‘information.’ In other words, a category of social learning refers to a 
set of ontogenetic trajectories that share family resemblance according to some criteria. 
What these criteria should be is a matter of theoretical debate. In Chapter 5, I suggested 
these criteria might include the time scale, the spatial scale, and the learning outcome of 
interest; the role of the environmental information made available by the facilitator; 
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whether the facilitator performs the target task or does something else; whether the 
influence between facilitator and learner is unidirectional or bidirectional; whether the 
influence is direct (by means of real-time behavioural coupling) or indirect (by means of 
persisting changes in the environment); and the intentions of those involved. Further work 
could examine this suggestion in more detail, e.g. with the intention to produce a 
principled classification scheme. This might improve our theoretical understanding of 
social learning processes because of the problems with the current typologies indicated 
in Chapter 5. 
8.3 Further work 
8.3.1 Theoretical questions 
Further work should focus on advancing the theoretical integration initiated here. 
Throughout the thesis, I indicated work by social anthropologists produced from a 
relational perspective. It will be important to engage in further dialogue with this literature 
more explicitly as each might have insights to offer to the other. 
One of the challenges commonly made to those advocating for radical embodied 
cognitive science is to provide a more robust account of so-called higher cognitive 
abilities such as intending, planning, remembering, or imagining. It is commonly assumed 
that it is difficult, if not impossible, for animals to do these things without representing 
the world around them and manipulating these representations in computational 
algorithms. For those interested in advancing radical embodied cognitive science, it is of 
central importance to explore ways to think and talk about the processes indicated by 
terms such as intending, planning, remembering, and imagining, which have traditionally 
been regarded as involving mental representations. For example, rather than viewing 
memory as the retrieval of represented knowledge, I suggest we focus on planning and 
remembering as activities in which the individual simulates perceptual experience. This 
is consistent with Gibson’s hypothesis that “a perceptual system that has become 
sensitized to certain invariants and can extract them from the stimulus flux can also 
operate without the constraints of the stimulus flux” (J. J. Gibson, 1979/2015, p. 244). 
There is currently exciting work being produced in this direction (Bruineberg, Chemero, 
& Rietveld, 2018; Juarrero, 1999; Kiverstein & Rietveld, 2018). The context of social 
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learning provides excellent opportunities to explore activities involving ‘higher’ 
cognition from the current perspective. 
8.3.2 Methodological questions 
It is reasonably straightforward to use cross recurrence quantification analysis to examine 
the coordination between two time series (e.g., one representing a facilitator and another 
the target learner). However, oftentimes learning involves situations in which larger 
groups of people (and other animals) interact in real time. It is less straightforward to 
envision how to apply this methodology to such cases. Thus, it would also be important 
to invest in further work focusing on advancing relevant methodology that might be used 
to study behavioural coordination in larger groups.  
In chapter 4, I explicitly included the intentions of the individual as one process 
causally involved in producing the flow of behaviour. In chapter 5, I argued that future 
work should focus on proposing operational criteria to identify the different intentions 
constraining the behaviour of facilitators and learners in specific cases of social learning. 
With this in mind, I suggest future work might focus on proposing and testing 
methodology that might be used to infer the intentions associated with teaching- and 
learning-related behaviour. This would be particularly helpful to those interested in 
conducting comparative studies of teaching-learning relations. 
8.3.3 Empirical questions 
Further empirical work might use cross recurrence quantification analysis (or other 
analytical tools) to systematically examine variation in coordination variables produced 
by sets of dyads, or larger groups if possible, engaging together in what might be 
described as ‘the same’ (or relatively similar) learning contexts. For example, we might 
examine how learners from different age groups, and/or from different historical 
backgrounds, coordinate their behaviour during a situation we might call ‘intentional 
demonstration’ (e.g., similar to the subtask TOOL_DEMO in the joint making activity 
reported in Chapter 6) or ‘assisted practice’ (e.g. similar to the subtask TOOL_USE in 
the same study). Additionally, we might examine the association between the 
coordination produced during such periods and measures of performance in a subsequent 
‘practice’ period. 
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In addition, we might investigate whether participants engaging in different 
learning situations produce systematically different patterns of coordination. From a 
comparative perspective, we might investigate how individuals from different species 
(say, humans and other primates) coordinate their behaviour in what might be described 
as ‘the same’ (or a relatively similar) learning context such as ‘intentional demonstration,’ 
‘incidental (unintentional) demonstration,’ or ‘assisted practice’. If different learning 
categories do indeed produce systematically different signatures of coordination, this 
knowledge might later be used to provide evidence about what might be going on in novel 
cases. 
8.4 Conclusion 
This project was motivated by a dissatisfaction with the dominant view that “we are 
largely what our genes and our culture make us” (Richerson & Boyd, 2005, p. 6), 
notwithstanding however intricately these factors might be said to ‘interact’ to produce 
the individual person or animal. The alternative endorsed here is to think of form – 
including the form of the organism, the form of individual behaviour, and the form of 
group-level patterns of behaviour – as persisting under historical transformations rather 
than being imposed, expressed, or transmitted, and to investigate the form-generating 
processes involved in the appearance and historical transformation of the phenomena of 
interest. 
The distinction between a domain of nature and a domain of culture or society has 
been under criticism within the social sciences for decades (Descola & Pálsson, 1996; 
Geertz, 1973; Ingold, 2000, 2011a; Ingold & Pálsson, 2013; Latour, 1993; Lévi-Strauss, 
1966; Stengers, 2000; Toren, 2012). This criticism is directed to a set of so-called Modern 
oppositions including biology-culture, body-mind, and individual-society. Similarly, the 
distinction between a domain of nature (biology, genes, innate, instinct) and a domain of 
nurture (culture, environment, acquired, learned) has also been under criticism within the 
biological sciences for decades (Gottlieb, 1976, 1997, 2007; Keller, 2010; Kuo, 1967; 
Lehrman, 1953, 1970; Lewontin, 1983; Oyama, 1985/2000, 2000b, 2015; Oyama et al., 
2001). Within the cognitive sciences, the distinctions between the body and the mind, and 
between the organism and the environment have also been under criticism for decades 
(Chemero, 2009; E. J. Gibson & Pick, 2000; J. J. Gibson, 1966, 1979/2015; Kelso, 1995; 
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Thelen & Smith, 1994; Thompson, 2007; Van Gelder, 1995; Varela et al., 1991).In this 
thesis, I explored what difference it might make to accept these criticisms and take the 
positive alternatives they suggest as a starting point to the study of social learning. 
In conclusion, this thesis contributes to the field of social learning by suggesting a 
new way of thinking about the relations among ontogeny, cognition, behaviour, the 
behavioural coordination enabled by living socially, and social learning. This way of 
thinking is consistent with critical theoretical and philosophical developments that are 
currently neglected in the field. This thesis also endorses and contributes to the field of 
radical embodied cognitive science by discussing theoretical connections with other areas 
of research, critically discussing the metaphor of transmission of information, clarifying 
terminology (such as the use of the term ‘information’), and suggesting areas for future 
research. While many points raised here must be further clarified and their implications 
more fully discussed, the present perspective suggests an exciting direction that might 
improve our understanding of how we live and learn socially. 
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Appendix: Transcription of instructions (Chapter 7) 
Transcriptions of the verbal instructions given by the facilitator for each task in the study 
reported in chapter 7. These instructions were presented as auditory stimulus for 
participants in conditions noVIDEO_AUDIO, noFACE_AUDIO, and FACE_AUDIO. 
Star puzzle: To complete the star puzzle, you have six identical pieces. Begin by placing 
two pieces side by side. Balance the second piece on top of the first. The 
third piece should be placed on opposite sides to create a mirror image. 
Now carefully lift each segment holding the three pieces together. Rotate 
one segment slightly so that they fit together, and you are done. 
Egg puzzle: To complete the egg puzzle, you have two large pieces, two solid-centred 
pieces, four hollow-centred pieces, and a solid column. Begin by placing a 
large piece in the palm of your hand, and then balancing the two solid-
centred pieces facing each other. Then place the second large piece on the 
top. Place the puzzle on its end and balance two of the hollow-centred pieces 
with the hollow facing up. Then turn the puzzle upside down and place the 
two remaining hollow-centred pieces with the hollow facing up. To complete 
the puzzle, insert the solid central column; and you are done. 
Barrel puzzle: To complete the barrel puzzle, you have two large pieces, two C-shaped 
pieces, two E-shaped pieces, two side pieces, two top pieces, an asymmetric 
‘C’, and a bar. To begin, place the C-shaped pieces into the centre of the 
large pieces and bring the two halves together. Slide one of the E-shaped 
pieces from the top, turn the puzzle upside down, and slide in the other E-
shaped piece. You will have a large hole and a small hole. Grip the side of 
the small hole and pull. Position one of the side pieces and the asymmetric 
‘C’ so that the large section is at the bottom. Place one of the top pieces so 
that the central bar aligns with the others. Then lock these pieces into place. 
Position the other side piece and turn the puzzle upside down. Enter the bar 
half way and then bring the bar and the remaining piece together, and you 
are done. 
 
